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  In this dissertation, I primarily examine the power complex formed by the 
People/the peoples, the Chinese state and the West, particularly its embodiment before 
the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games. This dissertation will adopt Giorgio Agamben’s 
theorizing of People/peoples to map the dialectical power dynamics through which 
the state sovereign of China tended to reinforced itself through hosting the Beijing 
Games. In addition, by engaging critical theories of cultural studies, I hope to avoid 
structural formalism caused by relying on one particular theory. Thus, by bringing 
post-colonial theories, theories of intersectionality, theories of transnational feminism 
and theories of globalization together, I want to capture the role discurs vely played 
by the West that shape and reshapes the People/the peoples.  
  The focus of my empirical study is the People/the people. Each chapter 
explores one group of individuals – the peoples confined by constructed identities. 
According to Agamben, the People/the peoples are nothing but pure construction by 
the power of the state. Although the People/the peoples are sometimes “fragmentary 
multiplicity of needy and excluded bodies” (Agamben, 1998), it is often th  case that 
the People/the peoples resist the power, acquire new subjectivities, and even actively 
engage in power negotiation with the state and the West. In this sense, the People/the 
peoples are not what Agamben theorized “bare life” that can only unconditionally 
subject themselves to the power. Instead, they carry the potential to disrupt power 
construction by forming transcendental subjectivity.  
  Following Andrews’ (2008) suggestion of embracing Physical Cultural Study, 
I employ a variety of qualitative methodologies to articulate the dynamic power 
complex. By doing so, I hope to make my limited contribution to breaking the 
confines that the power used to construct the People/the peoples, and possibly leading 
China to its proper place in this cosmopolitan world.
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Chapter One: Introduction 
DESIRING DESIRES – WEAVING AN OLYMPIC DREAM 
  In May 2008, a documentary film called Dream Weaver 2008 was released in 
China. The director of the film, Gu Jun, dedicated seven years and collected a huge 
amount of materials on how Chinese people prepared for the 2008 Beijing Olympic 
Games. Quoting the director’s words from one of her television interviews: 
The purpose of this film was to provide a small footnote for 1.3 billion 
Chinese people who were weaving their dreams in the past seven years by 
using the Beijing Olympic Games as one of the threads.  
As the only film produced in China for the Beijing Games, Dream Weaver 2008 was 
appraised by the Chinese official media as a contemporary epic for the nation. Unlike 
other documentaries that follow one narrative thread, the film juxtaposes six 
seemingly unrelated stories and addresses six different groups of people 
simultaneously.  
The first story was about the National Stadium, the so-called Bird’s Nest. It 
covered advertising for stadium designs, screening of submitted plans, finalizing the 
ultimate plan, and overcoming various technical and engineering obstacles during the 
construction. The design of the stadium went through many rounds of a strict 
selection process because the stadium was to be a symbol representing the Chines  
culture in this global age. The architectural expression has to be culturally Chinese as 
well as cosmopolitan.  
The second story is about urban relocation. Residents of a suburban village, 
2 
 
Wa Li Xiang, moved to modern high-rise subsidized by a large amount of financial 
relocation compensation. On the site of their homes, the Bird’s Nest and the Olympic 
Park were to be built. One relocated family was chosen by the director of the film to 
represent generational disparities – a young couple was excited about moving to a 
modern flat; their parents were nostalgic to maintain their old life-styl . However, this 
generational conflict did not prevent them from working for the Beijing Games as 
volunteers all together.  
The third story is about security policemen in Beijing. Throughout the seven 
years prior to the Games, policemen experienced rigorous training in order to be 
prepared to secure the Games. The fourth story is about well-known hurdler Liu 
Xiang who won gold medal in Athens and continued training to compete for the gold 
medal in the Beijing Olympics. The last story is about selecting and tr ining youth 
female gymnasts for the Beijing Games. More than several hundreds of young
gymnasts went to Beijing as candidates in 2002, only a tiny fraction of these 
candidates was selected to be on the national team. Six years later, only six f 
candidates represented China and competed in the Beijing Games. However, all of 
these gymnasts hold an Olympic dream.  
According to the director, the film was originally named Marching to 2008. 
Although she felt that the word “March” could be perceived to reflect a political sense 
and would not embody the strong desire of the Chinese people to host the Games. The 
desire of a group may be ideological or even arbitrarily imposed; but the desire of the 
individuals, called a dream, should be enabling and spontaneous. The title “Dream 
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Weaver” embodies not only the passion of the Chinese people towards the Games, but 
of the great efforts made by them to make their dreams come true. Not surprisingly, 
besides downplaying a nationalist tone, “Dream Weaver” also implies another layer of 
meaning – certain dreams just would not come true regardless of how much effort was 
made. For instance, in the documentary, three talented gymnasts managed to retain on 
the national team after rounds of competition. Tragically, one of them severely injured 
her hip at the end of 2006 and ended her gymnastics career forever. Playing out a 
dream infers linking imagined and desired objectives with tangible things of the real 
world. The ending might be pure ecstasy, hapless desperation or reconciliati  with a 
harsh reality. Nevertheless, it does not stop one from weaving a thread of the Beijing
Games into one’s life trajectory.  
After Beijing won the bid to host the 2008 Olympic Games in 2001, the 
media claimed that through the Games, China would march into a brand new era. 
Seven years later, this type of optimistic and nationalist discourse is still lingering in 
media. But the Games itself no longer is just associated with national discourse, b t 
has been incorporated into the daily practices of millions of Chinese. I witnessed how 
athletes with disabilities picture their dreams: “…if our team can win the national 
championship, we will go to Seoul for another game next August. If we manage to 
win that game as well, then you will definitely see us in 2008!” I also witnessed 
others projecting their dreams:  
“Regardless successful or not, the Games will bring a more promising  
  China.”  
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“After the Games, the housing price will go down;”  
“The Games will re-position China in the world;” 
“Chinese athletes will win more gold medals and bring more glory to the  
  nation,”  
“The Games will make the city more open and accessible,”  
“The Game will bring more opportunities to Beijing, and perhaps myself a 
  better career,”  
“The Games will bring tons of tourists and tons of business to Beijing.”  
  Entering a new global age, Chinese people are no longer subordinated to the 
state ideologies that suffocate all alternatives other than a communist veracular 
culture. Once freed from the suffocating culture promoted by the state, they soon 
devote themselves to making a new national culture that can better accommodate their 
own interests and desires.  
Although the Olympic Games is generally considered as a pivotal strategic 
response of cities or states to the exigencies of globalization (see Black & Westhuizen, 
2004), the political dialectics elicited by the Games goes beyond marketing power, 
global political order and national identity. The Olympic Games is not just a 
beneficiary strategy used by the “semi-peripheral” polities and cities to attract global 
capitals and media attention, and is not just a survival tool used by the authorities and 
regimes to divert critical attention generated by the public. For the public, hosting the 
Olympic Games is not only about refreshing subjective memories of personal and 
national past, but about acquiring new identities, fulfilling personal desires, and 
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attaching new meanings to the subjective self in this more globalized world, or in Gu 
Jun’s words – weaving a dream. Therefore, the Games is not only a collective and 
nationalistic project but also an artful representation of personal desires in people’s 
daily life.  
ABHORRING THE ABHORRENT –MAKING A NEW COSMOPOLITANISM 
 “Exporting humane value,” a phrase that Chinese people got very familiar 
with in 2008, actually resulted from an Olympic Games-related media cris s. On 
December 28th 2007, the sports channel (CCTV-5) of the China Central Television 
(CCTV) held a nationally broadcast ceremony to temporarily change its name to 
Olympic channel. During the ceremony, Hu Ziwei, a famous television anchorman, 
appeared on the ceremonial stage unexpectedly and condemned her unfaithful 
husband Zhang Bin, who is one of the most well-known sportscasters in China and 
the host of the ceremony. Rather than criticizing Zhang directly, Hu made a seemingly 
irrelevant announcement: 
As the wife of Mr. Zhang Bin, rather than in my normal role as a TV 
anchorman, I would like all of you to spare me a minute. Today is a special 
day for The Olympic Channel, and it’s a special day for Mr. Zhang Bin, and 
for me it’s a special day too. Because just two hours ago I found out that, 
besides me, Mr. Zhang Bin has been maintaining an improper relationship 
with another woman.  
Next year is an Olympic year, and all eyes will be watching China. But as a 
French diplomat once pointed out, if Chinese people don’t have any humane 
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values to export to the world...  
Forced to leave the stage, Hu was stopped from finishing her condemning speech.
Although her argument does not sound relevant to her husband’s scandal, and her 
presence was completely deleted by the CCTV from the ceremony show broadcasted 
nationwide, some journalists who were present at the ceremony recorded this event 
with camcorders and circulated the clip on the internet. In the video clip, Hu was 
wearing a trendy Burberry coat and denounced her cheating husband with her 
professional tone, as if she was announcing daily news. Within days, this media crisis 
had been turned into a widely known controversy, both in mainland China and 
diasporic Chinese communities.  
Hu’s articulation of “exporting humane values” soon became a popular cyber 
phrase. Some people used the phrase to ridicule Hu and Zhang’s failed marriage; 
some condemned Hu for arbitrarily bringing her private affairs to public sphere; 
others criticized Zhang’s immoral behaviors; many just use this phrase to jokingly 
greet each other in cyber conversation by replacing “have you eaten?” and “how are 
you?” with “have you exported humane values?” But there are still some people that 
agree with Hu, as one commented:  
Although Chinese people are getting rich, the saddest thing in our time is that 
we spontaneously give up our moral values. When Confucianism and 
Communism are no longer appealing to us, the society is permeated with 
Western individualistic desire for sex, money, status… Does hosting the 
Olympics really make us a difference? Does a perfect Games make us a 
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better member of the world community? My answer is No! In the past 
thousands of years, we exported Zen Buddhism, Confucianism and many 
other cultural components to the rest of the world. Today, when we are 
celebrating a life-time opportunity to host the Olympics, we only have a 
desperate wife telling us what is the right thing to do – you gotta export 
humane values! But the problem is: do we really have anything to export? 
From the argument, we can tell that some Chinese people develop a self-conscious 
antagonism to Western liberalism, and hold enthusiasm in their search for a new 
cosmopolitan humanity with Chinese characteristics.  
In Mao’s era, nothing in one’s life was private, and everything was linked to 
the grand project of Communist Utopia. Thus, those having sexual relation without 
the sanction of marriage would be charged with hooliganism and denounced in public 
settings. When Chinese people became adept at embracing capitalism to fulfill heir 
desires, including sexual desire and desire for wealth, they also found many side 
effects of capitalism. “It would be ideal for neoliberalism to get rid of public morality, 
but both state and society need to maintain it, at least a little, to produce 
self-regulating desires rather than allow desire to veer toward passionate excesses” 
(Rofel, 2007, p. 154). Therefore, the negotiations of what is the proper humane value 
and what should be incorporated in the cosmopolitan culture reveal an unstable 
process of conflict over what counts as beneficial and proper rather than adverse and 
immoral capitalist practices (Rofel, 2007).  
  On the one hand, the discourse of the American dream shapes Chinese 
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subjectivities and produces a perpetual desire to pursue the American lifestyle as an 
approach to internalize cosmopolitan subjectivities. Nevertheless, the project of 
possessing cosmopolitanism is definitely multi-faceted, systematical, intersectional, 
and sometimes contradictory; just as Hu Ziwei positioned herself as a cosmop litan 
urbanite with her Burberry coat, her highly gendered “professionalism,” her quotation 
from a French diplomat, and her resentment towards Western humane values. On the 
other hand, borrowing certain cultural and economic practices from the West does not 
indicate that Chinese people would accept Western culture as a whole. Therefore, the 
Western conjunction of capitalistic individualism and consumer culture was torn apa t 
in this unstable Chinese context – just like Hu Ziwei eager to make her private matter 
public, insisted exporting Chinese humane values, and attributed the failure of her 
marriage to the failure of social morality for unconditional acceptance of Western 
humane values.  
  For many Chinese, their antagonism towards liberalism and neoliberalism is 
not just embodied through condemning Western individualism and promoting Oriental 
collectivism, or even nationalism. Instead, the public culture values a new version of 
collectivism that differentiates itself from the People – a revolutionary collective 
promoted by Maoist socialism. For instance, although the American dream is still one 
of the most tangible approaches through which one can approve his/her meritocracy, 
many overseas Chinese have generated a new definition of individual success: the 
successful ones include those returnees who can not only enrich one’s materialistic 
life but also: 1) bring back cutting-edge technology and help China to achieve 
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breakthroughs; 2) distribute knowledge learned from the West to China; 3) involve 
themselves in China’s political reformation and policy making to make the Chinese 
society more egalitarian; and 4) help China to build enterprises that can compete 
against, or even surpass, transnational corporations. Besides highlighting one’s 
materialistic achievement, this type of moral desire conveys a strong sense of cultural 
nationalism by focusing on the collective interests of Chinese people. However, it 
does not indicate that they reach an unconditional compromise with the state power. 
As a matter of fact, it represents a strong intention to revive Confucian morality th t 
stands besides or even above the state regime, and so they can impose some moral 
restrain over the regime. In other words, by taking social responsibility through 
sacrificing their political freedom, returnees want to promote collectiv  social 
interests, identify with the people, and assign themselves a socially progressive role – 
giving voice to the people. By doing so, they may force the government to act as a 
responsible player. This type of strategy is also widely shared by man , including Hu 
Ziwei – only through recouping themselves as defensive and victimized maneuvers, 
can they promote their moral epistemology. Meanwhile, through sewing their own 
interests to the interests of the collectivity of the People, they wish to get credits for 
sharing the same value with the P ople and being a part of the People.  
In the meantime, the desire to make a better China means not only to make 
China into a strong, moral, wealthy and egalitarian nation, but also to make its 
citizens’ values cosmopolitan, in other words to export humane values to the rest of 
the world. As Girard (1977) notes, to desire means not simply to desire an object but 
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also to imitate a model’s way of desiring. No doubt, the superiority of the Western 
lifestyle is enabled and sustained by Western ideologies, the capitalist system and 
state apparatuses. Therefore, to make their moral standard something superior to that 
of the West and transform their standard to cosmopolitan standards, the Chinese 
people can only identify with a rising China that may facilitate the exportation of their 
humane values to the rest of the world.  
THE GAZING WEST 
Seven years ago, the West generally expected that the Beijing Games would 
push China to accept secular democracy. Seven years later, the expectation is l rgely 
considered a failure in that the Beijing Games have not significantly changed the 
political situation in China. In addition, China’s more prominent position in the world 
system manifested through the Games is criticized, challenged and feare by many in 
the West. Although the Games was seen by the Chinese government as an opportunity 
to project a new global image for China, the new global image of China elicits a risis 
in the West.  
Entering the new millennium, the tension between China and the United 
States reached a new height. On the one hand, the project of New American Century 
launched by the United States failed to win the War on Terror, but indirectly 
contributed to China’s economic prosperity (Arrighi, 2007). On the other hand, in the 
West, particularly in the United States, “independence of media has been 
compromised in some unprecedented ways” (Butler, 2002, p. 177). Although the 
economy of the United States has been tightly connected with that of China through 
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neoliberalism, the interconnectedness could not break the East/West dichotomy. Often 
told by media, the American masses generally believed that the Chinese government 
took the United States on hold through purchasing U.S. government debt; the Chinese 
economy undermined the U.S. industry by selling its manufactured products at below 
market prices; global outsourcing has greatly benefited China but left unemployment 
in the United States. What the media reluctant to reveal is how the neoliberal 
economic policy of the United States dragged China into the global economic system 
to rescue the United States from economic crisis (Arrighi, 2007). Under the 
contemporary strictures on media, the call for dual thinking regarding what makes 
China such a “monster” can barely be heard. Just as Butler (2002) notes,  
  It is the same binarism that returns us to an anachronistic division between 
  “East” and “West” and which, in its sloshy metonymy, returns us to the  
  invidious distinction between civilization (our own) and barbarism” ( p. 178).  
Although it is highly inappropriate to use the term “East” to refer to China’s position 
as much as to use the term “West,” the East/West dichotomy is still alive on 
subjective dimension and reinforced by various discourses.  
  As a result, in the Westerners’ eyes, the promise made by the Chinese 
government – to host an Olympic Games that embodies environmentalism, 
technology and humanitarianism – is a hoax played by a habitual criminal. Therefore, 
the Games was a cultural monstrosity is produced, making the West the scrutinizing 
audience of an on-going documentary named “China Watching” (Chow, 1991, p.84). 
Thus, from one perspective of the new image of the Games, we see the Games as a 
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meta-narrative composed of various voices situated in the chronicling of a national 
historical event, as the director of Dream Weaver 2008 tried to express. From another 
perspective, it is a spectacle in which all representational voices are suffocated, 
leaving inscrutable gestures of a monster – the Chinese state – for the Western 
audience to scrutinize.  
In 1980, when the Moscow Olympic Games was held, the world was 
geographically and ideologically divided with conflicts often fired betwen the 
capitalist and socialist camps. In 2008, China had become a discursive Other that one 
(the West) cannot not face and accept. Thanks to the World Trade Organization, the 
Chinese government has tightly woven the labor power of the Chinese people int  the 
network of the global economy in the past seven years, and tremendously 
strengthened its economic might. However, by associating itself with the global 
economic assemblage, the Chinese state refuses to give up its role as a dominant 
regulator and prevents new types of regulation and legislative items to emerge. More 
strikingly, when the Western media enjoys more media freedom in China, and is rea y 
to present a monstrous China to the world, it first confronts unexpected criticisms 
from the Chinese people.  
To many Westerners, the monstrous China they are facing today is more 
difficult to interpret than ever before. Although the image of the monster as 
Communism is long familiar to many Western audiences, the threat of the monster 
was largely imaginary until products carrying the labels of “made in Chia” flooded 
the Western market. On the one hand, the reading of the monster has not been 
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changed significantly: either a monster may collapse at anytime (see Chang, 2001; 
Shirk, 2007); or a monster can kill ruthlessly in any moment promoted by scholars 
who advocate China as a threat. On the other hand, the monster has closely tethered 
itself to the overall Western world through stock shares, bonds, foreign currency 
reserves, imported commodities as well as economic diplomacy. Even though the 
former Communist image has been replaced by a relatively tame appear nce of a 
capitalistic Chinese regime, the Western world is still hesitant to give up its “captivity 
narrative” of the once nailed monster –Communist China.  
  All the media discourse made the Western public hesitant to accept the claim 
made by the Chinese government – this nation will promote harmony, and rise 
peacefully as a responsible superpower. As Peerenboom (2007) notes,  
 Critics fear that unlike Japan, which during its economically powerful years 
did not attempt to challenge the Western powers, China is likely to take 
advantage of its growing economic and geopolitical influence to defend and 
advocate, even in the face of Western opposition, rights policies and a 
normative vision of the world at odds with current rights policies based on 
secular liberalism (p. 4).  
Evidently, the foremost concern was the totalitarian nature of the Chinese state. An 
opinion widely shared by Western media was that, if the Chinese regime were to 
usurp the Olympic Games to promote anti-Western xenophobia and facilitate its 
hegemony against universal human dignity, the Beijing Games may restage the scene 
of the 1936 Berlin Games. Even in the intellectual circles, the comparison between 
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Beijing and Berlin is often made by many (see Kruger, 2004; Brownell 2004). The 
second concern was regarding the tremendous influence China could generate to 
shape the current world order. As Samuelson (2004) puts it, 
All we know for certain is that we really don’t know. With a country as big as 
China undergoing so much dramatic change – moving from a “command and 
control” economy to a market system – the chances that anyone has a 
complete picture of what’s going on are slim or nonexistent. In a smaller 
country, our ignorance wouldn’t matter much. But in China, it’s slightly 
terrifying (p. A27).  
Unlike Japan and South Korea, China is not militarily depending on the United States 
and docilely handing in a protection payment on time. Also, China is not a city-state 
like Hong Kong and Singapore that barely have any natural resources. Its geopolitical 
position, military might and economic dominance in East Asia make the state more 
precarious to the West.  
The most urgent task of reading China is interpreting its economic reform. 
Although David Harvey puts the portrait of Deng Xiaoping along with those of 
Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan on the cover of his book— A Brief History of 
Neoliberalism, the Chinese regime does not completely comply with a neoliberal 
prescription. In the economic realm, the Chinese state never gives up acting as a 
“visible hand.” It actively regulates the flow of capitals, disciplines labor power, 
negotiates global trade agreements, controls currency exchange rates, and sets the 
prices of crucial resources and products on the domestic market. As World Bank 
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official Agarwala (2002) notes:  
China is perhaps the best example of a country that has listened to foreign 
advice but has made decisions in the light of its own social, political, and 
economic circumstances… Whatever else may be the basis for China’s 
success, it was definitely not a blind adoption of the policies of Washington 
(p. 96-96).  
Using its labor capital as stake, the Chinese state makes itself the biggest winner in 
the neoliberal game while many of the Third World nations suffer failure. When the 
World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the American government alo g 
with its G7 partners promote free market and grant more freedom to private financial 
institutions, the heavy state intervention in China appears irrelevant or even arbitrary. 
Although Castells (1992) identifies that, to the Chinese state, “economic development 
is not a goal but a means” to its nationalist power (p. 56-58), the highly improved 
living condition also makes Stiglitz (2002) affirm that the Chinese state never
confused ends (the welfare of the population) with means (free market economy). 
Thus, not only are the strategies adopted by the Chinese state obscure to read, the 
priority of its goal is hard to identify.  
In the field of international politics, the practices of the Chinese regime are 
also obscure. It insists the inalienable authority of state sovereignty by continuing to 
promote its old diplomatic agenda from the 1960s: no hegemony, no power politics, 
no military alliances, no arms race. In 2004, on the top of four Nos, Hu Jintao 
proclaims “four yeses: confidence building, reducing difficulties, developing 
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cooperation, and avoiding confrontation” (Arrighi, 2007, p. 292). Launching the 
Shanghai Coordinate Organization (SCO) was one of the materializations of the Four 
Yeses agenda in facilitating territorial economic cooperation. When the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO) radically expanded itself in Eastern Europe in the name 
of regional security and human rights, the Chinese government was rather reluctant to 
turn the SCO into a military alliance. When the United Nations (UN) troops were sent 
to Kosovo to make peace by overriding state sovereignty acknowledged by the UN 
charters, and the United States militarily occupied Afghanistan and Ir q in the name 
of defending human rights, the four Nos agenda seemed outdated. Nevertheless, it did 
not prevent the Chinese government to actively embrace economic diplomacy through 
bilateral and multilateral agreements with other states to win over political partners 
across the world. 
  Inscrutability of the Chinese regime set a challenge for the West to accurately 
visualize and capture this “monster.” As Arrighi (2007) comments, the confusion that 
surrounds Deng’s reform is symptomatic of widespread misconceptions of China’s 
development and the overarching role taken by the state. Furthermore, cultural 
homogeneity makes the authoritarian state extremely elastic and durable over other 
possible types of state structures such as confederations, loose empires or city- tates. 
When most Communist regimes stepped down from power, the Chinese state 
demonstrated unparalleled adaptability by reconfiguring its relationships with the 
neoliberal doctrine. The confusion forces many to rethink what neoliberalism is and 
what role it plays with the nation-state to enable neoliberalism for its wn interests. 
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Rather than defining neoliberalism as “an economic doctrine with a negative relation 
to state power and a market ideology that seeks to limit the scope and activity of 
governing,” Ong (2006a) suggests to consider neoliberalism as a governing 
technology – “a profoundly active way of rationalizing governing and self-governing 
in order to ‘optimize’” (p. 3). In other words, the state is not a passive victim that 
voluntarily gives up its authority to free market but a sophisticated player that strives 
to maximize its benefits by claiming economic freedom. Through negotiation, the 
Chinese state authorities accomplished the pragmatic goal of forcing the West to grant 
more trading privileges, accept regulative terms, and bring in technologies; the 
Western companies also gained substantially from the Chinese government, with 
cheap labor without unions, tax reliefs and access to the Chinese market (Chow, 
2002).  
  Often, initiating or joining the global economy functioned in ways that 
strengthened the nation-state in the short term but weakened its authority in the long 
term, particularly when the state is forced to give up its control over its capital. It is 
very true for the United States, as David Harvey (2003) notes,  
The vast quantities of capital fixed in place act as a drag upon the capacity to 
realize a spatial fix elsewhere….If capital does move out, then it leaves 
behind a trail of devastation and devaluation; the deindustrializations 
experienced in the heartlands of capitalism …in the 1970s and 1980s are 
cases in point. If capital does not or cannot move… then overaccumulated 
capital stands to be devalued directly through the onset of a deflationary 
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recession or depression (p. 116).  
When the state has to make a choice between deindustrialization and deflation, 
allowing the capital to move is a seemingly better option. It also helps to understand 
why former President George W. Bush commanded a political mandate to transform 
life in the United States by “preparing our people for the challenges of life in a free 
(market) society,1” leaving the economic losers to blame their inability to 
accommodate the new global order. It offers us an opportunity to witness that “the 
specific, often specialized rearrangements inside this highly formalized and 
institutionalized national apparatus that enabled that shift” (Sassen, 2006, p. 6).  
The shift from the arrangement of nation-states to a new global order might 
depend on multiple capabilities of nation-states, particularly their capabilities to 
enable the shift (Sassen, 2006). As Sassen (2006) predicts that, along with growing 
prominence of a global economy, the capabilities of nation-states will gradually 
diminish until they are replaced by a new global governmentality. Diluting rivalries 
among the major state powers could be used to exemplify the emerging governmental 
capability of the emerging global system (Sassen, 2006). However, this prediction for 
the emerging apparatus of global institutions and dynamics is heavily rely ng on the 
historical trajectory of Euro-American lineage. As a result, it tends to ownplay the 
power hierarchy and cultural heterogeneity embedded in the emerging global order.  
THE STATE AND ITS PEOPLE 
Early modern Europe realized an institutionalization of checks and balances 
                                                       
1 Bush pledges a broad push toward market-based policies. New York Times, Nov. 4th, 2004.  
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among towns and tribes, while ancient China gave birth to a totalitarian and inclusive 
empire (Hui, 2005). Since its first unification in 221 BC, China had been governed by 
a highly rational and meritocratically-selected bureaucracy, a political system that 
anticipated similar developments in Europe by almost two thousand years. Although 
the imperial state was always an embodiment of ruthless oppression of the people, its 
historical vicissitude and cyclical repetition transformed the apparatus of state to a 
meaningless resumption that hardly carries a rational mission other than continue 
itself (Agamben, 2000). This irrational inertia can be discerned from Chinese ma s’
fantasy of reiterating the habitual reproduction of the feudal states – we still exi  
when the other three ancient civilizations have long gone. As Chow (1998a) points out, 
“this fantasy (to history) says: The trick of our success is the ability to stick it out – to 
absorb every external difficulty into ourselves, to incorporate even our enemies into 
our culture. We endure, therefore we are” (p. 128). When the history of the people can 
only be narrated and remembered through the history of the state, the privileged 
cultural endurance of the people has been conflated with that of the state.  
  When the irrational inertia of the state was violently interrupted by modernity, 
the history of endurance transformed itself to a history of mourning and loss (Eng & 
Kazanjian, 2003). “To articulate the past historically,” Benjamin (1969) insists, 
“means to seize hold of a memory as it flashes up at a moment of danger . . . to retain 
that image of the past which unexpectedly appears to man singled out by history at a 
moment of danger” (p. 255). In modern history, the whole notion of China and the 
Chinese ethnical and cultural identities were invented through the clash between 
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Western imperialist power and Chinese feudal state (Liu, 2004). Even though the 
Chinese state struggles to achieve modernization, its tragic encounter with Western 
power also justifies its revival of ancient Chinese learning through which a holistic 
Chinese worldview is formed through reintegrating cultural fragments (Liu, 1995). 
When the state tradition is challenged or disrupted, the history with continuity 
becomes a “just” means to restore a (Chinese) Empire, to exclude an aggressor, to 
compensate a victim, and to create fear (Foucault, 1977). The violent construction of 
Chinese nationalism in late-imperial China was discursively connected wih var ous 
pre-modern cultural elements which overarch the fantasy of resuming the cultural 
endurance (Liu, 1995).  
The redemption of the subjective loss could not be fulfilled until another 
strong state – the Communist China – was established to resume this special fantasy 
over endurance. Not only did the state redeem the loss, it also claimed itself as h  
only means for the people to record their own histories. Dirlik (1987) observes the 
Chinese communist state: 
If it does not bring the proletariat (or the oppressed classes) into the forefront 
of history, it at least makes them into a central component of the national 
struggle – as a referent against which the fate of ideas and values must be 
judged (p. 37).  
It is the first time that China becomes the People’s Republic that can fend off 
imperialism and cultural oppression, making the nation truly of and for the people. 
Through manufacturing the grand collectivity of the P ople, the state presents itself as 
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an internal jurisdiction for the People (Agamben, 2000). Using dialectic between a 
desire of inclusion and a fear of exclusion, the state not only promoted “the idea ofa 
containable and countable population, the idea of a reliable census, and the idea of 
stable and transparent categories” (Appadurai, 2006, p. 6), but also imposed an 
inclusive but hegemonic subjectivity for all its citizens. For every citizen of China, 
only by signing a contract with the nation and subjecting oneself to the state 
sovereignty can they enter the state-promised Utopian space for the People. 
  However, created by the state sovereignty, the imaginary collectivity of 
People was “usurped by the state to picture a classless society, to project a P ople 
without fraction, and to facilitate peoples’ subjectification” (Agamben, 2000, p. 34). 
Rather than carrying political progressiveness, “the People as a whole and as an 
integral body politics ... (is) an inclusive concept that pretends to be without 
remainder … (and) the total state of the sovereign and integrated citizens” (Agamben, 
2000, p. 31). Once the state fails to keep its Utopian promise, the collective 
singularity – the People – soon turns itself to a sanctioned violence that can overthrow 
the sovereignty for the sake of promised Communist Utopia (Benjamin, 1996). Taking 
the 1989 Tiananmen accident as an example, when the state confronts the People that 
it cannot represent and discipline, the only thing the state can do is to use violence 
against the collective “singularity that wants to take possession of belonging to itself 
as well as of its own being-into-language,” (Agamben, 2000, p. 89).  
In the post-Tiananmen era, the Chinese state no longer keeps reinforcing the 
collectivity of the People but tends to re-create fractions to stabilize its authority. In 
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other words, the state divides the P ople into peoples with conflicted interests and 
phrasing them as “fragmentary multiplicity of needy and excluded bodies” (Agamben, 
1998, p. 177) to be fed. As Chow (1998a) laments: 
China’s foremost problem of governance, overpopulation, is approached not 
as a problem that can and should be solved gradually, but rather as an 
immutable fact – an immutable fact that is, moreover, cast in the form of an 
essential lack, the (potential) lack of food. Such, then, is the attitude of the 
Chinese authorities: it is inconceivable that the West tell China what to do on 
the issue of human rights because human rights in China simply means 
having enough to eat (p. 117).  
Thus, the state flexibly responses to social instabilities by adjusting its internal 
structure through variegated sovereignty to accommodate a turbulent neoliberal 
society and manage the fractions it re-created (Ong, 2006a). 
In the meantime, the state scrambles all the class-based identities and grants 
the people more individual “freedom” to enjoy materialistic “good life” (Agamben, 
2004). For instance, rural residents can move to the city “freely” to adopt urban life, 
even though the freedom in the city is exploitative and second-class; the new comrs 
to the city can “freely” manifest meritocracy and achieve their urban citizenship 
through acquiring housing and through consumption; individuals are granted more 
freedom to articulate the subjective desires rather than to speak through the language 
of the nation-state; and intellectuals can “freely” express theirartistic mind and pursue 
economic benefits as long as they do not directly challenge the authority of the sta e. 
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By governing people through freedom and in relation to freedom, the state can 
somehow differentiate its current form from that of its totalitarian and arbitrary past 
(Rose, 1999 & 2004). “As liberal discourse converts political identity into 
essentialized private interest, disciplinary power converts interest into normativized 
social identity manageable by regulatory regimes” (Brown, 1995).  
Since it adopted neoliberalism, the Chinese state has lifted more than 200 
million people above the poverty line, and enabled a large fraction of its populatin to 
enjoy a modernized good life (Yao, 2000). Following the nations in southeastern Asia, 
the state uses Confucian cultural essentialism to explain its economic success. Inside 
China, the state proposes culturally based national-building to constitute popular 
discourse of nationalism to achieve an inconspicuous disseminated overlap between 
the nation and the state (Zhang, X., 2001b). In a large context of Asia-Pacific, the 
state promotes a homogeneous Chinese culture, and establishes Special Economic 
Zones to attract investment from overseas Chinese. This strategy of variegated 
sovereignty soon generates a tremendous economic influence that goes beyond th  
geographical boundary of the state. As Ong (2006a) puts it, 
Unlike the EU, which was forged through multilateral negotiations…the 
regional space informally called Greater China is the outcome of the 
administrative strategies of a single state, China, in pursuit of greater 
cross-border trade. Greater China… is the spatial production of a state-driven 
scheme to integrate disarticulated political entities economically as a detour 
to eventually political integration (p. 98).  
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In the meantime, the cultural discourse of neo-Confucianism, which had been 
dismissed since the establishment of the People’s Republic, was revived by the 
Chinese regime to a grand, dynamic and fluid process of sovereignty that glues all 
political and economic archipelagos (Ong, 2004; Bell, 2008). The rhetoric of “Greater 
China” or “Cultural China” proliferating nowadays cannot blur the distinction 
between notions of the nation based on culturalist ethnocentrism and those based on 
modern, if not post-modern, economic rationalism” (Zhang, X., 2008, p. 109). 
Particularly, the Beijing Games is narrated by the Chinese regime as a symbol of the 
renaissance of Chinese culture at large, attempting to create transnational Chineseness 
based on cultural homogeneity. To capture the nature of state sovereignty, Agamben 
(2000) suggests that the political potentiality does lie in dialectic between a 
collectivity of People and fraction of peoples, both are created by the sovereignty to 
sustain its power.  
THE peoples 
  When neoliberalism entails deep imbrications with the national, and gains 
prominence in global culture, “processes of denationalization allow, enable, or push 
the construction of new types of global scalings of dynamics and institutions; other 
times they continue to inhabit the realm of what is still largely national” (Sssen, 2006, 
p. 1). China definitely stands as the latter one, when the state skillfully plays the 
dialectic of People and peoples, and extends Chinese cultural nationalism beyond its 
geographical boundaries. Thus, the predominant position of the Chinese state tends to 
confirm the singularity of itself as an irrational and inconceivable Other – a perpetual 
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enemy for neoliberalists as well as universal human rights. When this nation-state is 
not victimized by the dramatic global change, the only victim that can be identifed 
must be its people – the people still live with, and can only live with, national 
discourse. Nevertheless, Sassen (2006) argues:  
The institutional and subjective micro-transformations denationalization 
produces frequently continue to be experienced as national when they in fact 
entail a significant historical shift in the national (p. 2).  
Therefore, this grand manifestation of transnational nationalism as a part of the 
denationalization process is actually an expression of cosmopolitanism through 
national forms.  
  This vocalization of cosmopolitanism through national tone, however, does 
not necessarily anticipate what Sassen (1995) expected – global economic and 
political citizenship built upon transnational political institutions and economic 
agencies. Particularly, the transnational political and economic networks have not 
contributed to a politically progressive subjectivity of global citizens in China. Instead, 
when the Chinese state looses its ideological control and projects a picture of the 
“good life” to its People/peoples, the ever confined personal desires and 
individualistic subjectivities ramble on. For instance, Chinese intellectuals tend to 
rebuild a cultural hierarchy with a small circle of elitism, which had been discarded 
and even condemned when the regime promoted the Communist vernacular mass 
culture during the Cultural Revolution (Wang, 1996). Other intellectuals warmly 
embraced the Western cultural market, and tried to circulate their works around the 
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world as global cultural currency (Zhang, X. , 2001b). Influenced by Deng’s slogan 
“To get rich is glorious,” even Tiananmen pro-democracy dissidents tended to take the 
commercial road once released from prison (Arrighi, 2007). Maximizing personal 
wealth soon became a socially accepted ethic, when the ideology of the egalitarian 
achievement and Communist leadership were still lingering in people’s cultural 
memories. Ownership of wealth, along with on-going social stratification, becom s a 
crucial factor that constitutes one’s subjective understanding of self.  
  Besides emerging class-based identification, previously discouraged 
individualistic expressions were released. New social elites pursued sexual desires 
without considering moral responsibility, such as the aforementioned Hu-Zhang 
controversy. New gender identities, geographically based identities, national ide tity, 
bodily-based identities and other socially constructed desires were juxtaposed in 
booming metropolises for recognition and justification. Therefore, along with their 
hegemonic and tactical state, thepeoples of China also participated in creating 
cosmopolitanism in this neoliberal age through expressing their self-interests and 
staging their desired identities. The widely manifested liberal individualism entangled 
with governmentality of the state lie in the efforts by the Chinese state and its peoples 
to overcome their socialist past, assimilate strength from the global culture, and lead 
China toward its proper place in a cosmopolitan globalized world (Rofel, 2007). 
However, when they finally overcame their socialist past, they encountered various 
social inequalities and suppression brought by economic and cultural freedom.  
  When the state established free markets through policies, socially corrosive 
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effects of moneymaking became unavoidable. The ones who have greatly benefited 
from the change are not only the offspring of the party elite, but also former urban 
proletarians who accumulated personal wealth through privatization of previously 
public-owned enterprises. The widely manifested meritocracy and individual 
achievements used by these new social elites to conceal their contribution to new 
social inequality, condemned the socialistic equalitarianism in the past, and 
constructed new capitalistic moral economy. According to Adam Smith’s political 
economy, if we perceive the role played by the state as the visible hand, then the 
invisible hand are peoples who pursue their own interests. As Smith (2003) theorizes 
an invisible hand: 
As every individual, therefore, endeavours as much as he can both to employ 
his capital in the support of domestic industry, and so to direct that industry 
that its produce may be of the greatest value; every individual necessarily 
labours to rend the annual revenue of the society as great as he can. He 
generally, indeed, neither intends to promote the public interest, nor knows 
how much he is promoting it … he intends only his own gain, and he is in 
this, as in many other cases, led by an invisible hand to promote an end 
which was no part of his intention (p. 572).  
Although Adam Smith (2003) uses invisible hand as a metaphor to explain the 
unintended economic consequences caused by individuals’ economical practices, its 
implication is also valid in sociocultural sphere. In certain cases, when the sta e tends 
to mitigate stratification and grants a better materialistic life for all, an invisible hand 
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diverts the direction that social reformation intends to move. Even some seemingly 
righteous resistance is to achieve personal gains, and furthers marginalization of some 
invisible Others. In the meantime, some social groups that benefited from the state 
policies voluntarily gave up their political radicalism, passively attaching their 
personal fate with that of the state, and created new social worlds of class segregation.  
  Rather than summarizing the interests of the peoples in the neoliberal age as 
maximizing their economic gains, the manifestation of interests may not always be as 
apparent as we expected. Instead, the variety of interests is not only embodi d through 
more discursive cultural manners, but also linked to politics in previous epochs. 
Although the neoliberal cosmopolitanism largely dominates the economical sphere, it 
fails to fully erase the historical trajectory through which the contemporary 
cosmopolitan culture came into being. For the peoples who have benefited from the 
state and economic reformation, a selective version of genealogies was deliberat y 
chosen and modified in order to justify their private gains. Therefore, the peoples are 
marked by contradictory themes, and they could not be mechanically put in the 
category of subalterns dominated by the state.  
 For the state, the vicissitude of its precedents becomes the primary reason to 
maintain cultural solidarity and sustain its arbitrary claim of authority. In other words, 
“the dream of regaining China’s stature as an empire and the post-colonial desire to 
attain material and moral parity with the West have motivated much of China’s 
actions in the post-Cold War world” (Rofel, 2007, p. 12). Most importantly, the dream 
is not only the dream of the Chinese state in the name of the People, but also that of 
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its peoples.  
 Moreover, the purposeful revival of historical roots to justify ones’ political 
action, by the state or the peoples, is not only to fulfill political interest, but also to 
project a new cosmopolitan morality. In other words, because we (both the state and 
the peoples) are forced to give up so much in the past, we are not, and will not be, 
oppressive to others. We are just getting what we deserve. Both the state and the 
peoples uphold its moral superiority through transforming the victimhood, formed 
through ones’ subjective understanding of history, into the very means of cultural 
politics to “affirm a moral vision that things have been, should be, and could be 
different” (Lee & Yang, 2007, p. 7).  
 The moral economy adopted by the Chinese state and its citizens not only 
leads them to embrace the cultural and political movement that constitutes the global 
culture, but entails them to create a new cosmopolitan culture (Rofel, 2007). There 
was a commentary on how to properly position China in the world system and what to 
do to avoid repeating the mournful past. For instance, the proper path that China takes 
should never be assigned by the West. Not only should China never engage in 
wholesale privatization and marketization assigned by neoliberal economists in the 
West, but it should export its value system. The project of “world reordering” is not 
just a project proposed by the state. Instead, the desire of the Chinese people to 
construct cosmopolitan Chineseness is largely tethered with the desires of th  state.  
STATE, PEOPLE(s) AND THE WEST 
  Whatever the position one might take, the confusion that surrounds the 
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situation of contemporary China is symptomatic of widespread theoretical 
misconceptions about the relationship between the state, the People (or peoples), and 
the West. In my dissertation, the task is not only to articulate the political conjuncture 
composed of three crucial parties: the state, the People (or peoples) and the West, but 
also to critically engage and disengage different theoretical approaches.  
  First of all, I engage post-colonial theory and subaltern studies to interpret 
the East-West dichotomy, although neither the Chinese state nor its people ar fully 
subjected to the Western power. China is neither a superpower to collapse nor a 
monster that no one can take hold. Neither are the Chinese people brainwashed and 
indifferent to the suppressive state nor are they xenophobic and hysteric Communists. 
In addition, the construction of Chineseness, regardless if it focuses on the state or the 
people, is not a unidirectional process. Instead, the Chinese state and its people 
actively contribute to construction of Chineseness and afford it new meanings.  
Second, I adopt Giorgio Agamben’s theory to study the ambivalent and 
arbitrary state. Although the state is suppressive to various social groups - it does not- 
and can never be able, to handle its people like simply biological life. On the one hand, 
the Chinese government announces new initiatives to expand welfare for famers, 
waives agricultural tax, launches a universal healthcare system, cuts taxes for the 
urban low-income people, and postpones privatization of land. A predatory state 
would not tend to adopt such a set of reform policies. On the other hand, Chinese 
people are extremely savvy about how to interpret international/domestic polits and 
adept at skillfully fighting for their personal interests. Rather than leaving the socialist 
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slogan “serving for the People” in history, they use their socialist heritage to pr ss the 
government and strive for their own interests. Therefore, the state is not a pure 
Agambenian sovereignty that is eager to eliminate the exceptions that challenge its 
philosophical order; the people are not always the bare life that only has two options 
to choose: to be killed or to be subordinated.  
Third, I use theory of intersectionality to investigate complex identty politics. 
Although all identities are discursively constructed by power, some subordinated ad 
socially marginalized groups are intending to change the power structure that shapes 
their identities. Particularly, certain seemingly subalterns are not always undertaking 
the role of victim and carry the political agency. In my dissertation, even though I 
could not speak for the most marginalized social groups, I agree with Spivak (1996) 
that the most subordinated or marginalized social positions should not be fetishized. 
As a matter of fact, the socially marginalized groups never stop wrestling with 
ambivalence, just like Chinese people’s dilemma towards the new global culture 
brought by the Beijing Games – the thing they desire could be abhorrent.  
All chapters are related to the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games. Each of the 
chapters presented a banal scene (or an allegorical image), through which we 
discerned various contradictions embodied through the Games. To Chinese people, 
the Beijing Games is not only a sign indicating China’s march to the global world but 
also a venue through which they can possess cosmopolitan subjectivities. To the West,  
when the Olympic Games, an embodiment of world peace and a celebration of 
trans-cultural unity, was hosted by China, everything shiny, particularly those 
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constructed by the nation-state, become susceptible. For example, the massive project 
of beautifying the urban environment of Beijing was done to conceal the 
backwardness of the city caused by the totalitarian state. The radical modernization of 
the city lead to brutal destruction of the ancient urban layout and indicated the failur  
of the regime to modernize the nation as a whole. The coercive relocation must have 
been intended to expel the marginalized social groups from the urban space and 
maximize the monetary benefits of the local regime. All relocated families were 
subject to governmental persecution and suffered homelessness. For the athletes, the 
training was abusive in that their training is not driven by self-interest but the interests 
of the government. Not only were their bodies just a means to achieve certain ends 
desired by the state, but they were forced to handle a tremendous amount of pressure. 
Their success was to be the success of the manipulative project of nation buildig, but 
their failure was only their own. Moreover, rather than signaling social development 
of the Chinese society, the triumph of Chinese athletes with disabilities further proved 
that the state exploited the most socially marginalized groups to cover its cruel abuse 
of human rights. Briefly, the discourse regarding the Beijing Games was largely 
driven by a humanitarian desire for universal justice, attempting to reveal “facts,” and 
rescue oppressed Chinese victims from endless sufferings. Each “fact” listed above 
became a real starting point for me to model my consciousness.  
  Through examining these contradictions, we may “break through old 
narratives of change and seeing fresh ones” (Jameson, 1998, p. 376). Frow and Morris 
(2000) note, “cultural studies often tends to operate in what looks like an eccentric 
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way, starting with the particular, the detail, the scrap of ordinary or banal existence, 
and then working to unpack the density of relations and of intersecting social domains 
that inform it” (pp. 508). Each of the chapters started from an allegorical reading of 
social contradictions related to the Beijing Games. The question my dissertation 
addressed is not how Chinese people enabled the Games in China but how they 
negotiated with the gaze from the West and the oppression from the state. Taking the 
Beijing Games as a primary site, I work outwards, upwards, sideways and so o  from 
it to unpack the density of social relations that inform it (Frow & Morris, 2000). By 
connecting these allegorical images to deeper power struggles, I hope to articulate the 
power conjuncture formed by the Chinese state, the West and the People/peoples.     
In my dissertation, each of the chapters focuses on one social entity formed 
through contradictions, and all entities related to the Beijing Games and involved in 
the political conjuncture formed by the state, people(s), and the West. All thechapters 
are based on intensive empirical observations. In terms of subject matter, the chapters 
can be generally divided into two sections. One section addresses geopolitics, namely 
the urban space of Beijing. The other section illustrates biopolitics of people with 
disabilities. Chapter Two begins with construction of architectural Chinesenes . 
Dating back to the imperial era when the Oriental culture met the West, I trace the 
genealogical trajectory through which the discourse of “protecting the Old City” came 
into being.  
Chapter Three addresses the tourist gaze by focusing on an urban tourist site, 
the Beijing alleyways (also called Beijing Hutongs). The Hutong Tourbecame 
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popular around 1992, when Deng Xiaoping made his tour to southern China and 
encouraged further economic reformation to attracted foreign capital. The opening 
door not only attracts foreign direct investment but also foreign tourists who were 
looking for distinctive cultural features in the urban hinterland of Beijing. The global 
tourism greatly enabled the transformation of the landscape of the city as well as the 
local understanding of what the city should look like.  
Chapter Four projects the trajectory of the ever-changing housing policies 
advocated by the socialist government along with different versions of urban utopia 
constructed by its ideologies. By tracing the trajectory, we can make sense of the 
contesting powers that shape the urban space of Beijing in the pre-Olympic era 
through the capital and the housing market. These housing-related ideologies picture 
Utopias at different historical epochs. Rather than forming a harmonious continuity, 
these ideologies embody tensions and fractures between these epochs. The tension 
and fractures of ideologies further indicate the arbitrary nature of the nation-states. 
The illusionary narratives of Utopias are nothing but governing tactics by which the 
state disciplines the urban space and reinforces its legitimacy.  
In Chapter Five, I turn the attention to the construction of a geographically 
related identity— Beijinger. Different from the social scheme of the Western ociety, 
the social texture of the Chinese society is not so much mediated by race and gender 
as it is in the West. Instead, it is heavily delineated by geographical lines, sp cifically 
the urban-rural chasm. Living in the political, economic and cultural center of China, 
Beijinger is not only a local identity that symbolizes extraordinary politica  
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consciousness and cultural rootedness, but also a representation of geographical 
hegemony. Hosting the Olympic Games makes the ambivalence of this local identity 
more salient than ever before. Through tracing the genealogy of the urban space of 
Beijing, I want to reveal the making and remaking of this local identity.  
Chapter Six focuses on a highly gendered indigenous folksong – Jasmine. 
This folksong has been frequently used in widely-broadcasted cultural-political 
settings, particularly in mega-sports events such as the Olympic and Paralympic 
ceremonies. It almost becomes the secondary national anthem as God Bless America 
is in the U.S. This chapter specifically focuses on the musical presentation of China in 
these sporting events and ceremonies where nationalism and social subordination are 
contested and achieved. It is also an effort to scrutinize the versatility and ambiguity 
of musical aesthetics in the sports realm. 
Heavily borrowing from Giorgio Agamben’s theories of sovereignty and 
exception, Chapter Seven reflects on the repressive nature of a global system – the 
Paralympic Games. I want to reveal the invisible power embedded in this particular 
global system and its discursive influence on people, which distorts their 
understanding of their own bodies. It makes them believe that, only through endless 
negation of their physical bodies, here I mean punishing training and disciplining of 
their disabled bodies, can they eventually achieve the transcendence of physical 
materiality.  
Chapter Eight is an ethnographical study of Chinese athletes with disabilites. 
Through interviews and participant-observation, I analyze the articulation of athletes 
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with disabilities, and investigate how intersectional power of class, gender, sexuality, 
national identity, and body difference shape their subjective understanding of their 
disabled sporting bodies. Particularly, I want to address how the athletes’ d sires for 
social belonging and acceptance contour the way that they identify with 
able-bodiedness. In addition, how they use this identification to differentiate 
themselves from other people with disabilities.  
Chapter Nine investigates the power dialectic between Western 
cosmopolitanism and cosmopolitanism with Chineseness. After the Tibet turmoil in 
March 2008, a global protest against the Beijing Olympic Games, which had been 
discussed and planned in cyberspace, went beyond the virtual reality and widely 
manifested itself as a cosmopolitan movement during the global Olympic torch relay. 
As a response, the Chinese diasporic communities used cyberspace to organize 
pro-Olympic/pro-China demonstrations across the world, which later sparked 
nationalism in mainland China. I employ cyber ethnography to contextualize the 
worldwide boycott of the Beijing Games by articulating its social conditions, and 
delineate the politics through which cosmopolitanism with Chineseness is enabled as 
a counter-force of the boycott. 
The chapters tend to be, but are not strictly arranged, in a chronological rder. 
Instead, there are chapters overlapping in time. For example, Chapter Two and 
Chapter Six map the same post-colonial trajectory from different perspectives: 
architectural and musical aesthetics. Chapters Three and Four have time overlaps by 
addressing the post-1949 urban change but with different focuses. Chapter Two and 
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Nine both address the Western construction of Chineseness; however, the dialectical 
counterparts of the Western construction in different eras vary. The Chinese archit cts 
and oversea Chinese interpret their appreciation of Chineseness in distinctive 
approaches. As Grossberg notes, cultural studies is about integrating rigorous theories, 
empirical research and political commitment (Wright, 2001). Neither do the chapters 
embody direct connections with each other, nor do they share the same tone. However, 
the critical stance and political commitment I take towards the state, the West and the 
People (or peoples) remains.  
THEORIES 
  My dissertation is a limited endeavor to characterize the contexts that contin 
and embody physical culture and urban complexes of the contemporary China. The 
dissertation tried to capture dynamic social formations of Chinese society “w thout 
falling into the twin traps of reductionism and essentialism” (Slack, 1996, p. 112). 
Therefore, I try to approach contemporary China from various perspectives and 
conceptualize it with different theories and methods to avoid reductionism. 
    Stuart Hall (1983) notes that the commitment to “the process of theorizing” 
is the essence of cultural studies in that it is the engaging and graspin of something 
of the truth about new historical realities (p. 84). In the meantime, he also reminds us 
that using structured theories as rigid templates runs the risk of simplifying power 
conjuncture and formalism. As Hall (1980) insists, 
 The unity formed by this combination or articulation, is always, necessarily, 
a “complex structure”: a structure in which things are related, as much 
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through their differences as through their similarities. This requires that the 
mechanisms which connect dissimilar features must be shown – since no 
necessary correspondence” or expressive homology can be assumed as giv n. 
It also means – since the combination is a structure (an articulated 
combination) and not a random association – that there will be structured 
relations between its parts, i.e., relations of dominance and subordination (p. 
325).  
Therefore, the primary goal of my dissertation is to map the power relations of the 
global/local conjuncture.  
The primary structure of the dissertation is overarched by Orientalism, 
post-colonialism, and transnational feminist theories. The adoption of these theories is 
not only for their accurate delineation of the relations of dominance and subordination 
in post-colonial context in general and the contemporary Chinese context in par icular, 
but also for the powerful political agency embedded in these branches of theories that 
may change the uneven relationship for the better. However, the global power politics
has significantly changed the political and economic landscape of China. The 
argument that China has been subjected to colonial power and experienced extreme
substantial poverty becomes a more misleading rather than convincing statement in 
this new millennium. Thus, the adoption of Orientalism, post-colonialism, and 
transnational feminist theories should avoid arbitrary reductionism of historicty and 
ensure the attention is focused on the mechanism that contributes to the more 
contemporary cultural practices. Thus, the adoption of these branches of theories sets 
39 
 
a challenge for me – linking the somehow rigid theories to an ever-changing 
configuration of the powers, tracing their historical trajectory, and possibly 
re-articulating the system of dynamics.  
When the discourses of Orientalism, post-colonialism and transnational 
feminism are widely circulated and employed in Third World contexts, they have to 
mediate and negotiate with the specter of Marxism and resilient local culturalism. The 
various discourses intertwine together and form an extraordinary power complex. 
Although they appeared objective and interest-free, theories are always connotatively 
linked with interests of certain social groups. Along with the dynamics of power 
complexes, the interest groups represented by these theories are also changing. T king 
the discourse of protecting old Beijing City as an example, Orientalism, developed 
from a theory that narrates colonial oppression to a tool that the local intellectuals use 
to showcase their cultural capital and attack state hegemony. This type of 
self-Orientalism, furthermore, becomes a discursive domination constructed by the 
local intellectuals over the people. On the other hand, facing the multi-layered and 
discursive domination, the people present fractured identities and are unable to form 
any transcendental possibilities.  
Hall (1985) points out for us, the link of social relations “can be dissolved 
and replaced by new connections because it has ‘particular conditions of existenc’ 
that must be constantly renewed” (p. 113-114). Therefore, it is crucial to articul te and 
re-articulate the shifting processes of power struggles rather than confirming 
theoretical formalism and claiming a determinant social structure. Before I entered the 
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final stage of my dissertation writing, I decided to use Giorgio Agamben’s theory of 
state sovereignty and bare life as my theoretical underpinning. However, as I 
approach my subject matter, I gradually realized that the politics I wanted to 
conceptualize is far more complex than a dichotomy of absolute domination and 
unconditional suppression. Rather than surrender their lives to the state, the 
People/peoples never stop showcasing their resistance through either straightforward 
or savvy means. In addition, the relationship between the Chinese state and the West 
does not comply with what many Orientalists theorize that the Chinese state 
subordinates to the West, and exists as the exception. Instead, they form a discursive 
compliance with significant tension in between. As a result, I constantly changed my 
choice of theoretical standpoints and supplemented my interpretation of various 
theories. The power plurality of the contemporary moment is so contradictory, 
showing that it is impossible for a scholar to fully embody social relations with a 
single theory. Only through a re-articulation of the changing condition of the different 
social groups and post-colonial theories, can relations among the People/peoples, 
intellectuals, state and the West be accurately conceptualized.  
METHODS 
Constant shifting theoretical underpinning means one has to face the 
challenge of strategically adopting the most appropriate method/methods to facilitate 
re-articulation. As Slack (1996) puts it, “articulation is not completely ‘sewn-up’ 
method but rather a complex, unfinished perspective that continues to emerge 
genealogically. Second, articulation should not be understood as simply one thing… it 
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has thus emerged unevenly within a configuration of those forces and carries with it 
‘traces’ of forces from one piece of scholarly interpretation to another” (p. 115). 
Therefore, to grasp the shifting processes of power struggles, I have applied mu tiple 
methodology to use the Beijing Games as a venue to interpret the relationship 
between the state, the West and the People/peoples.  
The nine chapters included use distinctive methods and adopt different tones 
to facilitate articulation. For Chapter 1, Chapter 4 and Chapter 6, I intensively use 
historical materials. By reformulating the interpretation of the historical past, I tend to 
reveal how the past discursively shaped the contemporary social politics. Other 
chapters, including Chapter 2, Chapter 3, Chapter 5 and Chapter 9, primarily engage 
discourse analysis, including TV interviews, newspaper articles, novels and 
documentaries, to describe social dynamics and struggles.  
In addition, I conducted long-term ethnographical research to gather first 
hand data on a particular social group – athletes with disabilities. Through active 
participatory observation, I tried to capture a non-stereotypical portrait by stud  their 
subjective realm. The field work for Chapter 7 was conducted at a major city in China 
with a population of over 10 million. My field research primarily involves working 
with two teams: one female wheelchair basketball team and one mixed (being men 
and women) team of wheelchair fencing. Both teams are local teams sponsored by th  
local government and are prepared to compete with other local teams to make the 
China team for the Beijing 2008 Paralympic Games. Athletes must particite in 
regular training for six days a week to be able to compete. Housing accommodation, 
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food, beverages, sportswear and equipment as well as daily training subsidies are 
allocated by the municipal government. The coaches of each team are able-bodied 
former professional athletes. Besides spending two months in the training center with 
the two teams, I also worked as a volunteer for one national champion competition for 
wheelchair fencing, which was hosted in another major city in China. Being a 
volunteer and traveling with the wheelchair fencing team offered me opportunities to 
interview athletes from other parts of China. Throughout the research, my role was a 
Ph.D. student in an American university and a potential social worker for people with 
disabilities. 
More uniquely, I adopted cyber ethnographical analysis to study overseas 
Chinese’s anti-West social movement prior to the Beijing Games. This unique 
methodology allowed me to capture exciting social dynamics during which the 
People/peoples, the Chinese state and the West directly confronted each other. 
Following the boom of information technology, cyber ethnography has been widely 
adopted in the sociology of sports and physical cultural studies to critically exmine 
“the role that the Internet plays (or does not play) in the everyday lives of those w  
react to and interact with sports-related global forces” (Wilson, 2007, p. 469). 
Ethnography in cyberspace has been used to study various sports-related social 
movements (Sage, 1999; Lenskyj, 2002; Knight & Greenberg, 2002; Wilson, 2006). 
Due to the invisibility (or absence) of infrastructure, cyberspace not only provides a 
link to the networked complexities of communication, interaction, and information 
exchange in late capitalist technological culture (Dean, 2001, p. 244), but also has 
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often been perceived as a place for political progressiveness. It is generally believed 
that new social movements in cyberspace assisted by Internet technology have the 
potential to embrace new characteristics (diversity, decentralization, inf rmality and 
grassroots democracy) in lieu of former characteristics – unity, centraliza ion, 
formality – imprints of old-fashioned social movements, now mostly bureaucracies, or 
what Max Weber anticipated as an “iron cage” (Donk, Loader, Nixon & Rucht, 2004; 
McCaughey & Ayers, 2003, Crampton, 2003; Webster, 2001). If cyberspace is a place
where positive social change is nurtured, the boycott of cyberspace toward the Beijing 
Games could be seen as a global technologically facilitated revolutionary movement.  
MY OLYMPIC GAMES 
To re-articulate the relationship between the state, the West, and various 
social groups, I not only needed to critically engage theories and methods to articulate 
changing social dynamics mediated by factors such as class, race and gnder, but also 
had to establish dialogues with various parties I investigate. Having dialoue with the 
other can change our preconceptions through falsifying or extending our theories 
(Johnson, Chambers, Raghuram, Tincknell, 2004). As King (2005) points out,  
It assumes that all scholarship is partial (that is, incomplete and partisan) and  
that our research methods and theories cannot be usefully distinguished from
  their social origins and institutional locations for these origins and locations 
  shape the research questions that we ask and the processes that we follow. 
  However, research in cultural studies goes further than other methodologies 
  that refuse claims to objectivity in that it is always undertaken – explicitly – 
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  as a response to and intervention in political and social condition (p. 28).  
Adopting certain theories and choosing certain methodological approaches to achieve 
articulation are often pre-conditioned and relevant to one’s political stance. Insisting 
dialogue with the other, therefore, can facilitate us to give up insistence of objectivity.  
  Through dialogue, we can recognize our partiality and achieve bett r 
knowledge through self-reflection (Johnson et. al., 2004). In addition, having 
reflection is not solely about examining society, culture and history, but also 
contextualizing our ever-changing positionalities as researchers (Johnson et. al., 2004). 
Gramsci (1971) once reminded us,  
  The starting point of critical elaboration is the consciousness of what one  
  really is, and is “knowing thyself” as a product of the historcal process to 
  date which has deposited in you an infinity of traces, without leaving an  
  inventory (1971, p. 324). 
Researchers of cultural studies come to the subject matters th y s udies with a 
particular biography –a path through many formations and reformations of culture and 
identity (Johnson et. al., 2004, p. 45). In other words, by having dialogue, the power
relations we involved and our material and psychic investments in existing identities 
are also changed. Although the researching self can express desires for the other by 
merging with the objects of research, the self can also take a critic l distance from its 
others by making a dichotomy with an “us” against a “them” (Johnson et. al., 2004, p. 
47). The ultimate goal of research is able to turn the difficulties of having dialogues 




  When one is involved in research that lasts longer than four years, it is barely 
possible to hold one’s opinions and political epistemology consistent. During the four 
years, my political consciousness and epistemological perspective, as well ath  
political condition of the society, have experienced significant changes. As a native 
Chinese, who grew up under socialist ideology, and received training in critical 
theories in the West, I have to constantly shift my political position, voluntarily and 
involuntarily. People/peoples, the Chinese state and the West are not just the subject 
matters I study. Instead, each of them contributes to the formation of my identity. 
Therefore, by criticizing these three parties, I was forced to adopt new methods, 
examine and re-examine my political stances, adopt and give up certain theories, and 
refresh my understanding of the society as well as my subjective self. Throughout the 
research process, I engaged the self-other dialogue. By criticizing the West, the State 
and the People/peoples, I also carried a project of self-reflexive critique. It gr atly 
changed my decisions about who to talk to, who to ask, which pieces of evidence to 
use or discard (Johnson, et. al., 2004).    
  To avoid claiming absolute objectivity, I included a relatively subjectiv  
account of my personal experiences throughout the preparation of the Beijing Games 
as an indispensable footnote for my critical engagement.  
  …… 
 In 1996, when I first moved to Beijing for collegiate education, I brought a 
cosmopolitan dream to be realized in the city. Beijing University of Physical 
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Education (BUPE) was never an option, until one of my previous gymnastics coaches 
suggested me to consider sport management major. According to him, all graduates 
can obtain a position in the State Committee of Sports and Physical Education 
(SCSPE). “The study load is light,” he did not forget to tell me “you can play tennis 
every day!”  
  Besides the light study load, what made this university really attractive to me 
was the career path. In the 1990s, working for the government was definitely not the
most popular choice for college graduates in that foreign companies could pay much 
higher salary. However, working for the SCSPE was rather different to me. Not only 
can a position in the SCSPE grant me an apartment, a Beijing hukouand a decent 
salary, it also can afford me a exciting lifestyle that most white collar employees at 
foreign companies can never think of. Working for the SCSPE means that you have 
the opportunities to host different sporting events in different cities, visit many foreign 
countries along with attending international competitions, and make friends with 
world-class athletes.  
What was unexpected is that this career path suddenly became intangible in 
1998. Former premier Zhu Rongji launched radical reformation to downsize 
governmental bureaucracy, and enhance efficiency and competitiveness of 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Zhu’s assertiveness in international affairs and 
China’s survival of the 1997 economic crisis largely won him high-level popularity, 
allowing him to tackle challenging social problems and pushing further economic 
reformation. Zhu’s radical measures resolved certain problems but created som new 
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issues. For instance, Zhu’s radical restructure of SOEs increased their profitability by 
laying off workers. In addition, to dealing with governmental corruption and 
bureaucratic redundancy, Zhu re-evaluated governmental agencies, established a strict 
procedure for recruiting governmental officials, and cut non-productive (or 
non-profitable) organizations or urging these organizations to be self-sustainable.  
After evaluation, the SCSPE lost its status as a state committee, and was 
forced to accept a low-ranked title – the National Bureau of Sport and Physical 
Education (NBSPE). Not only that, the number of governmental officials that the 
NBSPE can recruit decreased dramatically. Some sports centers, such as those for 
soccer, basketball, ping-pong and badminton, were forced or encouraged by the 
bureau to make profit by operating commercial leagues nationwide. For some sp rts 
that do not have wide domestic popularity, the national centers were pushed to 
become independent non-governmental organizations: performing certain 
governmental responsibility on the one hand, but carrying various commercial 
activities on the other. Sports such as mountain climbing and tennis are in this 
category. For sports that have little potential to go marketization, such as weight 
lifting, boxing, and some winter sports, the bureau is only willing to provide a certain 
amount of funding, making the sports to survive on the elite level for the sake of 
nation-building.  
As a result, an employment hierarchy emerged, with the ones in the national 
bureau on the top and the ones works for sports centers, particularly the centers 
dealing with unpopular sports, on the bottom. A small number of officials that was 
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directly employed by the bureau can still enjoy allocated apartments. Those who work 
for various sport centers could no longer enjoy this benefit but encouraged to recur to 
the emerging housing market.  
The graduates in Class 1998 of sport management encountered an unparalleled 
difficulty in their job hunting. Many ended up going back to their hometowns with the 
broken Beijing dream. It is extremely difficult for college students who do not have 
Beijing hukou to land a satisfactory job in the city. Since I enrolled the BUPE, it was 
the first time that I saw many students studying in the library, in order to go to 
graduate school or study abroad. It was also the first time ever in my life that I sensed 
that my life trajectory was so much influenced by a social change.  
In 1998, the city of Beijing was growing aimlessly. The Loop Three was the 
primary transportation pivot of the city; the construction of the Loop Four was just 
initiated; and the Loop Five was still under proposal. The BUPE locates in the 
northern suburban where the so-called city life was barely sensible. In my spare time, 
one thing I really liked to do is standing on a passenger crossway above the Loop 
Three, watching vehicles bypassed me swiftly at night. This scene gave me a strong 
feeling that the city is running away, leaving me abandoned. Although the feeling was 
psychological alienating, I still performed it as one of my rituals. What unexpected is 
that years later I could consider this city, which once made me feel lost and alienated, 
as my second hometown.  
My depression did not last very long. In fall 1998, in a class of sports 
sociology, Dr. Lu Yuanzhen brought up a matter for classroom discussion – bidding 
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for the Olympic Games. He asked us, if China has decided to bid for another Olympic 
Games, which city should the government choose as the host? The question triggered 
a fierce discussion. Some of my classmates believe that Shanghai as an emergi g 
world city can better represent the progress China has made. Others argue th t only 
Beijing should be the most legitimate city to represent China. Overall, all my 
classmates wanted Beijing to be the host city, since we desperately need mor  
opportunities. Only an Olympic Games can drive the government to make more 
investments in sports.  
In the end of the class, Dr. Lu confirmed that he recently served on a 
consulting committee for the NBSPE to discuss the issue of bidding for the 2008 
Olympic Games. There were three proposals: Beijing, Shanghai and a jointed host by
Hong Kong, Shenzhen and Guangzhou. The third proposal was intended to manifest 
Hong Kong’s continuous prosper under the Chinese regime, showcase the booming 
manufacture zone in the Pearl River Delta, and promote a geographical proximity to 
the Chinese diasporic communities in Southeast Asia. Dr. Lu also confirmed, although 
Shanghai and the joint host won popularity in the committee, the final pick was still 
the political and cultural center – Beijing. Ten years later, I still clearly remember that 
the cheers we released almost overthrew the lecture hall. Long before many media 
agents, I already knew the city and the nation would expect a revolutionary change. 
After graduation, many of us, including me, joined the grand project of 
preparing for the bidding. For family reason, I could not stay in China and witness the 
moment that Beijing won the Games in July 2001. However, the geographical 
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distance never stops me from paying attention to every little progress China made for 
the Games. However, the Western media always associated the Beijing Games with a 
monstrous image of socialist China, and constantly compared it with the 1936 Berlin 
Games. It did not make me worry, since the majority of American people seemed too 
busy to concern what is going on in another remote country. A booming economy 
after the September 11 got them fully occupied. Therefore, when I started my study at 
Maryland, I thought my dissertation would be a research on China by taking a 
detached position and a relatively “objective” vision. The role of the West nevercame 
across my mind. However, the detachment I assume was collapsed later on.  
In September 2004, I just moved to Maryland and started my cultural studies 
journey. I was soon overwhelmed by the study load and the inconvenient off-campus 
transportation. I almost missed all the television coverage of the 2004 Athens 
Olympic Games, and only managed to watch some random coverage of the 
Paralympic Games. During the closing ceremony of the Athens Paralympic Games, a 
group of Chinese artists with disabilities staged a five-minute show as an invitation to 
the Beijing 2008 Games. Several instrumentalists with disabilities performed a 
folksong called Jasmine with traditional Chinese musical instruments. Following the 
folksong, a group of female performers with challenged hearing offer a thematic 
dance, called Bodhisattva with Thousands of hands.  
The dance was based on Chinese Buddhist folklore. In an ancient kingdom, a 
widowed king has three daughters. Against her father’s will, the youngest princess 
refused to subject herself to marriage and converted herself to Buddhism. To punish 
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her, the king forfeited the princess’s royal rank and confined her by force. However, 
the king was later diagnosed with a fatal disease, which can only be cured by a 
medicine made of his direct relative’ hands. The two elder princesses refused to 
surrender their hands by using the excuse that they have to take care of their husbands. 
The youngest princess cut off her hands voluntarily but ended up losing her life. 
Buddha was deeply moved by the princess’ unconditional sacrifice and filial piety, 
giving her divine status and thousands of hand to help people in need.  
The dance perfectly symbolizes the embedded cultural meanings. The golden 
background and costumes as well as the sound of ancient chime bell all indicate the 
context of a royal family. The rarely heard ancient music produced a solemn but tragic 
atmosphere. On the stage, the dancers’ calm expression under the specially designed 
lightening effect created goddess-like images, indicating neutralized sexuality of the 
princess. When I first watched the dance, I was stunned by its magnificence but felt
extremely unease. As my friend puts in her blog, the sensed grandness was fantastic
but certainly generated unspeakable negative feelings. Have not had chances to touch
gender theories, I only knew that the whole dance made me feel inspirational, but 
sense extreme depression at the same time. And, there is definitely something wrong.  
Eight years later, I gradually understood the dancing narrative by 
incorporating feminist theories and Agamben’s theorizing of bare life in my 
understanding. An aging king without male successor symbolizes an endangered 
blood lineage and a declining national sovereignty. The punishment on the princess is 
to discipline her sexuality and exploit her reproductive ability. The princess’ 
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insistence of chastity indeed anticipates her unconditional loyalty to the supr me 
patriarchal power. By narrating a story of a royal family, the boundary between 
ordinary families and the state was blurred. In addition, it grants the narrative a 
tremendous grandeur by telling every bare life: only by unconditionally surrende  
your life to the state sovereignty, can you transcend your disposable flesh (the 
materiality) and achieve immortal divinity. The persuasion was so discursive that a 
natural fear of death was replaced by an inspirational voluntariness to giving up one’s 
life for sacred sake.  
The dance and the Paralympic Games raised my interests to study athletes 
with disabilities. Having little knowledge of various theories and methods like 
in-depth discourse analysis, I decided to approach this subject matter by ethnography. 
Through close interaction with athletes with disabilities, I realized how tey use the 
identity of athletes to differentiate themselves from other disabled people. And, the 
reason for them to do so is that their basic rights to enjoy their gender role and family 
warmth as well as to perform their sexuality were ruthlessly taken away. They 
desperately need the Beijing Paralympic Games to change their status and obtain 
more opportunities, just like my classmates and I desperately expected the Beijing
Games to give us a brighter future.  
During my 2005 field trip to Nanjing for a national wheelchair fencing 
championship, I interviewed many athletes. Among them an attractive female fencer 
from Shanghai got my special attention. She was the national champion but failed to 
defend her title in the 2005 championship. The result greatly hurts her chance to make 
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Team China for the Beijing Games. I have to admit that the reason I paid special
attention to her was not solely because of her previous performance, but the desperate 
expression on her beautiful face. When I started the interview, she still had tears 
lingering in her eyes. I tried my best to comfort her. She kindly showed her 
appreciation. Suddenly, she raised her head and asked me, “Do you know how much I 
want to go to Beijing (Paralympic Games)? Do you know how much I want that gold 
medal? I dream about it every day…”  After a short silence, “Never mind…,” she 
said. When I asked whether I can take her pictures, she agreed without hesitation and 
posed for me with a big smile.  
After my Nanjing trip, I kept visiting training centers for athletes with 
disabilities in Beijing. One of the centers was adjacent to the Southern Loop Three.
Every time, I went to the center, I have to trespass a strange urban community, often 
called “village within city.” Driving on the Loop Three, you can only see numerous 
skyscrapers. Behind some modern buildings, people sometimes may discover a 
village like residential compound with an old style public toilet that can be found by 
following the stench. Residents are not often Beijing natives but rural migrants who 
speak inscrutable dialects.  
One of my college classmates, who was familiar with the surrounding area, 
gave me some background information. In the late 1990s, the municipal government 
tended to renovate this area, but failed to reach an agreement with local residents 
(here he means residents with Beijing hukou) on compensation and relocation 
packages. The native residents are still expecting to receive better compensation, but 
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the government and real estate developers have no desire to initiate a negoti tion, both 
due to the prohibitive relocation cost and relatively low return for investing real estate 
in the southern city. Most native Beijingers who live here have obtain modern flats 
through other channels, thus rented out their old houses to rural migrants for profits.  
 My classmate also briefly introduced the dramatic change of the southern 
city he witnessed throughout the years. His parents were among the most elite 
gymnasts in the 1960s and later worked for the SCSPE. They lived in an allocated 
apartment closed to the SCSPE in the southern city. According to him, because all 
sporting agencies were semi-military, all the earlier sporting organizations and 
facilities carried military and defense functions. Therefore, the locations of sporting 
facilities, including the BUPE (locating in the northwestern suburb), the SCSPE (the 
southeastern suburb), the Workers’ Stadium (the eastern suburb), the Capital’s 
Stadium (the western suburb) and many others, were deliberately planed. Until 1990, 
the Asian Game Village in the northern suburb distinguishes itself from older sporting 
facilities by carrying new social meanings and functions, and permanently breaks the 
balance between the southern and northern cities.  
In 2005, the struggle over who has the legitimacy to stay in the city was 
getting fierce. Public debates and news regarding forceful relocation and 
demolishment of ancient buildings constantly made frontline in major domestic media, 
and attracted foreign media’s attention. In the meantime, the Beijing Games also 
became a target for public criticism for eliciting these undesired urban changes. The 
construction of a series of public transportation facilities, including the Loop Four, the 
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Loop Five, and the new Metro system, does not alleviate the growing traffic pressure, 
but keeps attracting new migrants to the city. More and more Beijingers discar  their 
old bikes and buy new cars, gradually turning the city into a gigantic parking lot. In
2005, standing on the passenger bridge above the Loop Three, I no longer felt 
alienated, because all drivers were patiently waiting under the bridge. All these urban 
changes make me to doubt whether the Beijing Games would bring happiness to its 
people. It also leads my research to a new direction – urban change – and pushes me 
to adopt new methods and angles for spatial analysis.  
Without geographical proximity, I started to use internet to communicate with 
people who live in the city and gather their opinions about the on-going urban change. 
On the one hand, I registered membership on various internet forums on Beijing urban 
life, including real estate, transportation, education, architecture, traveling, cuisine, 
urban photography and so on. I also followed personal Blogs, particularly those 
documenting life in Beijing. On the other hand, I closely followed media coverage of 
Beijing’s urban changes by both domestic and foreign media. Furthermore, I c ll cted 
contemporary literature and art works, including novels, documentaries, memoirs, pop 
music and movies on Beijing. Most importantly, I greatly benefited from historical 
records and academic research on urban studies. All these materials help me to for  a 
more comprehensive understanding of the city’s past trajectory, current dilemma and 
various layers of conflicts and negotiation that shape its future possibilities.  
Because of my heavy reliance on cyber ethnography, how English media and 
foreign travelers talk about Beijing gradually attracted my attention. By collecting 
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those works by Expats, short-term/long-term visitors, and foreign reporters who work 
in Beijing, I have another opportunity to re-visit the theory of Orientalism and its 
configuration within the contemporary context, such as Chinese intellectuals’ 
self-Orientalism.  
In 2007 and the early 2008, when the Chinese government and Chinese people 
were making their last effort to make the Beijing Games perfect, the trend of 
demonizing the Beijing Games in Western media was getting severe. At that time, I 
was still planning to use Agamben’s theory to conduct an analysis of the Bodhisattva 
dance, using a critique of the Chinese state to conclude my dissertation. However, the 
turbulence of global politics soon pushed me to another direction. Following the 
outbreak of Darfur genocide, critiquing China and challenging the Beijing Games 
soon became the Western media’s habitual practice. Because of language barrier and 
media censorship, the Western media can only reach the Chinese domestic audience in 
a very limited degree. Nevertheless, it had generated a tremendous influence on 
Chinese diasporic communities.  
On Unknown Space, debates between pro-China and pro-West parties were 
often turned to fierce arguments or even mutual insults. In early 2008, on the most 
popular board – China News, which was under the charge of a pro-West board master, 
a large number of pro-China IDs were banned from publishing their opinions. After 
the turmoil happened in Lhasa Tibet on March 14th 2008, the board master of China 
News kept banishing pro-China voices, by only allowing criticism of the Chinese 
government to be published on the board. To protest, many pro-China IDs collectively 
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abandoned China News and moved to Military  – a board under the charge of a 
patriarchic board master.  
This cyber movement (or revolution) was so successful that it made the once 
ever most popular China News falling out of the category of popular boards. On 
Military , pro-China IDs intensively discuss the possibility that the Lhasa turmoil may 
swing Taiwan’s presidential election and other possible consequences. Many held a 
very pessimistic opinion on Taiwan’s election; some even anticipated an immediate 
war across the Taiwan Strait; a few, who still care about the Beijing Games, lamented 
that all the effort made for the Beijing Games would be wasted. Such a negative and 
pessimistic atmosphere in Unknown Space set a tone for their following pro-China 
political actions. After the pro-China Kuomintang Party under the leadership of Ma
Ying-jeon won the presidential election, the tension across the Taiwan Strait was 
suddenly eased. Overseas Chinese had not enjoy a moment to celebrate their 
“heavenly blessed China,” soon encountered large-scale organized protests of he 
Olympic torch during the torch relay in Western countries.  
During this political turmoil, I actively participated in cyber discussion in 
Unknown Space, criticizing China’s ethnic policies on Tibet and firmly opposing all 
forms of boycotts against the Beijing Games. On April 8th 2008, when I browsed 
Unknown Space in the morning as usual, what caught my eyes were calls for donation 
for the pro-China/pro-Olympic demonstration in San Francisco and news about how a 
Chinese female torch bearer with disabilities was physical assaulted by protestors 
during the torch relay in Paris. All pro-China IDs were gathered in Mil tary  and San 
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Francisco. From the news picture, I saw the female wheelchair fencer I interviewed in 
2005. In the picture, she sits on a wheelchair and holds the torch firmly. At the very 
moment, I could barely hold my emotion in check. I soon completed a donation 
through Paypal. Three hours later, the organizers of the demonstration announced that 
they have raised enough money for the demonstration, and my donation was returned.  
From April 9th, the pro-China/pro-Olympic Games movement spread out from 
San Francisco to all cities that hosted the torch relay. Eventually, it ignited a 
nationalistic movement in mainland China and boosted the passion of the Chinese 
people to the Beijing Games to a new height. As an active participant of this cyber 
movement, I experienced a similar psychological transformation as my friend narrated 
in her blog – the self was expanded to an unprecedented degree. In other words, 
during this cyber movement, I felt a complete conflation between China and me. It 
forced me to discard my plan of concluding my dissertation with a critical 
examination of the sovereign state of China but to re-examine the dynamic and 
complicated conjuncture formed by the state, the West and the People/people.  
…… 
From the beginning stage of my research, I approached the subject matters as 
if I was an objective and distanced researcher. By going to the field and taki g “raw 
materials” from the suffering of the oppressed, I did realize and reveal my privileged 
position acquired through education in the West. When I started my project on the 
urban space of Beijing, I started to notice that writing about the subject matter 
involved me in a contest between “being-in-itself” and “being-for-an-other” (Chow, 
59 
 
2003). The contest forced me to undergo a dramatic transformation of my subjective 
consciousness, so that my consciousness is no longer only about the object (the other) 
but also about one’s self (Chow, 2003). By criticizing the West, I reminded myself not 
to aestheticize the value of minority positions, be it China’s position in the world 
system or my intellectual position in diaspora. Furthermore, when I investigatd 
suppressed groups, I also declared my self-interest –developing my intellectual career 
in the West. When I critically analyzed the Chinese state, I was protesting against my 
nationalistic self. In other words, by waging a war against the West, the Chin se state 
and the People/peoples, I waged a war against myself and made my research a 
journey of recovering a new self. Therefore, my dissertation is not only a 




Chapter Two: From Colonial Birth to Neoliberal Death: The Geopolitics of Preserving 
the Old Beijing 
Every appearance that manifests human beings thus becomes for them 
improper and factitious, and makes them confront the task of turning truth into 
their own proper truth. 
--Agamben (2000, p. 97). 
A SPECTACLE OF REMEMBERANCE 
 In 2004, the Beijing municipal government announced that, except for few 
government selected ancient urban areas, the majority of the Old City of Beijing, 
including numerous ancient valleys and traditional courtyards, would be demolished. 
According to the government, the demolition would be followed with a rebuilding of 
a pedestrian commercial district and modern residential areas. Even though te 
municipal government did not publicize its motivation for this urban reformation, to 
most Chinese citizens, its motivation was evident in that the government continued to 
present to the world a “New Beijing” for the coming 2008 Olympic Games.  
The announcement had an impact on a number of groups. On the international 
level, various media or individuals lamented the irrational hegemony of the Chinese 
government for destroying an invaluable cultural heritage. In addition, many predicted 
that it is almost unavoidable that such large-scale urban renovation would elicit 
coercive relocation, during which native residents’ interests would be sacrificed for 
this grand urban developmental project. Therefore, various human rights 
organizations began to initiate new campaigns to expose the on-going violation of 
human rights in China.2 On the domestic level, various websites were launched by 
                                                       
2 According to Michael Meyer (2008), the author of The Last Days of Old Beijing, the United Nations Educational, 
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people who identified themselves as Beijing natives, to protest the on-going urban 
demolition and to unleash a wave of nostalgic sentiment.3 I stead, a multiplicity of 
activities was on going in this cyberspace: people launched discussions on potential 
alternatives that could preserve the ancient urban space but still facilitate the 
transformation of Beijing into a modern metropolis; certain people wrote memoirs 
regarding their childhood spent in the Old City; some participants organized activities 
to record the demolition of ancient urban areas by using high-tech appliances, like 
digital cameras and camcorders. Many Beijing natives uploaded their vid o clips and 
pictures to websites. Some of the pictures present traditional aesthetics through 
highlighting the architectural styles of Beijing courtyards; others provide portraits of 
the mundane life of Beijing natives who were still living in these to-be-demolished 
courtyard houses. However, this spectacle of remembrance is not only limited to the 
those directly affected. Famous artist Zhan Wang, historian and ecological act vist 
Liang Congjie, writer Feng Jicai and other well-known intellectuals all participated in 
grand discussions about preserving the Old Beijing and criticized the government. 
Well-known guitar player Xia Yan and popular music singer Zhang Hongliang 
composed rock-and-roll songs to memorialize their courtyard childhood. As Feng 
Jicai puts it, “We are going to host a ‘humanistic Olympic Games’ (the official slogan 
of the Beijing 2008 Olympic Games). The on-going demolition of Old Beijing is 
against such a humanistic ideal. The Old Beijing is not only a cultural heritage of the 
                                                                                                                                                               
Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) expressed its concern with the Beijing government over th  
protection of historical and cultural heritage as erly as 2002. Both the Human Watch and Amnesty launched 
campaigns to reveal and protest against coercive relocation in preparation for the 2008 Olympic Games. 
 
3 For instance, oldbeijing.org and bbs.oldbeijing.or a e the cyber forums sponsored by people who identify 
themselves as native Beijing residents to memorize the disappearing ancient city.  
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Beijing people, but a heritage for the world.”  
This local-based cultural movement can almost be interpreted as an alliance 
between Beijing natives and Chinese intellectuals against the hegemony of the 
post-socialist state and conspiracy of global capitalism. If we make a careful 
examination of this spectacle of remembrance, we can clearly tell that it is  
movement of a collection of groups. Therefore one might ask: how do the masses and 
intellectuals share a similar sentiment of nostalgia and grief? What kind of 
identity-politics is played out? What kind of mechanism is working to bringing the 
intellectuals and the masses together? How should we understand this spontaneous 
and collective mourning of loss in the greater globalization context in which the local 
and national cultures are downplayed? How does the individualist and liberalist 
rhetoric of nostalgia of intellectuals and collectivist lyrics of local identity by the 
masses compatibly play out?  
Freud (1923) ever points out that identification with a lost object has “a great 
share in determining the form taken by the ego and that it makes an essential 
contribution towards building up what is called its ‘character’” (p. 23). Across 
different cultural contexts, the boundaries between the common vernaculars and 
intellectual discourse always have been well delineated and defended. Sharing one 
“character” based on the common loss or embracing one identity for the identical 
political interests is possible but is destined to contain evident or hidden tensions and 
contradictions. The embodied collective mourning is not composed of a diversity of 
individuals “but a diversity of groups each with its own language, spatial position, 
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dynamics and relationship to the (diminishing) physical environment” (Laughlin, 
2000, p. 37).  
This collective and spontaneous mourning, at first glance, tends to confirm the 
singularity of the Chinese state as an irrational and inconceivable Other. It stimulates 
people to wonder when the Chinese state can finally become a civilized member of 
the world nation community, and when it will stop being irrational against a universal 
humanitarian system of values? However, the naturalization of the Chinese stat as an 
Other may also run the risk of simplifying the on-going political complex. As Zhang 
Xudong (2001a) remarks, “the habit goes unchallenged – both inside and outside 
China – to view everything in the PRC through the imagined totality of the 
government and its official policies and rhetoric” and “to see anything 
extragovernmental as instantaneously and naturally subversive, progressive and good” 
(p. 3). Therefore, the irrationality of the Chinese nation-state, either as a constructed 
or an essential feature, also calls for critical inquiry.  
To solve this paradox, in this chapter, I focus on the role of Chinese architects 
and then investigate a constellation of processes to map out the contingent power 
dynamics that shaped and keep shaping the urban space of Beijing. “A focus on the 
material inscriptions of power in the everydayness of the city involves a consideration 
of how power can be sustained through architectonic forms” (Gandy, 2006, p. 498). 
The processes that I will explore include the socio-cultural politics, through which 
construction of Chinese architecture and the Beijing courtyard culture are achieved, 
the interaction between local politics/culture and global flows, the participation of 
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state in the transformation of urban spaces for Beijing’s global future, and the 
embracing of a cosmopolitan subjectivity in a global scheme. In order to achieve t ese 
goals, I have to trace the historical trajectory through which the discourses of 
historical preservation, particularly the preservation of architecture in Old Beijing, 
came into being.  
NEO-CONSERVATIVE LIANG FAMILY AND ITS INTELLECTUAL 
RESIDUE 
The emergence of the notion “preserve the Old Beijing” is interwoven with the 
prominent intellectual Liang family in China. Liang Qichao (1873-1929) is among the 
six intellectual political activists who advocated a constitutional reformation to the 
Qing monarchy (1644-1912). Borrowing from the Meiji Restoration as a paradigm, 
Liang Qichao, along with his peers, suggested that the Qing government engagein 
self-reformation on both institutional and ideological levels for modernization. Even
though Liang’s political reformation was violently terminated by the political 
conservatives in the Qing government and he was forced into exile in Japan, he kept 
endorsing the Qing monarchy during the early republican era of China.  
The son of Liang Qichao, Liang Sicheng (1901-1972) is among the first 
generation of Chinese students to travel abroad. Liang studied architecture at the 
University of Pennsylvania and Harvard University, and established one of th first 
architecture programs in China after he came back from the United States. Later, 
Liang also taught at the Architecture School at Tsinghua University and conducted a 
thorough field research on traditional Chinese architecture in north China during the 
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1920s and 1930s. His academic works include A Pictorial History of Chinese 
Architecture, which is generally considered to be the first modern study of Chinese 
traditional architecture. In addition to academic research, Liang Sicheng was also 
actively involved in the restoration of various historical architectural sites, including 
the Forbidden City and the Temple of Confucius, and designed landmark architectural 
works, such as the National Monument for People’s Heroes in Tiananmen Square in 
19514.  
Liang Sicheng remarks that “Beijing is an unparalleled masterpiece of city 
planning” and should be preserved as an entire complex (quoted from Wu, 1999, p. 
6-7 & p. 10). Working as the director of Beijing’s Urban Planning Commission for the 
new People’s Republic, Liang proposed to develop a new urban center to host the 
communist party government and governmental employees at the western suburb of 
the old Beijing. Nevertheless, for many historical reasons, Liang’s plan was ot 
accepted by the Communist government. First, to Mao Zedong and many left-wing 
party leaders, Beijing is a symbolic repository of feudal sovereignty. The primary goal 
of the communist party was to eliminate various social and cultural hierarchies, which 
cannot be achieved only by facilitating economic equality. To Mao, creating a 
communist culture, including communist architectural aesthetics and communist 
urban space, was also critical to the communist nation building. The city of Beijing, 
as the political center of communist China, has to represent a communist ideal and 
anticipate utopian spatiality. Second, the lack of an economic basis is another reason 
                                                       
4 See Liang and Lin Partners in Exploring China’s Architec ual Past, by W. Fairbank. University of Pennsylvania. 
Also, further information can be found in Writing a Modern Chinese Architectural History: Liang Sicheng and 
Liang Qichao by Li Shiqiao.  
66 
 
that the communist regime adopted the old urban center as its host (Wu, 1999). By the 
time the new People’s Republic took power, China had just gone through the 
Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945) and the Civil War (1945-1948) and anticipated the 
Korean War (1950-1953). The financial situation forced the Communist party to 
maximize the utilitarian values of the old Beijing rather than initiate a grand urban 
project. In addition, it was believed that Liang’s proposal – building an independent 
modern urban center in the western suburb – might lead to various transportation 
issues and possibly accelerate the deterioration of the old urban center which already
faced increased derelict housing (Wu, 1999). Therefore, the spatial production in 
Maoist China, particularly in the case of Beijing, was not only due to the sociali t 
mode of spatial production, but also due to the historical condition of materialistic 
scarcity and weak planning power in a peculiar socialist/Third World national context 
(Lu, 2006).  
Taking the urban center of old Beijing as its political center, the communist 
party immediately faced the issue of providing housing for employees and improv ng 
the living conditions of the residents. Many modern residential compounds, designed 
purely for utilitarian value rather than aesthetic merit, were gradually scattered within 
the old city and in its close suburbs, which disturbed the indigenous and aesthetic 
cosmology of the old city. Simultaneously, the dramatically increased population 
density not only facilitated an expansion of living space but also challenged the 
transportation infrastructure of the old city. As a result, many ancient living
compounds were demolished to launch modern road systems, including a beltway 
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(also called ring road) surrounding the old city and radial roads that connect the urban 
center to suburbs.  
Thus, Liang Sicheng’s enthusiasm for traditional Chinese architecture, 
particularly his ambition to protect the old city of Beijing as a whole, was dampened 
in the 1950s. From 1950, ancient city walls were gradually demolished5. The 
continuous urban demolition and renewal projects in Beijing led to the first 
confrontation between Liang Sicheng and the communist party (Hu, 2006). On the 
grass-roots level, a story regarding Liang’s endeavor to protect the city wall is still 
circulated by word of mouth. It states that prior to the demolition of the city walls for 
modern transportation – the current Second Ring Road and subway system – Liang 
Sicheng leaned against the city wall and cried out loud. Liang’s desperation cn also 
be traced in Mao Zedong’s speech, as he put it in 1958, “antique can be good, and also 
can be bad. Someone cried when Beijing dismantled the city walls and gateway 
entrances, which indicated the political attitude” (quoted from Hu, 2006).  
The triumph of communist ideology on Beijing urban planning in the 1950s 
somehow predicted a more radical social movement against historical and cultural 
heritage during the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976). During the Cultural Revolution, 
except for limited significant historical sites such as the Forbidden City, Confucius 
Temple and the Summer Palace, many historical sites were pulverized or destr yed by 
Red Guards for their feudal aesthetics which represented a cultural hierarc y. Prior to 
                                                       
5 As an outgrowth of their function as military nexi during the feudal era, Chinese cities tend not to 




the Cultural Revolution, Liang had been identified as an extreme rightist and was 
frequently exposed to public criticism. Liang’s death during the Cultural Revolution is 
generally believed to be as a result of party persecution and therefore carries a 
strongly tragic sense.  
To the general public, Liang’s tragic death and his insolvable melancholia 
have been closely aligned with the catastrophe of the old city of Beijing. In the 
post-revolution era, Liang’s architectural and aesthetic beliefs keep shaping public 
understanding of urban spaces. In the Architecture School at Tsinghua University, the 
most prestigious university in China, a group of architects who inherited Liang’s 
thinking, insist on resuming his preservation-oriented urban planning agenda. For 
instance, Wu Liangyong, a professor and the chairman of Tsinghua architecture school, 
in his work Rehabilitating the Old City of Beijing, reflects on Liang’s theories and 
raises a new approach which he calls “organic renewal” (Wu, 1999). Taking both the 
preservation of urban fabric and architectural styles into consideration, Wu (1999)
favors preservation of the urban structures of the old city gradually adopting these 
ancient features into modern life. Different from Liang Sicheng, Wu (1999) is not 
only concerned with preserving the architectural aesthetics of the ancient urba  fabric, 
but also calls for the protection of the organic nature of the ancient neighborhoods. 
Wu designed the redevelopment of Ju’er Hutong (Ju’er alley) and was actively 
involved in the construction process.  
With the endeavors from other scholars and students from Tsinghua 
Architecture and advocates of urban preservation, including historian and ecological 
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activist Liang Congjie (son of Liang Sicheng), preservation of Old Beijing has 
gradually become one of the central issues of Beijing urban planning. On the one 
hand, these architects and scholars, who inherit Liang’s intellectual heritage, use their 
access to domestic public media, such as news paper interviews and TV talk shows, to 
raise public consciousness about the importance of preserving Old Beijing. For 
instance, Liang Congjie and another radical architect who endorses the notion of 
reconstructing Beijing as a global modern city debated on a TV talk show, which as 
broadcast nationwide. On the other hand, along with the globalization of higher 
education and academic communication, more Chinese students and scholars have 
entered the circle of Western academia. Positioning themselves in the Western system, 
these Chinese architects and architectural scholars facilitate the circulation of Liang’s 
urban conservationism around the world as a transnational intellectual currency.  
IN THE NAME OF CHINESENESS 
It requires only a brief acquaintance with the vicissitudes of the Liang family 
within the context of these turbulent political times to note that the significance of 
Chinese traditional architecture has never stopped being contested and rewritten. It let 
us to examine “Whether the emergence of a national perspective – of an elite or 
subaltern nature – within a culture of social contestation, can ever articulate its 
‘representative’ authority in the fullness of narrative time” (Bhabha, 1994b, p. 206). 
Among the various historical conjunctures, I am more interested in how traditional 
Chinese architecture, which represented utilitarian functions and symbolic values in 
the feudal era, have become the target of knowledge production. In the republican era 
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(1912-1949) following the closure of the Qing Monarchy in 1912, the City Walls 
stopped carrying military functions, and ancient courtyard houses were no longer 
associated with aristocratic status. The epistemic-political-institutional value system 
of the Chinese feudal society seemed to dissipate gradually. As Hobsbawm and 
Ranger (1983) remark “objects or practices are liberated for full symbolic and ritual 
use when no longer fettered by practical use.” (p.4) When Liang Qichao witnessed 
that his proposal of a constitutional monarchy lost political currency, his son Liang
Sicheng soon discovered treasures from the monarchy’s spatial residuals. 
Nevertheless, its spatial residuals had undergone a cultural transformation through 
which the relationship between architectural spaces and value was now encompassed 
by the embodiment of Chineseness and a mechanism of knowledge production on 
Chineseness (in this case, Chinese architecture). In other words, during the 
transformation, the old urban space of Beijing shifted its role from the production of 
feudal space to a space of knowledge production. Such a seamless transition created 
an illusion of absolute knowledge (Lefebvre, 1991). This intricate and overlapping set 
of geopolitical transformation lays the foundation for a perpetual traffic in ideas of 
nationhood, peoplehood and selfhood (Apparudai, 1996). It permanently confines 
some Chinese architectural intellectuals in irresoluble melancholy for the 
disappearance of ancient urban space. This melancholy, or perpetual longing for the 
loss of a Chinese aesthetical heritage, directs us to reflect on the original discovery of 
the treasure, namely Liang Sicheng’s announcement of Beijing City as “an 
unparalleled masterpiece” and as an object of aesthetic scrutiny.  
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In Translingual Practice, Lydia Liu (1995) points out that self-congratulation 
on the part of Chinese intellectuals regarding the Chinese holistic world and Chinese 
essence is a result of theoretical borrowing from Western modernity. A similar 
argument is presented by Lupke (1995), “(t)he twentieth century in general has been a 
period during which Chinese intellectuals have looked to the West for all sorts of 
models whereby to reconceptualize cultural values in China (p. 130).”As a matterof 
fact, Liang Sicheng’s life trajectory fully embodies this colonial cultura  hierarchy. As 
a Chinese elite intellectual who was born in Japan when his father was in exile, Liang 
Sicheng finished his education in the West. During his time at the University of 
Pennsylvania, Liang studied under Paul Cret, who advocates pushing architecture 
toward a new classicism (Farnham, 1998). Negotiating between the aestheticism of 
traditional Western classics and the rationalism of technological novelty, Cret asserts 
that “the past must not be forgotten as a distinct and constituent part of the present” 
(Farnham, 1998, p. 264). However, Cret also had to compromise with rational modern 
engineering to find the most satisfactory synthesis.  
Returning to Liang Sicheng’s sentiments over Chinese traditional architecture, 
if we can frame his neo-conservatism within the historical disjuncture between East 
and West in the modern epoch, the Chineseness that Liang highlights in architectural 
knowledge, therefore, can be naturally linked to the Chinese nationalistic struggles 
over ethnicity, civilization and national identity. According to Liu (1995), 
disenchantment with the materialistic culture of the West seems to facilitate Chinese 
scholars to look for alternative solutions by reviving the symbolic resources of their 
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native culture and remaking cultural pride. While Cret still had to wrestle with 
engineering rationalism to rescue the declining Western classics, Liang insisted that 
the great civilization is still well preserved in China.  
Rather than characterize Chinese architecture as “backward” and “inferior” to 
Western classics, Liang Sicheng announced that Chinese architecture is a nation l 
treasure beyond the value system delineated by the Western classics. Here, I want to 
borrow Spivak’s (1985a) inquiry of the emergence of Marxist feminist canons – what 
subject-effects were systematically effaced and trained to efface themselves so that a 
canonic norm might emerge?—to investigate Liang’s consciousness of naming the 
Chinese architectural classics. In Scattered Speculations on the Question of Value, 
Spivak (1985a) trenchantly points out, “(w)hen we feminist Marxists are ourselves 
moved by a desire for alternative canon-formations, we work with varieties of and 
variations upon the old standards (p. 74).” Throughout the canon-construction, the 
feminist subject has to prove that the existing Canon is not transcendental and that 
exceptions exist outside the boundaries of the Canon as a differential. Through 
establishing analogical equivalence between the Canon and the exceptional 
differential, the subject can legitimize the value of the exception she recognized 
within the logic of the Canon. Thus, value could be realized by using an analogy to 
bridge the metonymy (the exception) with the metaphor (the Canon) rather than solely 
through Marxist labor production (Spivak, 1985a). In other words, rather than 
challenging the value of the Canon, feminist Marxism confirms the value of classical 
Marxism by bringing the exception they identified in to the Marxist value system.  
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To construct the equivalence of exchange between the Canon and the 
exception, the subject-effects, in other words the subjective desire for value, must be 
effaced or rearticulated. In the account of Liang Sicheng’s construction of aesthetical 
values of Chinese architecture, his arguing for Chinese singularity could be 
interpreted as restoration and preservation of knowledge for the sake of the Chinese 
nation and culture building. His internal drive is indicative of an anxiety to rescue 
authentic cultural China from the extinction brought by imperialist nation-states. 
However, due to the asymmetrical structure between the modern West and China, his 
efforts to valorize and promote China are being made through a priori surrender to 
Western theoretical domination and an unconscious downplay of the cultural 
contestation between East and West.  
Not only deferring to the order of Western canon, Liang also adopts the 
Western consciousness. As Spivak (1996) remarks, “consciousness is not thought, but 
rather the subject’s irreducible intendedness towards the object” (p. 109). Clifford 
(1988) further theorizes the construction of a Western subject through two strategies: 
property ownership and repetitive exhibition of what is being owned. The two 
strategies can be clearly located in Liang’s endeavor to historicize Chin se 
architecture and the endless effort of getting his work A Pictorial History of Chinese 
Architecture published in Western academia (Lu, 2007). The strong sense of 
ownership is accumulated through Liang’s systematic study of thousands of pieces of 
architecture in North China. Using photography and drawings, Liang wants to prove 
to the world the “authenticity” of Chinese architecture with its distinguished foreign 
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features fossilized in pictures and photography. Even though Liang was subjected to 
ideological criticism during the Cultural Revolution, considered the most disastrous 
epoch for Chinese intellectuals, he never stopped trying to publish his “A Pictorial 
History” in the West. This work’s final publication in 1984 in the United States has 
been widely addressed by Chinese scholars to demonstrate his intense desire to show 
these national treasures to the World (see Rowe & Kuan, 2003; Li, 2003; Lu, 2007).  
Even though Liang’s construction of architectural Chineseness is by no means 
Eurocentric, Chinese architects and scholars who inherit Liang’s thoughts tend to 
naturalize this construction by ignoring the influence generated by the West. If we 
take a historical account into consideration, it is evident that the Orientalist studies of 
Chinese architecture definitely did not originate from Liang. Instead, the colonial 
power never stopped its efforts at “domestication” of Chinese architecture since the 
early 19th century (Dirlik, 2005). Nevertheless, rather than directly referring to 
Western orientalist studies of China, Chinese intellectuals manifest an enthusiasm to 
embrace self-orientalism by framing Chinese architecture as an absolute Other. The 
type of self-Orientalization could be interpreted as a desire for a collective agency of 
self-representation. In order to circumvent Marx’s dictum in The Eighteenth Brumaire 
of Louis Bonaparte that “They cannot represent themselves; they must be 
represented," Chinese architects and intellectuals are interpellated to embrace “a 
compulsory self-ownership,” to repetitively show their allegorical cultural existence 
(Chow, 2002, p. 123). Zhang Xudong (1994) even theorizes that, generally Chinese 
intellectuals’ “heritage” is either associated with the Western symbolic order or the 
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Chinese gentry tradition. Nevertheless, in this case the collective desire to be a su j ct 
of knowledge production should not be severed from its discursive connection with 
Western modernity. Therefore, their embracing architectural Chinesenes  and the 
formation of a collective consciousness vis-à-vis an aesthetical heritage should be 
understood as a complex configuration between the Western symbolic order and the
nationalist spirit of Chinese gentry. It further reveals that their persist nt pursuit for 
cultural autonomy preconditions the following loss of the identified “national 
treasure” during Mao’s era. Their narcissistic self-consciousness of ownership also 
predicts an irrevocable trauma when their mission of preserving Chinese essence fails.  
To some Chinese cultural studies scholars, the most valuable feature of 
Maoism is the revolutionary concept of erasing difference not only in economic ters 
but also in a cultural dimension (Liu, 1997). In other words, creating a homogeneous 
and inclusive proletarian nation is achieved by “creating new linguistic and aesthetic 
forms that are not only national and popular, but also revolutionary and proletarian” 
(Liu, 1997, p. 75-76). Mao’s political aesthetics also accurately reflect on the 
architectural style in post-1949 China. In Beijing, socialist architectural style, adopted 
from the Soviet Union, emerged in the middle of traditional residential compounds. 
During the Cultural Revolution, spurred on by Mao’s propaganda, some historical 
architectural pieces were demolished or destroyed by “Red Guards” to erase any 
residue of from the Confucian and bourgeois eras. In addition, one of the major 
effects of this public aesthetic was to replace individual subjectivity with a collective 
proletarian consciousness. As a result, intellectuals, including architects and scholars, 
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became the target of condemnation or persecution. In particular, those intellectuals 
trained in the West who held onto the idea of protecting the Chinese cultural heritage 
were perceived as a bourgeois class undermining the grand communist project. Their 
experiences also led to Chinese intellectuals’ hostility toward the Cultural Revolution 
by defining the era as a “carnivalesque suspension of social hierarchy” (Lu, 2004, p. 
561).  
During the Cultural Revolution, trying to disrupt the town-country dichotomy, 
Mao urged urban youth and intellectuals to leave urban educational institutions and 
immerse themselves in the rural proletarian culture. At the same time, Mao highly 
encouraged reproduction as an attempt to prepare army reserves – for the anticipated 
Third World War between socialist and capitalist camps, or possibly between th  
Soviet Union and China – and to fulfill grand communist projects. In addition, 
ideological struggles were given priority over economic development and 
infrastructure construction. When the Cultural Revolution came to an end after Mao’s 
death in 1976, the accumulated population and people returning from the rural areas 
made urban housing among the most urgent issues facing the Chinese government. 
Addressed by different scholars, in the pre-1949 era, urban Beijing had a very low 
population density. In most cases, one single-story courtyard house could usually host 
one to three families. Compared to the post-Mao era, one courtyard house could host 
more than five or six families without private toilet and bath. Under such conditions, a 
sense of privacy becomes luxurious.  
Severely deteriorating living conditions and various social issues have been 
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reflected in mass media culture. For instance, acclaimed author Liu Heng, a Beijing
native, published his novel Garrulous Zhang Damin’s Happy Life (Pinzui Zhang 
Damin de Xingfu Shenghuo) and provided a fictional account of a Beijing native 
Zhang Damin who lives in one of these ancient courtyard houses. The novel depicts 
the various social conflicts that arise out of such harsh living conditions. For instance, 
Zhang competes with his younger brother over who should have the right to bring the 
wife to their already overly crowded courtyard. Expecting a baby, Zhang has to build 
a room in the yard, which causes a fight between Zhang and his neighbor. Zhang’s 
youngest brother feels perpetual hatred towards the whole family and the courtyard 
lifestyle. In the finale, the Zhang family can resume their happy life in a modern 
apartment. Because of its popularity, this novel was later converted into other media 
formats, such as a film, a series of TV shows, and a local opera.  
Even though housing conditions in the post-Mao era were severely deficient, 
what is unexpected is that the adverse physical environment forced the neighbors in 
the courtyard houses to generate an unusually close relationship. In other words, 
sacrifice of privacy is compensated by a sense of community. Wu Liangyong’s (1999) 
field research in Beijing courtyard houses reveals the following: someone who had a 
night shift could ask his/her neighbor to keep quiet during the daytime; children were 
looked after by their neighbors when their parents were absent, and neighbors made 
visits with each other on a daily basis without prior announcements. Even though 
Beijing courtyard residents suffer material scarcity, drug usage and criminal acts – 
which are usually prevalent in Western urban ghettos – are rare.  
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To mitigate the housing shortage in Beijing and satisfy the need of modern 
subjectivities, the dilapidated urban places had to be turned into modern residential 
spaces. According to Wu (1999), in 1987, Beijing launched a practical experiment to 
renew derelict courtyard houses in the old city. No longer being targeted as the 
people’s enemy, a group of scholars and architects from Tsinghua University, under 
the leadership of Wu Liangyong, had a chance to resume their pre-revolution mission 
– transforming ancient residential living areas into modern habitats without 
devastating the Chinese architectural aesthetics. Thus, in the post-Cultural Revolution 
epoch, “cultures condemned to extinction in an earlier period have found renewed life 
in service to aspirations for ‘alternative modernity’ (Dirlik, 2005, p.44-45).”  
What makes Wu and his colleagues, the post-revolutionary intellectuals, 
different from Liang Sicheng is a new notion they proposed – heritage preservation 
should not be limited to architectural aesthetics. Preservation of the urban fabric and 
traditional neighborhoods both deserve sufficient considerations, an initiative 
described as “organic renewal.” In other words, one of the most valuable features of 
the old Beijing is its commune culture, “a contrastive rather than a substantive 
property of certain things” (Appadurai, 1996b, p. 12). No longer represented as a 
stigmatized pre-modern lifestyle and related to an embarrassing absence of privacy, 
life in Beijing courtyard compounds has suddenly become a treasure for Beijing 
natives, architects and urban planners.  
At first glance, we might assume that Wu and his colleagues take a humanistic 
turn. But an in-depth examination reveals that their practices have not been freed from 
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the influence of East-West intellectual exchanges. In Wu’s (1999) reflection on the 
Ju’er Hutong project, he mentions that, influenced by Jane Jacobs’ (1970 & 1992) 
writing on the drastic clearance of urban slums, he decides to rank organic renewal as 
his top concern. In response to Jacob’s writings, which “highlight the relationship 
between the deteriorating physical environment in blighted areas and the consequent 
loss of tax revenues, the increase in government subsidies, and the worsening of crime
and social delinquency” (Wu, 1999, p. 64), once again, Chinese architects and urban 
designers witness the disenchantment of modern urbanity and discover that a new 
treasure, namely a sense of community, is well preserved in Beijing courtyard 
compounds.  
Nevertheless, the theoretical position taken by Jane Jacobs (1970 & 1992) is 
far from politically progressive. If we take a deeper reading of Jacob’s agenda of 
urban planning, it is evident that crime prevention, urban tax revenues and upgrading 
the physical environments are her primary concerns. From this perspective, the liberal 
political position Jacobs takes is to call a political order into question as an attempt o 
reinforce and preserve a state sovereignty rather than overthrow it (Brown, 2005). 
Jacob’s position could be mistakenly perceived as taking the political stance of the 
marginalized social groups but it indeed treats the subalterns as objects of knowledge 
production and populations to discipline. Even though “Western critics take pride in 
their objective, liberalist, and pluralistic approaches, it is a mistake to believe that 
their practice has been free from the influence of political contingencies” (Liu, 1993, 
p. 16). Just as Barme (1989) laments: 
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Technocrats reformulate the social contract, one in which consensus replaces 
coercion, and complicity subverts criticism. Censorship is no longer the job of 
a ham-fisted apparat, but a partnership involving artists, audiences and 
commissars alike. This is “progressive censorship,” and it has an aesthetic all 
of its own (p. 62).  
Accordingly, Wu’s campaign to preserve the sense of community in his urban 
planning and architectural design is also a disciplinary tactic, since interpersonal 
closeness is manipulated to control potential criminality in the gradually gentrified 
city. Privileging the sense of community which is still well “preserved” in the old 
Beijing, Chinese architects and urban planners have successfully raised the public’s
consciousness about its possession of this substantive cultural property. The public’s 
subjective fantasy over the ownership of this cultural property is fully articulated in 
various works of literature and media products showing the uniqueness of their urban 
experiences. For instance, in Garrulous Zhang Damin’s Happy Life, due to pressure 
from his neighbors, Zhang Damin has to build his housing extension without cutting a 
big tree. After several rounds of negotiations with his neighbors, Zhang ends up 
allowing the tree to grow through his roof. Feeling rather embarrassed, Zhang still 
maintains an ebullient attitude and enjoys his “happy” life. He even names his new 
born baby Zhang Shu (shu means tree in Chinese). Similar mass media products, built 
upon individual fantasy and the nostalgia of Beijing natives, circulated in the market 
in post-revolutionary China (Li, 1996). What is problematic is that this enchantment 
with Beijing courtyard life embodied in various textual works is more often portrayed 
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as an essential feature belonging to a special group defined by locale rather th n a 
byproduct of China’s special historical trajectory. A closer look at the sense of 
community in Beijing courtyard compounds suggests that the sense of 
interdependency cannot be understood without the high housing density and the 
communist equalitarianism promoted during the Mao era. As a matter of fact, this 
sense of community was never a patent exclusively belonging to Beijing nat ves but a 
nationwide phenomenon. Nevertheless, the privilege afforded by architects to Beijing
courtyard life sanctions a special cultural superiority to Beijing natives and 
preconditions the aforementioned spectacle of remembrance. The cultural superiority 
of being a Beijing native has caused and is still causing endless identity poli cs. 
Therefore, identification of Beijing courtyard life as cultural heritage not only 
reserves a potential space to reinvent new identity politics, but also erases the 
modernity’s complex becoming (Dirlik, 2000; Wang, 2004).  
Partially due to Maoism’s revolutionary and anti-intellectual traditions, 
Chinese intellectuals are reluctant to acknowledge that the sense of commune in 
courtyard compounds was shaped by Maoist Communism. Furthermore, positioning 
the courtyard life as a cultural property, Chinese intellectuals demonstrate their 
intention to build alliances with the powerless urban residents. Unlike Liang Scheng, 
who was exclusively preoccupied by Chinese classic aesthetics, contemporary 
Chinese architects have shifted their aesthetical attention from the Chinese 
architectural essence to Chinese cultural patterns. By doing so, Chinese intellectuals 
strategically compete with the state over the “Chinese people” for their ever 
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conflicting interests with the state (Chow, 1995, p. 114). Therefore, their deliberate 
cultivation of the aesthetic object – courtyard life – is indeed politically contingent.  
NEOLIBERAL ENCROACHMENT 
After finishing the follow-up studies for the first three phases of the Ju’er 
Hutong Rehabilitating Project in 1993, Wu Liangyong (1999) notes, apart from 
several problems already identified, that his organic renewal project is practically 
feasible and deserves further generalization. According to the result of Wu’s study, 
residents generally report that their living conditions have been greatly improved. In 
addition, most residents agree that their privacy is better protected without losing the 
sense of commune (Wu, 1999). Most significantly to Wu (1999), the traditional 
architectural aesthetics, that is the Chineseness, is well preserved. In his follow-up 
study, Wu (1999) also acknowledges that the successful realization of the Ju’er 
Hutong Rehabilitating Project cannot be separated from the Beijing housing reform 
policy, otherwise, the project could remain “an idea on paper” (p. 185). Wu (1999) 
notes that the developers reported that they had “a slight profit” from it (p. 202). 
Therefore, Wu (1999) claims “the high cost of redeveloping housing in the Old City 
suggests that it should be commercialized in order to make development of 
infrastructure and public service improvement financially feasible” (p. 191).  
The housing reform that Wu refers to was initiated by the Chinese government 
in an attempt to gradually commercialize the housing market. The Chinese archit cts 
obviously forgot Marx’s theorizing of the nature of capitalism: capitalism is not about 
making profit for self-survival but maximizing profit for self-expansion. Apparently, 
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the approved “slight profit” cannot satisfy the gluttony of capitalism. When Chi ese 
architects were ready to generalize their organic renewal project, th  radically 
commercialized housing market was no longer willing to accommodate their 
aesthetical experiments. The comparatively higher price to build the Chinese 
traditional architecture and the relatively low population density (in order to maintain 
the sense of closeness) all became excuses for developers to favor high-rise apa tment 
buildings. To the municipal government, mitigating the housing shortage for local 
residents with subsidized prices as well as collecting taxes from commercial 
apartments is their primary mission. Particularly, when the Chinese state joins the 
game of urban commercialization as the most advantaged player (see Gu & Liu, 2002; 
Zhou & Logan, 2002; He, Li & Wu, 2006; Wu, Xu & Yeh, 2007), the Chinese 
architects find that they cannot maintain their aesthetic and humanistic grounding in 
the neoliberal turbulence with Chinese characteristics. In addition, marketiz tion of 
land use rights has led to skyrocketing housing prices, which make housing in the old 
city no longer affordable for most courtyard residents. What is ridiculous that many 
older residents in the new Ju’er Hutong sold or rented their residences out to wealthy 
consumers, either Chinese new rich or expatriates, who are attracted to Wu’s 
synthesization of modern architecture and traditional style. Therefore, “residents have 
been displaced by upwardly mobile professionals, including quite a few foreign 
tenants, who consider it a nice place to live” (Li, Dray-Novey & Kong, 2007, p. 274). 
As Zhao (1997) ridicules, commercialization is “indeed what the intellectuals called 
for as part of liberalization, but once it came, they despaired” (p. 37).  
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In the meantime, the aesthetic agenda of preserving authentic Chineseness is 
also under attack. A group of radical Chinese architects has started to challenge 
Liang’s synthetic approach. As they point out, the architectural style valued by Wu 
Liangyong and other traditional architects is tantamount to reproduce “an abstract 
modern body with a Chinese roof – a sentimental, scenographic regionalism with a 
strong connotation of imperial nationalism” (Li, 2000, p.392). This trend in 
architecture echoes the post-allegorical phase in other domains, such as literature and 
film production, aiming at challenging Jameson’s (1985) stereotypical theorizing of 
the Third World as perpetual national allegories. No longer privileging the metaphor 
of Chineseness, Li (2000) argues that the Chinese traditional “ideals” have prevented 
Chinese architecture from marching towards a global culture. Rejecting the no ion 
“the more ethnic, the more international” (Visser, 2004, p. 286), radical Chinese 
architects and architectural students tend to adopt a new architectural langu ge to 
escape the irrevocable nostalgia of old and are eager to be integrated into the World 
value system without being an Other in the margin. Therefore, in the 1990s, 
postmodern designs and indigenous expression were juxtaposed in the urban space of 
China and contested for legitimacy.  
The contestation between the local and global architectural forms is along with 
a subjective transformation that the ever highly privileged identity – Beijing native – 
has been replaced by an emergent cosmopolitan subjectivity. Along with Beijing 
embracing global capitalism, the Chinese government has demonstrated a tendency to 
transform the big city as a denationalized space – a site that welcomes foreign talents 
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and captures circulating global values rather than a space for tourists’ shor stay (Ong, 
2007). When Beijing competes with other Asian cities, such as Hong Kong, Singapore, 
Taipei and Shanghai, for talented foreigners to work and stabilize capital, its local 
identity has to be downplayed in order to create a space to accommodate 
heterogeneous identities and cosmopolitan subjectivity. Ethnic Chinese returnees – 
those educated in prestigious Western institutions with working experiences in 
transnational corporations, and who enjoy a cosmopolitan lifestyle – override various 
Chinese local identities and destabilize the original meaning of urban citizensh p. 
Embodying global value, their presence soon makes the nostalgia for Beijing 
courtyard life fall out of fashion. Even the most nostalgic Beijing artists who protest 
the urban renewal projects are eager to embrace a cosmopolitan subjectivity after 
packing up their nostalgia for sale in the global media market (Liu, 2004; Visser, 
2004).  
CODA 
By showing the intertwined relationship between Chinese architecture, the old 
city of Beijing and Chinese architects, I want to provide an “unsentimental analysis of 
the intellectual elite” (Zhang, 1997, p. xi). To read the modern Chinese cultural 
genealogy, its discursive connection with the Western modernity has to be prudently 
examined. However, in many works by Western architects and scholars, there is a 
tendency to treat changes of Chinese cityscapes as an unreadable singularity. For 
instance, on the one hand, Broudehoux (2007) acknowledges that, “China 
emphatically signaled that it no longer wished to ‘catch up’ with the modern world, 
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but that it had arrived on the world stage and now strived to get ahead” (p. 385). On 
the other hand, she laments, by destroying Beijing’s historical and cultural landscape, 
the Chinese government “has annihilated part of the city’s competitive advantage and 
erased the particularities that had give Beijing its distinctive flavor” (Broudehoux, 
2007, p. 389). The type of national narration is so ambivalent that it is caught between 
continuous progress and timeless impasse (Bhabha, 1994b). Not only can we 
categorize Broudehoux’s argument as a Jamesonian reading of the Third World, but 
we may also reveal the anxiety over the disappearance of “anachronistic space” 
(McClintock, 1995), upon which she can heighten our sensitivity to differences and 
sustain her allegorical reading of Chinese urban space. In addition, making the 
Chinese state an irrational Other conceals the discursive influence of the West which 
contributes to the prevalence of neoliberalism in Chinese urban space.  
Meanwhile, there is also an orientation for Chinese architects and scholars to 
conceptualize the reconfiguration of Chinese urban spaces and architectures through a 
Chinese chronicle (see Wang, 1997; Li, 2000; Lu, 2006). To a certain degree, it 
reveals a narcissistic Sino-centralism and an arbitrary understanding of history as 
constituted of isolated fractions. The evident nostalgic sentiment in their writing 
signifies not only their success in transforming Chinese architectural aesthetics and 
authentic Chinese culture into intellectual currency to circulate in a world of value, 
but also their failure to maintain the value of their ownership, which finally leads to 
the perpetual loss of their possessions.  
In this section, I have no intention of reiterating the nostalgia of intellectual 
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elites but choose instead to understand this spectacular nostalgia as a historical 
conjuncture. As Dai Jinhua (1997) remark: 
If history reveals its own footsteps in the process of a continuous flattening out 
of space, then contemporary Chinese people are fortunate to encounter history 
and to witness this process of revelation (p. 146).  
I do not want to celebrate the idea that Beijing has successfully shaken off its label as 
an inconceivable Other and integrated itself into the global assemblage. In fact, we 
have to be critical of the “liquid nature” of the assemblage (Bauman, 2000) as well a 
the possibility that the global assemblage shifts its center (the West) to it  periphery 
(China). In the case of the cityscape of Beijing, the reality is that no matter how 
radically Chinese architects promote post-modern aesthetics, all the landmark 
architecture of the city – including the national theater, the new headquarters of he 
CCTV the Boxer, the 2008 Olympic Stadia Bird’s Nest, the National Aquatics Center 
Water Cube, and new Capital Airport – were designed by foreign firms to express 
Western modern aesthetics. Chinese radical architects are still scorned as “superficial” 
and “less educated” (see Rowe & Kuan, 2003). The West still dominates the means of 
global cultural production and endlessly generates exclusion/inclusion within the 
global value system.  
       Through rearticulating the role of Chinese architects in the historical 
trajectory of Beijing’s urban space, I hope to raise the consciousness of the 
socio-historical mechanism through which this contemporary spatial organizatio  
came into being. By reflecting on the emergence and disappearance of the specifically 
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national/local cultures and their replacements, I suggest that the on-going 
transformation of Beijing’s urban space is a result of a complex dialectic between 
external global culture and domestic reproduction of the national tradition, which 
makes contemporary Beijing the “loci of the practices of predatory global capital” 
(Appadurai, 2000, p. 627). Rather than solely criticizing the Chinese state as an 
inconceivable Other, Chinese intellectuals in general, and Chinese architects in 
particular have to reflect on their geopolitical unconsciousness. Only through 
generating creative strategies to wrestle with global capitalism and the sovereign 
Chinese state, can they offer political intervention to the neoliberal urban culture.  
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Chapter Three: New Beijing; New Toilets; Great Olympics: Tourist Gaze and Urban 
Reformation 
It is happening more and more often that in pornographic photographs the 
portrayed subjects, by a calculated stratagem, look into the camera, thereby 
exhibiting the awareness of being exposed to the gaze. This unexpected gesture 
violently belies the fiction that is implicit in the consumption of such images, 
according to which the one who looks surprises the actors while remaining 
unseen by them: the latter, rather, knowingly challenge the voyeur’s gaze and 
force him to look them in the eyes.  
            -- Agamben (2000, p. 93-94).  
In chapter two, I addressed that Chinese intellectuals, particularly Chinese 
architects, have greatly contributed to the construction of Chineseness in architecture. 
The language of national culture and the idea of national essence do not just circulate 
in a symbolic plane. As Bhabha (1994b) have noticed that there is always an 
ambivalent relationship between people who write the national language and those 
who live it. Rather than being totalized and fossilized, the national culture generat s 
wide dissemination of meanings and symbols to different social groups (Bhabha, 
1994b). Thus, people who are separated by national geographical and cultural 
boundaries participate in the on-going politics – producing and reproducing the 
national culture; drawing and redrawing the national boundaries. In this chapter, I tak  
the Beijing courtyard compound as an example to capture the power dynamics though 
which global tourism produces the meaning of cultural specificity for the local. 
Beijing courtyard compounds (or Beijing hutongs, means alleyways) have 
long been objects of Western fantasy. When the first groups of Western tourists visited 
the ancient residential compounds in Beijing, their exotic architectural styles and the 
unspeakable sense of community intimacy had a peculiar hold on the Western 
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imagination. During the last two decades, the aesthetical, historical and cultural values 
of courtyard compounds have been widely recognized by certain Westerners, but 
disdained by others. Beijing courtyard compounds have been portrayed sometimes as 
an urban legend – by preserving a peerless sense of commune in a metropolis – or as 
an urban slum where modern civilization is totally abandoned.  
Typical of those who hold this antipathetic view are short-term travelers, who 
are very much disappointed to see that Beijing courtyard compounds have no 
significant difference from Western urban ghettos, other than having worse hygiene 
conditions than the Western ghettos. As a blog user who just traveled back from 
Beijing offers a negative comment: 
 Beijing has these amazing old neighborhoods known as Hutongs, full of tiny 
houses in mazelike back alleys. Problem is, since most of these neighborhoods 
are ancient, there is no running water, so each neighbor has its own toilet area, 
which you can always find by following the ammonia stench [sic]. 
Similarly warnings can be easily located on the internet or in tour guidebooks.  
 At the same time, many foreigners who are living in Beijing for the long-term, 
particularly artists and writers, hold a different view. For instance, American architect 
Tim Geisler (2000) comments on public toilets in courtyard compounds: 
 Some of the structures themselves, despite the unpleasant odor, have quite 
friendly atmospheres inside as well as out, with inventive skylights and doors 
with exotic shapes. Many also have no dividing walls between toilet holes, 
making casual on-the-stool chats quite convenient (p. 217).  
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Besides analyzing the public toilets from the dimension of architectural aesthetics, 
Geisler (2000) further addresses the on-going urban demolition and toilet upgrade 
projects. Regarding the disappearance of the old toilets, Geisler (2000) express s a 
strong nostalgic sentiment, as he remarks, “but the memory of them, the anecdotes 
and quips, the political rhetoric, and the social habits of the Chinese people will live 
on long after those curious little architectural urbanites have returned to dust” (p. 
219).  
Other than Geisler’s (2000) special taste of architecture, in The Last Days of 
Old Beijing, Michael Meyer (2008) who works as a voluntary school teacher in the 
hutong area offers a narrative and humanitarian account for the public toilet:  
 A child runs in, wearing the school-issued yellow baseball cap whose printed 
characters announce SAFETY. The hat makes kids visible to cars. Hutong 
traffic is mostly bicycles and the occasional mule cart, but rules are rules. A 
backpack weights the boy down, and he struggles to keep balance while 
lowering his pants. He crouches, looks up, rises, makes a small bow, and yells, 
“Good morning, Teacher Plumblossom!” (p. 8).  
From these vivid articulations, we can clearly discern the Westerners’ ambiv lent and 
contradictory understanding of toilets in courtyard compounds. This ambivalence has 
been extreme and volatile in the case of ancient urban space of Beijing and it 





FROM AN URBAN ADVENTURE TO AN ORGANIZED COMMERCIAL TOUR 
Since the middle of the 1990s, foreign tourists in Beijing started to have one 
more option on their travel itinerary- Beijing hutongs - the narrow urban alleys in the 
courtyard residential compounds. In Transformation of Beijing Hutongs and Tourism 
Development, Choe (2005) offers a detailed account of the emergence of the Hu ong 
Tour. A local businessman, Xu Yong, realized that foreign tourists are intensely 
curious about these old courtyards. However, the local residents, in the 1980s and 
early 1990s had a strong resistance to foreign tourists’ interruption of their daily life. 
According to Choe (2005), the local residents in courtyard compounds frequently 
refused to allow foreign tourists to take pictures of their living environments. When 
Xu realized the commercial potential of these ancient courtyards and registered a 
company – Beijing Hutong Cultural Development LLC – he not only needed to 
negotiate with local governmental agencies, but also had to convince the local 
residents to change their hostile attitude towards foreign tourists. From 1992 to 1 94, 
Xu dedicated two years to make the first organized commercial tour to Beijing 
hutongs possible through negotiating with local bureaucracies. What was unexpected 
was that, along with the Forbidden City, the Great Wall and the Summer Palace, the 
Beijing Hutong Tour soon became a “must see” spot for foreign tourists. On the city 
streets of Beijing, a regular scene was the foreign tourists boarding t aditional 
tricycles or rickshaws, holding cameras and screaming with excitement. When foreign 
tourists arrive, flyers with pictures and English explanation are distributed to them to 




Residents in the courtyard compounds also realize the commercial value of 
their living environment and their life style. Some of the residents sign contracts with 
tourism companies and local administrative agencies in order to cater to foreign 
tourists, such as showing tourists around their courtyards or providing traditional 
Chinese food to their “guests.” Since the late 1990s, taking pictures and taping video 
have been generously allowed to satisfy the curiosity of foreign tourists. Residents, 
regardless of age and gender, have been used to posing naturally in front of foreign 
tourists’ who wish to capture the moment for posterity. Without doubt, the changing 
attitude of the native residents demonstrates their transformation from “pedagogical 
objects” to “performative subjects” (Bhabha, 1994b). By doing so, they successfully 
incorporated “national culture” into their daily life. The boom of the Beijing Hutong 
Tour, furthermore, confirms the cultural value of the Beijing courtyards, which has 
been claimed by Chinese intellectuals, including famous historian Liang Congjie a d 
architect Wu Liangyong, even though the cultural and aesthetic values of the Beijing 
courtyard compounds are manifested through immediate commercial values. They are 
delighted to see that the aesthetic and cultural values with which they identify are 
further confirmed by foreign tourists. Having a culture, the culture of Beijing, truly 
becomes an opportunity to select and cherish an authentic collective property 
(Clifford, 1988, p. 237), regardless of whether the value of the cultural property is 
assigned from different perspectives by a multiplicity of social groups.  
  After the Beijing municipal government announced that most of the 
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courtyard compounds would be demolished for modern upgrades, many foreigners 
who lived in Beijing for the long-term, foreign media reporters, first time tourists in 
Beijing and scholars who were interested in Chinese issues, all autonomously 
participated in a campaign against the demolition. Some foreign freelancers wrote 
memoirs to recognize their happy life in the ancient urban area. Many short-term 
visitors joined Beijing natives to record with modern technological devices the last 
scene of the courtyard compounds. If we say that the existence of the identity of 
“Beijing natives” is still legitimate in that they have lived in these courtyards for 
decades and have cultivated a deep sense of “place” and geographical and cultural 
“rootedness,” the obsession with courtyard compounds expressed by these foreign 
visitors is somehow inscrutable. Most of the foreigners had never lived in these 
courtyard compounds. It forces one to ask: what type of political dynamics are 
involved in this traveling and cosmopolitan subjectivity vis-à-vis the local geopolitical 
complex? What political mechanism makes the vernacular residential compounds in 
ancient Beijing an object for the fantasies of Western travelers? Is this political 
mechanism that produces values from Beijing vernacular housing identical to that of 
Chinese intellectuals and Chinese architects? How should we interpret this type of
value production in the grand context of globalization? What are the meanings or 
values that the new urban space of Beijing tends to present to the world?  
At the same time, from all of the pictures taken by foreign tourists, I 
discovered one interesting phenomenon, namely their obsession with Beijing’s public 
toilets. On the one hand, foreign tourists use their cameras to record the culturaland 
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aesthetic differences they locate in the ancient urban space of Beijing; on the other 
hand, they publicize their subjective shock when they encounter the filthy public 
toilets, particularly in the ancient courtyard compounds. Therefore, their ambivalence, 
the intertwining loathing with obsession with Beijing’s ancient urban space, desrves 
special scrutiny. In this chapter, I explore the construction of an anachronistic 
temporality and spatiality through the tourist gaze by investigating displacement and 
gaze. By doing so, I want to reveal how Western cultural hegemony generates 
discursive effects on the local culture by making it fragmentary and contradictory, and 
how the cultural hegemony enabled by state, racial, gender and class politicsis 
relocated to an alien urban context in China.  
DISLOCATION IN CHINA 
  To many Western scholars, large scale displacement in China is only a new 
social phenomenon in the post-Mao era and one that has occurred along with radical 
urbanization and industrialization when China embraced capitalism. As a matter of 
fact, from 1949-1976, socialist China was never short of large scale displacements. In 
the 1960s, as a part of the project of creating a progressive vernacular culture, youth 
were encouraged to travel around the nation to exchange revolutionary opinions and 
to challenge geographical constraints. From the 1950s to 1980s, skilled workers, 
engineers, teachers and administrative personnel were encouraged to go to
“backward” regions, usually with abject poverty and minority groups, such as in Tibet, 
Yunnan and Xinjiang, to facilitate modernization in these peripheral territories f 
China. In addition, as an attempt to break the urban/rural chasm, urban youth were 
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sent to rural areas to learn the vernacular culture of peasants. During the Cultural 
Revolution, millions of Red Guards visited Beijing to witness Mao Zedong giving his 
revolutionary orders in Tiananmen Square. 
  These large mass dislocations during the Mao era, motivated by national 
socialist ideologies, provide a distinctive contrast with the displacements of the
post-Mao epoch, which were generally driven by economic benefits, individualist 
ambition and tourist fantasy. Beijing, originally a destiny for socialist pilgrims, has 
been gradually transformed into a place to get a better education, better pay and more 
working opportunities as well as a wonderland for tourists, Chinese and Westerner . 
However, traveling, to a large extent, generates different cultural meanings to Chinese 
and Western subjects. To most Chinese, traveling around the world, literally, indicates 
social status and signifies the possession of a cosmopolitan subjectivity. Having 
experiences of traveling to Europe and North America are still relevant to high social 
prestige. While tours to Oceania, Sweden and Greece displayed in luxurious 
consumer magazines lies beyond many Chinese people’s incomes, plenty of local 
commercials advertise for tours to other parts of China or reachable foreign destinies, 
including Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Australia, New Zealand or Korea. To people 
in north China, a two-day tour to Beijing belongs to the most affordable category with 
many classical tourist spots highlighted including the Great Wall, the Forbidden City, 
the Summer Palace, the Temple of Heaven and a series of tombs of the Ming 
monarchy (1368-1644). To Chinese travelers, these tourist landmarks represent 
Beijing and are a part of the national culture. It is evident that Chinese tourists are 
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totally indifferent to Beijing courtyard compounds (or Beijing hutongs), not only for 
their lack of monumental features of China’s “nationscape” (Oakes, 1998, p.49), but 
also for the poverty and backwardness that they have come to represent. During the 
Mao era, one of the ideological themes is repetitively “speaking b tterness” (Anagnost, 
1997 & Rofel, 1994) and highlighting materialist scarcity to form a revolutionary 
collective. In the post-Mao era, when Chinese decided to forget the revolutionary and 
impoverished past, and stride to catch up with Western modern temporality, they 
surprisingly encountered Westerners who returned to the premodern spatiality looking 
for their lost sense of historicity.  
CREATING THE HISTORICAL PRESENT 
History becomes something to be established and managed through tours, 
exhibitions, and representational practices in cinema, literature, and other 
forms of cultural production. 
 - Kaplan (1996, p. 35) 
Clifford (1992) takes the question of how cultural analysis constitutes its 
objects regardless of whether the objects are from other societies, traditions or 
communities, and how an Other place is bounded in space and time. Taking the 
Beijing Hutong Tour as an example, the obsession of foreign tourists with ancient 
Beijing courtyard compounds is nothing but a misplaced search for temporal and 
spatial authenticity. In Beijing’s courtyard compounds, tourists can witness how 
complex interpersonal connectedness is well preserved in a foreign urban space and 
can possibly restore themselves in a profound sense of place. In the 1990s, foreigners 
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who worked in Beijing could only choose to live in certain residential areas, including 
the Asian Games Village and the Ethnic Chinese Village. What surpried the Beijing 
municipal government is that it received more and more requests from foreigners, 
asking to live in the dilapidated hutong areas. According to Choe (2005), many 
foreigners who live in Beijing believe that Beijing hutongs have an unspeakable yet 
unique charm. More and more foreigners with a strong curiosity toward the courtyard 
culture choose to live with Beijing natives in the courtyards.  
Some foreigners who live in courtyards even direct short video programs to 
introduce hutong culture to the West. Many short videos can be easily located on 
public websites, such as YOUTUBE. For example, during an interview for a short TV 
program called “Hutong Chronicles,” Michael Meyer, an American writer/volunteer 
who has lived in Beijing courtyards for many years, comments on the on-going urban 
demolition in Beijing during the interview: “…what is more valuable has been lost, 
what is priceless has been lost is this community texture, a non-American way of 
life… what was dense with humanity on the street… I always said that when I go 
back to America, I immediately feel lonely.”  In the video, Meyer was chatting with 
an elder Chinese female regarding the party he participated in the prior night, as if he 
can only gain access to a full, authentic and un-alienated self in an alien culture. The 
elder Chinese woman was happy for Meyer having a good time. Meyer, obviously, 
believes that this non-exclusive nature is an essential feature of Beijing courtyard 
culture.  
Obviously, Meyer fails to realize that the humanity and mutual interpersonal 
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dependence in Beijing courtyards is compensation for the deteriorated living 
conditions and material scarcity in the Communist epoch. An exploration of the sense 
of commune in Beijing courtyard compounds suggests that the sense of 
interdependency cannot be understood without considering the high housing density 
and the socialist equalitarianism promoted during the Mao era. What is more 
problematic is that this enchantment to Beijing courtyard life is more often portrayed 
as an essential feature exclusively belonging to a geographically define  group 
–Beijing natives, rather than interpreted in China’s special social and historical 
context. As a matter of fact, this sense of commune was never a patent exclusiv ly 
belong to Beijing natives but a nationwide phenomenon. When Meyer celebrates his 
successful escape from a sense of loneliness deeply embedded in the Western context, 
he mistakes the priceless hospitality he encounters as an essential nature of  folk
culture by severing it from its historical conjuncture, especially the courtyard culture 
as a Communist legacy, and believes it is the treasure that Western modernity has lost. 
In Meyer’s account, what he constantly addresses is “what has been lost” which 
signifies a strong nostalgia for, as well as a sense of, inevitableness. As Tuan Yi-Fu 
(1998) theorizes, modern people usually feel a strong need to engage with other 
human beings but also realize that this type of direct contact is more common in 
premodern times, and more common among people with little material means due to 
necessity (p. 92). Modern people need privacy and interpersonal distance to maintain 
their hygiene conditions and a subjectivity of self.  
Narrating Beijing courtyards as anachronistic space is also well revaled in 
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photographs taken by Western tourists. In many blogs and cyber photography 
galleries, foreign visitors who have been to Beijing exhibit their pictures, manyof 
them in black white or in fading color. Some of them even offer a brief introduction 
and highlight that these scenes can no longer be located in current Beijing. These 
pictures are intended to “create a distance between oneself and the world, and thus to 
constitute it as something picture-like – as an object of exhibit” (Mitchell, 1989, p.  
229). At first glance, tourists use black and white photography to better present 
aesthetics of Chinese urban space. What is generally believed is that “photography is 
what manufactures a present that will forever be new and clear” (Chow, 1993, p.169). 
In this case, the deliberate manipulation of photographic color tends to create a 
distorted temporality in that it is the anachronistic space making the Westrn visitors 
experience the present as a past. The projected anachronistic nature of the Beijing 
urban space reverses the embedded power relationship between seeing and being seen. 
In these pictures, the being seen is no longer a form of powerlessness, but a powerful 
agent to preserve history and present a spectacle to the viewers. It disguises the fact 
that the temporal chasm created by these pictures makes Beijing natives forev r
frozen in a graphically mediated history. In this history, another type of non-place is 
presented through a spatial and temporal “distance which indicates that adversaries 
(between the being seen and the seeing) do not belong to a common space” (Foucault, 
1977, p. 150). These mediated images not only eliminate the possibility to restore the 
subjectivities of Beijing natives from visual abstractness, but also disguise the fact 
that it is the Western tourists who transcend spatial boundaries and distort temporality 
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and appropriate “history.” 
DISAPPEARING LABOR VALUE IN WESTERN NON-PLACE 
If we say that the tourist’s gaze and the visibility it creates represent an 
Orientalist power in the post-colonial context, another question we need to explore is: 
what political mechanism enables the tourist’s gaze and tourist’s visibility (Urr , 
1990)? To answer this question, it is necessary to revisit the construction of 
“non-place” in the Western context, which cannot be realized without creating 
“innocent” and “alienated” traveling subjects.  
In Escapism, Tuan Yi-Fu (1998) argues that one facet of human nature is a 
reluctance to accept reality, and escaping the reality is a universal tnd ncy. Rather, 
Marc Auge (1995) provides a different approach to understand the seemly universal 
desire to escape by referring to it as an issue of disappearing, temporality. Indeed, the 
desire to escape is not historically universal but only prevalent in supermodernity 
during which people can no longer have interaction with organically social places, but 
are trapped in non-places. In supermodernity, the homogenization of needs and 
consumption patterns makes people no longer able to distinguish between the past and 
the present and therefore, they lose the sense of temporality (Auge, 1995). A similar 
argument also appears in Jameson’s (1984) analysis of postmodernity, as he 
comments, “this mesmerizing new aesthetic mode itself emerged as an el borated 
symptom of the waning of historicity, of our lived possibility of experiencing history 
in some active way.” (p. 68) 
In non-places, people not only lose their ability to interpret the present  along 
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with the waning of the historicity, but also are exposed to inescapable solitude (Ag , 
1995 & 2002). Given the space for public transport as examples (airports and metro 
stations), what is manifested in these public spaces is a “collectivity without festival 
and solitude without isolation” (Auge, 2002, p. 30). In non-places, personal 
interactions are purely instrumental and contractual; the solitude, caused by alienation 
of the modernity, however, is perpetual and inescapable to people in modern cities. 
Therefore, industrial zones and supermarkets lure modernists to visit the ancient
places to get references to understand the contingent present (Auge, 1995, p. 74).  
Auge is definitely not the only western intellectual longing for the sense of 
places. Georg Simmel (1971) and Walter Benjamin (1999) have generated similar 
melancholia in different stages of development of modernity by using terms like “the 
blasé attitude” or “flaneur” to critique the alienating nature of modern urban spaces. 
Probably, because of the inescapable solitude in non-places, traveling subjects are 
more often portrayed as individuals alienated in Western modern/supermodern 
contexts and looking for emancipatory potential in foreign pre-modern contexts. Their 
dislocation (or displacement) and exploration of distant places become “a cult of 
interpersonal intimacy” which is “a psychological compensation for the loneliness” 
(Bauman, 1996, p. 33). With such a desire for interpersonal intimacy and a sense of 
place, vagabonds even become a metaphor of “apparent freedom to move and so to 
escape the net of heretofore locally based control” (Bauman, 1996, p. 28).  
However, the claimed transparent and alienating nature of non-place and 
innocent traveling subjects also attract critiques. Tomlinson (1999) poses a question 
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regarding the functional, abstract and unmediated nature of non-place. As Tomlinson 
(1999) points out that, to people who work for public transportations, the non-place is 
not a non-place but their working places. Therefore, the bourgeois melancholia of 
traveling subjects is enabled by structural exploitation of people who facilitate the 
operation of these non-places. Furthermore, in Empire, Michael Hardt and Antonio 
Negri (2000) suggest a more radical understanding of a non-place as an Empire – a 
smooth space of imperial sovereignty. “Empire is the non-place of world production 
where labor is exploited” (Hardt & Negri, 2000, p. 210). Within the abstract and 
transparent non-places, “the very qualities of labor power… can no longer be grasped, 
and similarly, exploitation can no longer by localized and quantified” (Hardt & Negri, 
2000, p. 209). Not only has labor value disappeared in these non-places and become 
immaterial, but also substantial resistance against exploitation has faded away. 
Therefore, the neutral, anonymous and unmediated nature of non-places is masked by 
savage capitalism that projects the spatial hallucination to disguise its constitutive 
contradictions (Zimmer, 2006).  
Rather than constituting a natural formation, the lack of interpersonal intimacy 
in non-places is deliberately constructed by abolishing labor-power from recognition 
and measurement. Thus, non-places should “be positively defined both by the 
intensity of the mobilization and by the consistency of the biopolitical nexus of 
labor-power” (Negri, 1999, p. 83). And travelers’ insistence on the alienating nature of 
non-places is tantamount to broadcasting their fabricated victimhood and erasing their 
discursive class domination over disappearing labor. To traveling subjects, the 
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disenchantment of the everyday non-places can only be realized through further 
exploitation of affect values from service labors. Therefore, “travel cannot even be 
imagined as a modern experience without also recognizing its reliance on the uneven
distribution of power” (Oakes, 1998, p. 19). The “non-place” in the western context is 
where labor, exploitation and power intersect, and its biopolitical nature deserves 
critical inquiry (Hardt & Negri, 2001).  
  Going beyond Hardt and Negri’s (2000) classical Marxist analysis, 
McClintock (1995) affirms that the biopolitics of non-places is also highly gender d 
and racialized. In Imperial Leather, Anne McClintock (1995) uses “the labor of 
leisure” as an explanation of how labor-power is abolished in Empire/non-place. 
When the middle-class embraced a fetish of whiteness and a cult of cleanness to 
achieve “middle-class” identity, the economic value of the domestic servants h d been 
converted to symbolic value of “cleanliness” for exhibition. What we often miss is 
that the construction of cleanliness is violent and contradictory. On the one hand, “the 
fetish for clean clothes was eloquent of a systematic attempt to erase from the view 
any visible trace of domestic work” (McClintock, 1995, p. 163) by female servants; 
on the other hand, female servants in Victorian households were configured as 
representations of disorder, disease and contagion.  
  In contemporary Western society, cleaning rituals are still regularly 
performed yet barely recognized. The cleaning of private spaces is either performed 
by racial minority females or working housewives. The invisibility of domestic work 
is still overridden by the symbolic value of labor. In addition, sanitization of public 
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spaces is still largely maintained by minority females. For instance, a cultural 
geographical study of locker rooms conducted in Canada shows that, 
(T)he caretaker’s of these …locker rooms are women and men of Chinese, 
Portuguese and Eastern European ethnicity. The locker room is a space of 
employment for these racially minoritized bodies; they work to keep locker 
rooms respectable (Fusco, 2006, p. 71).  
Similarly to domestic servants in the Victorian era, these female janitors start their 
work before people arrive. The imprint of their labor, as long as the racial and gender 
inscription carried by their bodies, is erased with the cleanness left as a perpetual 
spectacle for exhibition. Dirty locker rooms or toilets are symbolically associated with 
moral inferiority, laziness and a threat to hygiene. Therefore, the purpose of 
cleanliness in non-places is still largely an embodiment of a policing of social
hierarchies of class, race and gender.   
At the same time, the middle-class fetish for cleanness was also manifested n 
a foreign context along with the expansion of imperialist power, and its manifesttion, 
in turn, changed the social and spatial order of the foreign context. McClintock (1995) 
uses the “soap saga” to narrate how colonial subjects use cleaning rituals to demarcat  
body boundaries and police social hierarchies which are colonized on the bottom (p. 
33). McClintock (1995) also remarks: 
 The poetics of cleanliness is a poetics of social discipline. Purification rituals 
 prepare the body as a terrain of meaning, organizing flows of value across the 
 self and the community and demarcating boundaries between one community 
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 and another. People who have the power to invalidate the boundary rituals of 
 another people thereby demonstrate their capacity to violently impose their 
 culture on others (p. 226).  
Once the social discipline of cleanliness emerges from the center of Empire and 
achieves a status as new moral norms for daily life, it further transforms into a new 
notion of right. In the name of guaranteeing contracts and resolving conflicts, the new 
notion of right inscribes authority, disguises its arbitrary coercion and serves to 
expand Empire (Hardt & Negri, 2000). All these hegemonies are embodied in the 
practices of disciplining the toiletry space in Beijing courtyard compounds. I  the 
following section, I will use public toilets in Beijing courtyard compounds as an 
example to articulate the hegemonic “cleanliness” in the West as it is imposed on the 
urban space of Beijing.  
PRODUCING TOILETS AS “NON-PLACE” IN BEIJING 
Those upon whose bodies the tourist gaze falls strive themselves to mediate 
the construction of that landscape in order to maintain their own subjectivity, 
to make their experience of modernization one that is meaningful and 
potentially liberating.  
- Oakes, 1998, p. 12.  
  With the increasing culturalization of tourist practices and commercialization 
of tourist culture, tourism has generated a profound influence on the toured 
communities (Morris, 1995). China is no exception. Since the Chinese state 
announced the reformation and open door policy, the number of foreign visitors has 
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never stopped increasing, except for a short period following the 1989 Tiananmen 
upheaval. For most foreign visitors, the geographic scope they can reach is still 
largely limited to several major cities, such as Beijing and Shanghai. In the meantime, 
in the Western publication market, guidebooks to encourage Westerners to visit China 
have become popular.  
  In most of these guidebooks, brief introductions are usually juxtaposed with 
impressive colorful pictures. The scope of introduction can be wide, ranging from 
food, local customs, weathers, security conditions and traveling tips. Most guidebooks 
for potential travelers to China mention that China, in general, has a very 
foreigner-friendly environment. Therefore, well-prepared travelers can fully enjoy 
exploring the Chinese cities, as long as they pack enough toilet paper and brace 
themselves for the bizarre design and horrible hygiene condition of Chinese toilets. 
Certain guidebooks even give a special note, cynically describing the public toilets in 
Beijing courtyard compounds as “shocking” and “beyond imagination.” Traveling tips 
regarding the toiletry space in Beijing are not only limited to tourist guidebooks. 
Along with the boom in internet technologies, the exchange of photographs and video 
clips has become part of our daily entertainment across the globe. In many of these 
public websites, one can easily locate videos and pictures about public toilets in 
Beijing taken by Western tourists.  
  In the past two decades, the growth of foreign tourism in China’s major cities 
has not only resulted in the construction of hotels, shopping areas and commercial 
facilities that are desiged to accommodate the needs of Western visitors, but has also 
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elicit a revolutionary change in public toiletry spaces. From the late 1990s, the 
Chinese tourist agencies in Beijing started campaigning for a clean and modern city in 
order to accommodate the tremendous growth of the tourist industry as well as 
business travelers. As a response, many hotels and modern facilitates in Beijing were 
updated or built according to international standards. According to the campaign, the 
hygiene conditions of Beijing’s tourist facilities have elicited many complaints from 
foreign visitors; therefore, improving the hygiene condition was taken as a priority in 
order to compete with other Asian nations on the international tourist market. In a 
mass campaign to make Beijing a better place to live and visit, the propaganda says:  
If we do not make an effort to improve the environment for foreign visitors, 
we will lose our market competition to other Asian nations. In addition, the 
improvement of hygiene condition will also bring convenience to ourselves 
and reflect the achievement of our modernization.  
At first glance, this type of rhetoric serves not only the “collective” interests of 
Chinese people, but also repaint the image of China to outsiders. The linkage between 
hygiene conditions and making a profit for the collective “we” has consistently born a 
feature of such rhetoric. Indeed, such rhetoric justifies “collective interests” through 
claiming that tourist business creates more jobs, although most of the job increases ar  
low-paying and temporary service jobs as “the level of demand for such service is 
highly volatile and unpredictable” (Urry, 1990. p.74). The availability of these jobs is 
more often a pretext for the government to encourage unemployed individuals, such 
as workers laid off by state-owned enterprises, to actively engage themselv s in the 
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booming tourist economy. In addition, many service jobs are taken by immigrants 
who are looking for a better future and more opportunities in Beijing. During an 
informal talk with a manager of a four-star hotel in Beijing, the manager noted: 
These service workers (fuwuyuan) come and go. We have to do recruiting all 
year around. Why? Because they think they are underpaid and constantly look 
for better paid positions. But the reality is, no hotel would want to pay a higher 
price for service workers – only if they can speak good English to cater to 
foreign visitors directly. But most of them just have a middle school or higher 
school education. By the way, we are not afraid of losing them; there are tons 
of new people arriving in Beijing everyday.  
During the conversation the manager also stated that her hotel is much cleanerthan 
many hotels that are popular to foreign visitors. However, when China first opened its 
doors, the number of clean hotels was rather limited. Thus, the first few hotels that 
adopted international hygiene standards soon became the first choice of many foreign 
tourists. Later on, foreign visitors exchanged this type of information by word of 
mouth. Even though her hotel, according to her narrative, is identical to other 
four-starred hotels in the world, many foreign visitors refuse to take the risk of staying 
in an unknown hotel. 
   This phenomenon also clearly projects the ambivalence of the short-term 
foreign visitors. On the one hand, they are eager to witness the “shocking” and 
“beyond imagination” experiences in person and to record those cultural 
transgressions through videos and pictures. In order to do it, they have to place 
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themselves close enough to the filthiest materials and subject themselves to what hey 
call – a “traumatic” psychological risk. In other words, they have to actually disgust 
themselves and use their victimhood to prove the authenticity of the filth they have 
intentionally “encountered.” Using the authenticity of the filth, they can prove the 
authenticity of the foreign culture they experience. On the other hand, they always
choose to stay in the well-known clean hotels in order to secure a true modern 
subjectivity.  
Their ambivalence is hard to make sense of without referring to Bauman’s 
theorizing of scrupulous packaging shocks with safety. Bauman (1996) remarks, “(I)n 
the tourist’s world, the strange is tame, domesticated, and no longer frightens; shocks 
come in a package deal with safety” (p.29-30).  Therefore, it was precisely these 
imbalances of social power that afford the tourist the “compulsive and perpetually 
deferred pleasures over filth” (McClintock, 1995, p. 78). It suggests the psychological 
trauma that the foreign visitors claimed is nothing but an affirmed package of safety
with their intensive scopic desire over filth. They are obsessed with witnessing the 
fragile nature of social boundaries, which are arbitrarily established by modernity. At 
the same time, they tend to maintain a safe distance between social boundaries and 
themselves, and then claim their dominant status as arbitrator of the social order.  
  In the 1990s, more and more modern hotels, either with direct foreign 
investment or as joint ventures, were erected in Beijing. The international brad 
names such as Hilton, Hyatt, Marriot, Fairmont and Westin, guarantee global service 
and hygiene standards. These non-places are “centrally conceived and controlled… 
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and devoid of distinctive substantive content” (Ritzer, 2004, p. xi). Some of them 
have hyper-ethnical decorations for their lobbies and provide exotic Chinese foods 
which have been assured to be well-handled by Western stomachs. In these hotels, 
U.S. dollars can be redeemed for Chinese currency; major credit cards are accepted. 
Certain social rules that are widely adopted in Western contexts are also enforced here. 
For instance, unlike other Chinese service providers, service providers in these 
non-places are expecting tips, particularly foreign currencies. In order to maximize 
convenience for foreigners, many of these modern hotels are located in the 
commercial and business centers or the diplomatic district where embassies re hosted. 
Therefore, these non-places are nothing but a spatial extension of the Empire.  
  In order to facilitate the adventure of Western visitors in the urban space of 
Beijing, in 2001, the tourist agency established a new star classification scale for 
toilets in tourist spaces, similar to the globally standardized classification of hotels. 
The tourist agency, sponsored by the municipal government, has the authority to 
award a plaque to toilets if they are maintained to the hygiene standards est blished 
by the tourist agency. Consistent conformity with the standards is maintained through 
frequent inspections by governmental agencies’ personnel. The plaque, usually in 
Chinese and English, shows the star level of the toilet, indicates the degree to which 
that the toilet complies with the global hygiene standards and reminds the foreign 
tourists about hygiene conditions. Thus, the competition for star-ranked or for highe 
ranked status is a ceremony of objectification that distributes toilet space onto a 
bureaucratic grid for the purpose of specification and judgment (Anagnost, 1997, p. 
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100). Through administrating the toiletry space, the state agency becomes an arbiter 
of everyday practices the interests of foreign tourists.   
  Another practice of the government tourist agency is to promote hygiene 
toilet culture to the public through public events. For example, the host of the World 
Toilet Summit in 2004 in Beijing further demonstrated the Chinese state’s resolution 
to sanitize toiletry space and promote a new version of civility, referring to 
international hygiene standards of toiletry spaces. One of the themes of the Summit 
was that having a clean toilet is a human dignity and a right. Using foreign tourists’ 
complaints of Chinese toiletry facilities, the civil discourse tried to create subjectivity 
through shame for “the failure of the Chinese people to embody international 
standards of modernity, civility, and discipline” (Anagnost, 1997, p.76). It urges 
Chinese people to be sensitive to inferior hygiene conditions and encourages Chinese 
tourists to report to local government agencies as a way to protect their rights as 
consumers. The recently established Federation of Consumer Rights Protection has 
announced its new working emphasis of protecting the right of tourist consumers. 
This recently emerged right discourse further jeopardizes the status of lower-class 
service providers in Beijing through transforming their labor power to transparent 
exhibitive values. When Chinese tourists take up the rights discourse produced in the 
West, they are reinforcing a hegemonic Western representation through a non-Western 
subject (Narayan, 1997, p. 45).  
MAKING A NEW BEIJING 
 In the display windows of the world market, such “primitives” are the toys, 
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the fabricated play forms with which the less powerful (cultures) negotiate 
the imposition of the agenda of the powerful.    
            - Rey Chow (1995, p. 201).  
  Is a city truly a concentration of social economic production of the local or a 
nodal point within a global system of flows? This debate between Henri Lefebvr and 
Manuel Castells is not only a disagreement between local and cosmopolitan urban 
epistemologies, but also a debate between industrial and post-industrial urbanites. 
Since the Chinese government announced the demolition project, it seems that the 
party leadership is determined to reform Beijing into a global metropolis rather than a 
place of local production.  
Inside the Loop Two Highway of Beijing, the area where courtyard 
compounds are predominant, construction of many shopping zones was initiated right 
after the demolition project. In the area close to where Michael Meyer lives, the 
traditional merchant zone will be replaced by a modern shopping pedestrian street. 
Rather than fully filling this inner urban area with modern and postmodern 
masterpieces by Western architects, many urban shopping zones are designated to 
preserve or represent architectural Chineseness. Rather than refurbishing the old 
buildings, the new consumption area has buildings with complete modern interiors 
and a Chinese traditional external look. The new shopping area will be the host of 
many transnational brand names, including McDonald’s and Starbucks, as well as 
traditional Chinese boutiques. A part of this systematic facelift, even the very few 
courtyard compounds that the government decides to preserve, are all renovated and 
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equipped with modern public toilets. The renovations tend to preserve the authentic 
old Beijing by using grey bricks and vivid color painting of windows.  
Such change is not only limited to the ancient urban area in Beijing, but has 
been happening in smaller consumption spaces, such as restaurants, bars, and shops. 
Since the late 1990s, many restaurant owners in Beijing have started to decorate thei  
restaurants according to the old fashions in different historical periods of China. A 
restaurant, therefore, is no longer a purely functional space but a fully embodi ent of 
the owner’s aesthetic taste and cultural capital. For instance, some restaurants tend to 
create a spatial miniature of Chinese gardens. Guests can only pass an old style
wooden bridge to access the dining area, and underneath the bridge, the presence of 
red carp and turtles offer the tourist an excursion into ancient China. In many 
restaurants, waiters and waitresses are dressed in ancient costumes from different 
dynasties, serving customers amid Chinese traditional music. Some luxury restaurants 
invite musicians to play ancient Chinese instruments, such as zithers and Chinese 
flutes, to construct a peerless “authentic” consumption of Chineseness. By the year 
2007, the retrospective decoration has become fashionable, and has been adopted by 
many less expensive restaurants. The change to restaurants is obviously welcomed by 
foreign visitors. More and more modern high-rise office buildings are sites of one or 
two stylistic Chinese restaurants to accommodate the need of Chinese and foreign 
business elites. A scene often seen in these hyper-real spaces with Chinese 
characteristics is that, Chinese and foreigners discuss their business issue in English.  
Nevertheless, the broader change to the urban landscape of Beijing is not 
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warmly welcomed by foreign visitors. As a British writer Matthew Plowright let 
comments in his blog:  
 I’ve always been amazed by the Chinese desire to reconstruct all their 
“historic” sites to make them appear as if they had been built in 2007 not 1707. 
This is a view that is commonly felt by foreigners and foreign visitors to China: 
many express disappointment at the lack of, for want of a better word, 
authenticity, of many historical sites in the country (Retrieved from: 
http://www.cibmagazine.com.cn/theyuanalsorises/index.php/2008/02/19/new-
build-history/). 
The disappointment of foreign visitors can be anticipated when they arrive in Beijing 
and see a faux-ancient Chinese thoroughfare with the Golden Arches of McDonald’s 
rather than authentic courtyard compounds. The only Chineseness they can sense is
through the paint, which “is barely dried on the ancient calligraphy style shop signs”
(Plowright, 2008). By talking to a taxi driver who was a Beijing native who used to 
live in a courtyard, Plowright (2008) surprisingly found out that this Beijing native 
does not appear to be too nostalgic about the change. A shop owner in the ancient 
shopping area even confirmed to Plowright that foreigners would love the new 
shopping pedestrian street, because it is both new and “old”. In the end, Plowright 
(2008) even warned that, when the past of China is demolished, its appeal as a tourist 
destination will be lost, which easily reminds us of the rhetoric used by the 
government tourist agency – if we cannot provide a hygienic environment, we will 
lose our business.  
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  In the aforementioned scenario, it seems that all the renovation and 
architectural facelifts prepared for Western tourists is indeed eliminating what really 
attracts them. As Plowright claims, what attracts the foreign tourists is “authenticity.” 
It further raises the question of what represents “authenticity” of Chinesenes . Who 
has the authority to identify, recognize, and justify “authentic” Chineseness? And, 
who has the responsibility to stage the “authenticity” for whom? If there is a d alectic 
dynamic of staging and viewing (as well as acting and judging), where is th  agency 
located in the dyad?  
  For this section, I was inspired by Rey Chow’s (1993, 1995 & 2002) 
theorizing of coercive mimeticism. Borrowing from Frantz Fanon (1991), Homi 
Bhabha (1994b) further elaborates that in the post-colonial context, the colonized 
subjects are forced by colonial discourse to mimic the colonial authority. To Bhabha 
(1994b), the mimicry itself in turn menaces “the narcissistic demand of colonial 
authority” (p. 126). In the case of the transformation of urban Beijing, neither the 
Chinese government nor individual business owners intend to fully embrace the 
mimicry project to eliminate the Other Chineseness. The change definitely does not 
present any menace to the Western modernity, since all the renovation was conducted 
in a great effort of preserving “Chineseness.” The use of grey bricks, graphic color 
painting in traditional calligraphy, the old-fashioned decoration of restaurants, and the 
traditional Chinese music played through imported audio systems are all evidenc of 
an endeavor by the Chinese to reconstruct “Chineseness” for foreigners. Neverthel ss, 
Chinese are blamed for the loss of the authenticity of an ancient non-Western 
117 
 
civilization. If we say the mimicry is disavowed for a potentiality of presenting a 
threat to the colonial authority, what make the Westerners discredit the 
self-mimeticism by the Chinese?  
  In The Protestant Ethnic and the Spirit of Capitalsim, Rey Chow (2002) 
raises a question regarding self-mimeticism by asking “what is the condition of the 
ethnic subject who feels she must try to resemble, to appear as herself— to be ethnic” 
(p. 108)? In the aforementioned scenarios the juxtaposition of a fabricated “nostalgia 
for a historical past with the commodity is not accidental,” as Anagnost (1993) 
remarks, “the desire for one excites the desire for the other” (p. 595). The 
reconstruction of space in Beijing is initiated when the gazed ethnic objects, the 
Chinese government as well as Chinese business owners, learn how the colonial
vision is organized and started to take an active role in staging what the gazers desire. 
When the Chinese mistakenly assume that foreigners like to see the exotic portions f 
Chinese architecture and culture, but dislike seeing filthy toiletry facilities in ancient 
courtyard compounds, the Chinese constitute a spectacle according to the way 
Western vision is organized. Therefore, the very state of being looked at is shaped by 
the way gaze is organized (Mulvey, 1975).  
  What Chinese do not expect is that Western tourists are willing to see the 
primitiveness and the backwardness of Chinese culture as well. They are willing to 
witness the spectacles of filth and the absence of interpersonal distance in courtyard 
compounds. The “authentic” Chineseness, according to Plowright (2008), can only be 
located in buildings built in 1707 rather than in 2007 and can only be represented by 
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non-mimetic and spontaneous Beijing natives. In other words, if a self-mimeticism is 
inevitable, it has to “convey the ‘original’ without leaving its own traces” (Chow, 
1995, p. 184). When Chinese take their initiative to present Chineseness, it is the 
Western tourists who remain at the center and whose gaze serves as the hinge of t e 
entire narrative of Chinese urban space. When the Chinese encounter critiques from 
the West, which phrases their ancient urban space as “beyond imagination,” Chinese 
actually have two choices: eliminate their ethnic features and stage a fk Chineseness 
or subordinate to the ethnic interpellation for a Western conceived but inferior 
authenticity (Chow, 2002). Thus, Chinese are constrained in a dilemma: either be 
primitive or be a failure to present original Chineseness.  
SELLING THE NEW BEIJING 
 The city surrendered itself to sight, bowing to the demands of the gaze; it 
neither shocked nor corrupted the eye and even allowed itself to be 
constituted as an image – one that edified and signified order.   
                                           Laporte (2000, p. viii). 
  In the stories of urban demolition in Beijing and the urban legend of public 
toilets in courtyard compounds, the Western gaze is one of the most significant 
powers that incite the on-going change. Nevertheless, it is the power of the Chinese 
state, the efficiency of transnational estate developers, the influx of Chinese tourist 
capital and the efforts of individual entrepreneurs such as restaurant owners that 
enable such dramatic urban change. Some may argue that the collective agency of 
these subjects does not do any good but creates a modern version of a cultural Other. 
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In the past one hundred years, China has not stopped seeking an alternative to achieve 
modernity. When modernity is finally granted, it still carries an inerasable 
Chineseness which perpetually positions China under the Western gaze. What 
deserves attention is that, rather than staging an urban space identical to Western 
modern metropolises, Beijing chooses to deliberately present itself as a modern city 
with cultural distinction. Hardly can we interpret the urban strategy of Beijing through 
the glocalization paradigm (Robertson, 1995), which highlights local resistance and 
celebrates cultural heterogenization, since the original drive of China to change 
Beijing was to satisfy the gaze of Western tourists and make profits from their 
satisfaction.  
However, the on-going urban transformation in Beijing also seems to manifest 
China’s global ambition. For instance, the construction of a series of global 
architectural landmarks, including the new CCTV building, the National Theatre, the 
National Stadium (the Bird’s Nest) and the National Aquatics Center (the Wat rcube) 
all associated with “cosmopolitanism with Chinese characteristics” (Rofel, 2007, p. 
111). The Chinese state is no longer interested in passively accepting a position in a 
cultural and political conjuncture forced by the West, but rather wants to actively 
engage in recreating a new global context (Rofel, 2007). So, rather than joining the 
so-called global cities as a late comer (Sassen, 1991), Beijing should launch “  
national project about global reordering” (Rofel, 2007, p. 20) through which China’s 
position in the world system could be renegotiated. From this perspective, the 
fabricated Chineseness in urban Beijing produces meanings on both local and global 
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levels by wrapping a package of “Chineseness” and insisting the world to buy.  
Nevertheless, the spectacle of urban Beijing should not be read as a hybridized 
city but as a “contact zone” (Pratt, 1992, p. 6-7) where powers collide into and 
support each other, and reinforce the exploitation of marginalized social groups. 
Therefore, we should be cautious of the naturalized non-places in the West and their 
expansion to Chinese urban space. In addition, we should also be keen to the role 
played by the Chinese nation-state in the reproduction of non-places in China, 
particularly how it arbitrarily presents a new Beijing and uses the symbolic meanings 
of this new urban space to negotiate its political capital in the world system. In the 
next chapter, I will explore how housing policies were/are manipulated by the Chinese 




Chapter Four: Beijing and Beijingers 
During the preparations for the 2008 Olympic Games, news regarding 
coercive relocations occurring in Beijing often mad headlines in Western media, 
referring to the Chinese government as “totalitarian,” and the people as “victims.” 
Other media reports lamented urban regeneration project in Beijing was violence 
against civilization in that it destroyed the materialistic carrier of Chinese culture. The 
claim was well echoed by artists, musicians, and writers, particularly those who were 
born and raised in Beijing. Different from Chinese architects who created Chineseness 
against the West (as I addressed in Chapter One), these native intellectuals often 
referred to the culture they defended as not only the culture of old Beijing but also the 
culture of China. It seems that they were implying a message – Beijing is the only 
legitimate embodiment of cultural China, therefore the culture of Beijing is the 
national allegory, deserving protection of every citizen. Many people agreed with 
these native Beijing intellectuals that most Chinese cities were suffring for cultural 
anemia by aimlessly adopting cultural elements from Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore, 
Seoul, Tokyo and New York. Beijing, even though it is the political center of a 
totalitarian regime, never stopped producing politically active individuals, such as 
politicians, artists, musicians, activists, scientists, etc.  
Influenced by these Beijing native intellectuals, many migrants who had just 
arrived in Beijing believed that they should be responsible for the fading Beijing 
culture, even though they rarely paid attention to the disappearing local cultures in 
their home provinces. As a result, Beijing became the only city where demolition of 
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ancient residential buildings became politically sensitive and controversial, even 
though Beijing is not the only city in which ancient architecture was demolished. As a 
matter of fact, the radical urbanization and an exploding demand for housing caused 
by migrant population were not exclusively staged in Beijing. Across the nation, old 
housing was torn down to accommodate new residential high-rises. The local medi 
rarely painted portraits of the change as violence against cultural herit ge, but often 
gave a snapshot of the interest in the conflict between residents, new migrants, re l 
estate developers and the local government. Rather than perceiving the on-going 
demolition as a disaster of cultural legacy, the local media tended to interpret it as a 
political conflict.  
It urges me to ask, what affords the urban reformation in Beijing one more 
layer of cultural and political meaning? What make the sentiments attached to the 
ancient urban space more nostalgic? To answer these questions, the seemingly 
fossilized local identity of Beijing, recently emerged urban migrants in the ci y, and 
cultural construction of native places deserve special scrutiny. In this chapter, I will 
de-naturalize the seemingly fossilized but indeed volatile identity – Beijing r – by 
tracing its genealogy. 
AMBIVALENT BEIJINGERS 
A Beijing native, also known as a Beijinger or an Old Beijinger, is generally 
considered the identity for people who were born and raised in Beijing. The various 
characteristics attached to this identity are contradictory but still can be generally 
summarized as generous, politically conscious, talkative and cosmopolitan. Rather 
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than being a new urban phenomenon, the political consciousness of the Beijingers has 
a long history. As Strand (1993) identifies, as early as the republic era (1912-1949), 
“public awareness of issues, and the persuasiveness of small and informal gatherin s 
of like-minded persons with shared interests, were basic facts of political life in
Beijing” (p. 171). This pattern of social life is so valued by the local people that it s
been transformed into a performative aesthetics of their daily practices. Beijingers are 
often proud of themselves as being knowledgeable and curious about various 
domestic and international political issues by contrasting themselves with the 
utilitarian and money-driven merchant culture of the Pearl River Delta (Guangzhou) 
and the Lower Yangtze River Delta (Shanghai). They generally believed these 
characteristics to be a result of their geographical proximity to China’s political center. 
There is a well-known old saying – leaning against the wall of the imperial city – to 
portray this local identity’s geographical proximity to the sovereign power. Having the 
geopolitical privilege to witness all major political and diplomatic spectacles in China, 
Beijingers are often self-claimed as having a political cosmopolitan vision.  
This type of cosmopolitan vision claimed by Beijingers is unique for its 
cultural rootedness in that they understand the world but are still subjectively centered 
in China. In other words, their cosmopolitanism carries Chinese characteristi s. 
Carrying a strong sense of nationalism, Beijingers praise themselves for their cultural 
rootedness and their resistance to capitalist rationality. In media and in daily life, this 
cultural rootedness of Beijingers is always compared to the rootless nature of 
Shanghai natives by Chinese intellectuals. Shanghai people are generally recognized 
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as longing for diaspora due to their obsession with economic benefits and admiration 
of Western culture. In contrast to that of Beijingers, the local identity of Shanghai 
people is generally interpreted as influenced by its colonial legacy.  
All local identities carry ambivalent meanings. When the people try to 
eulogize the identity they embrace, they are negatively labeled. Beijingers are no 
exception. For instance, their sensitive political consciousness is often juxtaposed 
with their political inability or political inertness. Their enthusiasm for p litical issues 
is often portrayed as compensation or a default option to their inability to catch up 
with the trends of the global economy. In many cases, pin (in Chinese it means 
garrulous) is the word broadly used to characterize Beijingers. Pin not only indicates 
their talkative nature, but further implies their inferior working ethics – alltalk; no 
action. Their generousity is sometimes interpreted as “saving face.” In certain cases, it 
indicates that they can obtain easy money through their geopolitical advantage. 
Therefore, the generous Beijingers are also compared to penny-wise Shanghai natives 
and hardworking Cantonese. In order to scrutinize the ambivalence of this local 
identity, namely Beijing, a careful examination of the cultural construction of 
geographical imagination, namely identification with native places, in Chinese history 
is necessary.  
SALIENT GEOGRAPHICAL IDENTITIES 
According to Honig (1996) and Duara (2000), very few aspects of an 
individual’s identity in China are more primary than native place. Many studies even 
show that native-place ties played a significant role in urban politics prior to the
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formation of the People’s Republic. Goodman (1995) reveals that in the republic era 
(1912-1949), urban space became a platform on which the old culture and new culture 
were on display, and native-place solidarities had greatly mediated Chinese urban 
residents’ imagination of the nation and their political engagement of urban socil 
organization. The co-existence of native-place organizations and new social 
institutions, such as workers’ unions, both shaped the daily politics of urban residents 
and newcomers to cities. Strand (1993) further elaborates that in the republican era, 
“use of native-place loyalties as a means of developing a core of followers and 
extending one’s influence was a well-established strategy in Chinese urban politics” 
(p. 226). In some extreme cases, certain criminal organizations and secret societies 
were organized based on locality ties.  
 As Oakes (2000) reveals, regionalist texts shared three common features: 1) 
enclosing regions, treating them as coherent cultures without acknowledging 
interaction with other regions; 2) establishing a sense of cultural purity and 
authenticity; 3) offering a set of features of folk culture that are readily commodified 
(p. 674). All three of these features can be identified in the process through which the 
local identity of the Beijinger came into being. Taking the “coherence” of Beijing’s 
local culture into consideration, we can clearly see that the term “Beijinger” continues 
to carry new meanings. Most striking is that during the Qing Dynasty (1644- 912), 
there was no such a generic name for a population as “Beijingers.” Dong (2003) 
suggests, “Imperial Beijing was a city of hierarchy, expressed not only through the 
walls that marked status and ethnic segregation but also through architectural 
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features” (p. 30). Residents in Beijing during the Qing dynasty were not only 
dichotomized according to their ethnicities but geographically divided. The inner city 
of Beijing, with the imperial palace located in the center, was divided into eight 
sections for the eight banners for Manchu people to live. Considered the loyalist 
social group, the Manchu bannermen lived closest to the Forbidden Imperial City and 
guarded the safety of the monarchy (Dong, 2003; Li, Dray-Novey & Kong, 2007). For 
a Manchu, the size, location and the architectural style of his residence was 
determined by his banner affiliation and aristocratic rank, which is usually associ ted 
with his blood connection with the Qing monarchy as well as the hereditary rank of 
his ancestry (Dong, 2003). City planning for imperial Beijing represented the 
“disposition of bodies” through which the hierarchy of Qing power was expressed 
(Elliott, 2001).  
 In order to maintain its sovereignty over the ethnic majority Han group, the 
Qing monarchy adopted Confucianism to sustain the privileged status of Han 
intellectuals, using the imperial exam to select Han intellectuals to serve for 
bureaucratic positions. Certain loyal Han elites were awarded with Manchu status but 
were still forbidden from living in the inner city. Instead, the Han elite officials, 
intellectuals and common people intermingled in the outer city. At the same time, the 
Qing government did not permit Manchu bannermen to do business and practice 
crafts, which were forbidden in the inner city as it represented low social habitus. 
Instead, “they enjoyed regular monthly allowances of grain and yearly cash incomes” 
(Dong, 2003, p. 219) in the outer city. The original intention of this restriction was to 
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keep Manchu bannermen militarily active or pursuing bureaucratic positions through 
imperial examination. However, the stagnant imperial bureaucracy could not keep 
bannermen from abusing their social status by spending their allowances on luxury 
goods and entertainment in the outer city. According to Strand (1993), “there were 
popularly regarded as having lost their martial spirit and retained an unwarrated 
sense of entitlement” (p. 13). As a result, by the time the Qing Dynasty collapsed in 
1912, many Manchu families soon suffered poverty for their lack of skills and had to 
sell their possessions, including antiques and residences. The ethnical-geogrphical 
divide of Beijing was blurred when some Han merchants and political elites took over 
the courtyards from bankrupted aristocratic bannermen.  
 Nevertheless, the fall of the feudal monarchy did not bring Beijing any 
prosperity but left it stagnant for several decades. In 1928 Beijing lost its statu as the 
national capital to Nanjing and was renamed as Beiping, becoming a dilapidated city 
without any self-sustaining economy (Dong, 2003). According to Dong (2003), in 
1931, 32.7 percent of the workers in the workers’ union in Beijing were unemployed 
(p. 80). The number of non-unionized labor should be far higher than this number. A 
large rural population moved to Beijing due to frequent military confrontations 
between warlords in north China. Dong (2003) notes that “these peasants were not 
attracted to the city by employment opportunities; rather, they were driven f om the 
countryside by hardship or wars” (p. 221). Although the municipal government tended 
to revive Beiping as a tourist city, this plan was frequently interrupted due to a severe 
deficiency of financial support. This situation was further exacerbated when the 
128 
 
Japanese army made inroads into Beiping in 1937. Wealthy families and merchants, 
even major educational institutions left Beiping to the south of China to avoid warfare. 
When Beijing regained its old name and the status as the capital city of socialist China 
in 1949, many architectural landmarks in Beijing were in ruins.  
In the republican era, although we witnessed endless labor movements and 
militancy in the urban sphere, the decisiveness of native place worked against the 
development of transcendental identity and class consciousness among workers (Perry, 
1995). The retreat of imperial state power, embodied through the presence of fractured 
warlord politics and the intervention of foreign powers, paved the way for the 
proliferation of new economic and social organizations and the rise of civic activism 
(Bergere, 1997). When the regime of the People’s Republic took power, the strong 
civic social and economic organizations had been replaced by a strong state power 
that was eager to put identities to native places on hold.  
A careful reading of the modern history of China tells us that during the Mao 
era, local identities, considered as a feudal residual, were suppressed in order to 
formulate a grand vernacular culture to achieve Communist ideals. In this era, a 
geographical fetish did exist, but was often linked with a communist revolutionary 
heritage. For instance, the hometown of Mao Zedong, Shaoshan County (now 
Shaoshan city) in Hunan province, became a sacred place for communist pilgrims. As 
already mentioned, during the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), millions of Red 
Guards (youths with Communist beliefs) traveled to Beijing to witness Mao’s speech 
in Tiananmen Square. In addition, certain places were named as ge ming lao qu 
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regions with revolutionary traditions. Most of these revolutionary regions were relat d 
to the political and military history of the Chinese Communist Party. For instance, 
Jiangxi province has many revolutionary regions because the Communist guerrilla 
bands used to have military bases in the Jiangxi mountainous areas. Another famous 
revolutionary sacred place is City Zunyi in Guizhou province where Mao Zedong 
took over the military power and assured his military strategy of “rural attacks the 
urban” in the party and launched the legendary Long March. Most of these 
revolutionary regions are rural and impoverished places due to the military strategy of 
the Chinese Communist Party to avoid military confrontation with their enemies in 
major cities. Nevertheless, unlike the post-Mao identification with local cultures, the 
geographical fetish attached to these revolutionary regions was constructed by th  
communist ideologies, and was therefore, nationwide. As a result, various local 
identities were downplayed for their noncompliance with the communist ideology.  
The transformation of the social structure from strong and diverse intermediate 
organizations to an atomic state entity can also be detected by examining the change 
in Mao Zedong’s social propaganda (Zhao, 2001). In an essay finished in 1919, Mao 
identified three types of voluntary associations – worker unions, student and 
educational associations, and native place associations – and predicted that these 
associations (small Chinas) would provide the potential to construct a grand China 
(cited in Goodman, 1999). On the one hand, Mao recognized the potential 
contradictions among small Chinas; on the other hand, he demonstrated optimism that 
the small Chinas could form an inclusive unity. In 1937 Mao wrote his legendary 
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essay “Combat Liberalism,” in which he suggests to adopt an “active ideological 
struggle” to ensure unity within the Party and to motivate the revolutionary 
organizations. In the essay, Mao (2007) clearly identified native-place solidarity as a 
symptom of liberalism: 
To let things slide for the sake of peace and friendship when a person has 
clearly gone wrong, and refrain from principled argument because he is an old 
acquaintance, a fellow townsman, a schoolmate, a close friend, a loved one, an 
old colleague or a old subordinate…: this is one type of liberalism. (p. 103) 
During the Eleventh Session of the Supreme State Conference in 1957, Mao (2007) 
further claimed social forces and groups which resisted socialist unity as enemies of 
the people. Not only were solidarities based upon native place condemned, but also 
sentiment over native places was devalued. Instead, individuals were told that they 
should be ready to give up their geographical affiliation and respond to the call from 
the Party and to relocate anywhere the Party needs them.  
Besides its cultural endeavor to create a homogeneous culture as an approach 
to realize communism, the Chinese communist regime also reconstructed an 
all-inclusive institutional system to consolidate its power. Through constituting the 
universal hukou system with a work-unit system in the urban areas as well as a 
farming commune system in the rural regions that cover every single Chinese c tizen, 
“the state was for the first time in history able to penetrate society down to the village 
and factory level and to effectively engage in radical transformative programs 
according to utopian visions” (Zhao, 2001, p. 41). As a result, all medium-level social 
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institutions, including native-place organizations, independent workers’ unions and 
professional associations, various criminal and religious secret societies, wer  also 
fully eliminated (Zhao, 2001).  
Strictly under the control of the state, random and autonomous dislocation 
disappeared; native culture and social relations based on native-places were 
suppressed. Diverse and hierarchical urban culture was replaced by a universal and 
progressive socialist vernacular culture. One piece of the evidence of the control of 
native/local culture was the successful promotion of standardized Chinese (so called 
putonghua) pronunciation as the only formal language to be used in official and 
educational settings as well as in public media. Putonghua is officially defined “to 
have Beijing speech as its standard pronunciation, the northern Chinese dialect as its 
base dialect” (cited in Guo, 2004, p. 46). As Lydia Liu (1999) has observed, 
adaptation of a language more or less signifies adaptation of a culture. Therfore, the 
successful promotion of putonghua over a variety of Chinese dialectics symbolizes 
the dominance of a socialist vernacular culture over a multiplicity of Chinese ative 
cultures. However, there is an exception among many native cultures. Although the 
Beijing dialect was chosen by the regime to be the language of China, the native 
culture of Beijing was suppressed along with other native cultures by giving up its 
cultural characteristics. In this sense, Beijing had lost its geographical singularity and 
became a substitute name for the Party, its regime structure and the mass vern cular 
culture promoted by the regime. In other words, the Beijing dialect became the 
language of the socialist state, and Beijing culture was forced to become the cultural 
132 
 
allegory of the nation. 
However, the strong state control could not alleviate poverty and social chaos 
in the urban areas. The government of the People’s Republic faced cities with no 
mature industry, a large unemployed population suffering with dilapidated housing as 
well as a lack of transportation. The housing problem was particularly acute in that 
housing shortages, dilapidated conditions, and a lack of proper sewers or water supply 
in most residential areas were foremost concerns to communist governors (Zhang, X., 
p. 1997). Taking Beijing as an example, the demography of the city of Beijing in 1949 
was composed of artisans, small business owners, low-waged service workers (such 
as rickshaw pullers), unemployed homeless and a small portion of industrial workers. 
As Dong (2003) points out, the Republican Beijing (1912-1948) did not develop an 
industrial system. Nevertheless, according to orthodox Marxism, craftsmen and small 
business owners did not carry a proletarian agency. In order to make Beijing a 
representative communist city and reduce unemployment, a large urban industrial 
sector had to be established to transform the predominant population of the city to a 
progressive and politically conscious collectivity of proletarian workers and replace 
various organizations with a strong structure of state. It soon turned Beijing into one 
of the biggest construction sites for industrial factories in China.  
As a result, during the Mao era, “the state socialist regime had long been 
concerned with the production of new socialist subjects and it … insisted on 
inculcating state-authorized subjectivities in the populace” (Lee & Yang, 2007, p. 10). 
The endeavor to create a collective “we” went to an extreme during the Cultural 
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Revolution (1966-1976). One of the frequently adopted strategies of the communist 
regime was to suppress various identities while calling on the masses to participate in 
a communist vernacular culture. Under the leadership of the Chinese Communist 
Party, Chinese masses devoted themselves to endless ideological movements. For 
each ideological movement, the party regime identified one theme; and the masses 
used the theme as a guide for their political practices in their daily lives and as a 
weapon to attack their class-based “enemies.” For instance, during the Cultural 
Revolution, Mao Zedong affirmed that “revolution is not criminal, revolt is justified” 
and encouraged the Red Guards to attack any feudal historical and cultural residuaas 
well as social elites in bureaucratic institutions. It upset the social hierarchy and 
demolished local cultural heritage a frequently staged scene in urban China.  
As mentioned previously, prior to the Cultural Revolution, Beijing was a big 
industrial site where the recently constituted proletarian working class demonstrated 
its unprecedented passion for production. During the Cultural Revolution, Beijing 
soon became the largest ideological battlefield in the nation. Massive campaigns were 
initiated against the “people’s enemies,” including intellectuals, party bureaucrats and 
the anti-revolution Right (Andreas, 2007). Guided by Mao’s directive, the Chinese 
masses were granted the “four great freedoms” to write Big-Character posters, to 
speak out freely, to air one's views fully, and to hold great debates and massive 
demonstrations to denounce and attack any identified people’s enemies (Huang, 1996). 
It in turn transformed the urban space into a symbolic chaos without any sense of 
authority or hierarchy, or as Zizek (1994) puts it a “carnivalesque suspension of social 
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hierarchy” (p. 55).  
During this mass movement, in order to comply with ideological propagand, 
everyone was suppressed to various degrees. However, it also made the Chinese 
masses experience a collective fantasy. Famous Chinese film director Jiang Wen, who 
is also a Beijing native, and who found himself at the center of an ideological 
battlefield, explained this dilemma in his controversial movie In the Heat of Sun: 
“‘people in the West forget that that era (the Cultural Revolution) was a lot of fun… 
The Cultural Revolution was like a big rock-and-roll concert, with Mao as the biggest 
rocker and every other Chinese person his fan.6” The chaotic equalitarianism 
represented the Maoist ethos about the superiority of the proletariat and afforded the 
masses the political consciousness to defend the Maoist equalitarianism. This 
proletarian equalitarianism was not only fully staged during the Cultural Revolution; 
it became branded onto the collective memories of the Chinese masses and is 
constantly used by Chinese people to justify their participation in politics during the 
post-revolution era. 
IN THE POST-MAO BEIJING 
  Although local cultures were not highlighted in the Mao Era, the bodily 
practices of local cultures were not fully eliminated during the Cultural Revolution. 
For instance, Brownell (2001) notices that local cuisines were well preserved, then 
commercialized in the post-Mao era for the tourist industry and popular consumption 
                                                       
6 Andrew Solomon, “The Howl That Could Free China,” New York Times Magazine, December 19, 1993, 70, 
quoted by Rey Chow in her introduction to Primitive Passions: Visuality, Sexuality, Ethnography, and 
Contemporary Chinese Cinema. P. 30, also by  Tonglin Lu in her Fantasy and Ideology in a Chinese Film: A 
Zizekian Reading of the Cultural Revolution, Positins, 12, 2. p. 556. 
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(p. 125). In addition, in the post-Mao era the opening ceremonies of the Chinese 
National Games became a contest of local cultures rather than a showcase of the 
homogenous communist national culture (Brownell, 2001, p. 131). In post-Mao China, 
when the residual effects of feudalism were no longer denigrated as a cultur l poison 
undermining the grand communist project, but were viewed as an historical legacy 
that extended Chinese culture and justified the Chinese nation-state, it became a rich 
reservoir where people endlessly explored cultural capital to decorate their new social 
habita. At the same time, the historical legacy became the nexus at which people 
traced the superior/inferior characteristics of local identities, such as Beijingers.  
In the 1980s, Deng Xiaoping’s economic reforms soon brought about rapid 
economic development and material prosperity. At the same time, unbalanced 
economic developments and stratification crumbled the proletarian equalitarianism 
vis-à-vis the collective fantasy of the socialist utopia. The first wave of ec nomic 
investment, brought by ethnic Chinese from Taiwan, Hong Kong and other nations in 
Southeast Asia, created an economic miracle in south China, mainly in the Pearl Riv r 
Delta (including Fujian and Guangdong provinces). Following investment from the 
Chinese diasporic community, the second wave of investment, mainly from Western 
developed nations, reproduced another economic center in the Yangtze River Delta 
(including Shanghai, Jiangsu and Zhejiang provinces). Even though workers were 
also unemployed in south China, they enjoyed many more opportunities in the market 
economy than their peers in the north (Lee, 2007). In north China, the situation was 
rather different. The state-owned industrial enterprises, which were develop d in the 
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Mao era, faced competition from the coastal area in southeast China. Lacking the 
resources to upgrade their technology and diversify their products to meet the needs 
of consumers, state-owned enterprises in north China experienced extreme difficulty. 
To overcome economic stagnancy, the party adopted a series of practices, such as 
large scale layoffs and privatization of state-owned enterprises, which led to s vere 
corruption.  
Encountering the economic boom in southeast China, Beijing’s geographical 
prominence was severely diminished in the 1980s. On the one hand, residents of 
Beijing had the advantage of being the first to witness the economic development and 
democracy of Western society through global media. On the other hand, Beijing was 
the host of China’s leading academic institutions where elite intellectuas serve. It 
made Beijing the center of the cultural and political movement in the post-Mao China. 
In The Power of Tiananmen, Zhao Dingxin (2001) records that when the state 
loosened its control on propaganda, commercial, cultural and political activities 
mushroomed in the post-Mao era. The mainstream media was full of intellectuals’ 
diagnoses of the Chinese economy and society, all of which contributed to the 
economic and moral crises of the state. After comparing the activities of college 
students in Beijing, Shanghai and Guangdong in the 1980s, Zhao (2001) revealed that 
when students in Guangdong were busy on their small business projects, Shanghai 
students were obsessed with TOFEL and GRE tests, Beijing students were honing 
their political sensitivity by participating in endless conferences and seminars held by 
radical left-wing intellectuals.  
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What is intriguing is that left-wing intellectuals used Maoist strategies, such as 
the four great rights to achieve a Rousseuian understanding of democracy (Zhao, 2001, 
p. 61). For instance, the earliest and one of the most well-known political dissidents, 
Wei Jingsheng (a Beijing native whose first name means “born in Beijing”) posted his 
big character poster on the Democracy Wall in 1979, attacking the socialist regime as 
a “dictatorship” and calling for democracy. Another cultural icon is heroic 
nonconformist Chinese rocker Cui Jian. Influenced by Western rock-and-roll music
which was imported into China through illegal channels, Cui vividly articulated the 
melancholic and angry mentality of Chinese people, particularly those in North China. 
In his legendary song “Nothing to My Name,” Cui represents the cruel social reality 
that Chinese people have to face in the post-Mao epoch. By frequently using 
quotations from Mao Zedong, Cui’s music can be interpreted as either expressing an 
irrevocable nostalgia for socialist equalitarianism or as a ruthless satire towards the 
quixotic utopia. When the fantasy of a socialist utopia collapses, materialistic scarcity 
and social inequality become more unbearable. 
As Barrington Moore (1978) remarks, what may trigger rebellion against the 
social order is often moral outrage rather than materialistic hardship. It can be used to 
explain why a massive national solidarity was well maintained throughout the Mao 
era even though everybody was extremely impoverished. The studies of Chinese 
workers in the post-Mao era show that they were discontent because they no longer 
carried the social privilege for being the proletarian class (Unger & Chan, 2007; Lee, 
2007). In addition, the economic reformation that happened in state-owned enterprises 
138 
 
made them the most vulnerable collectively. Not only had the previous job security 
and welfare, such as free education and medical care, been gradually banished, but 
also the economic reformation made bureaucrats in their enterprises the new rich. 
Throughout the economic transition, the changing policy was always taken advantage 
of by bureaucrats and leaders in state-owned enterprises. In certain cases, 
administrators in public sectors abused their power during the process of privatization 
of public properties. This practice further exaggerated urban residents’ outrage 
towards social orders.  
One Beijing worker who was a political activist during the 1989 Tiananmen 
Square protest appeared in the documentary The Gate of Heavenly Peace and 
described the situation thus: 
My mom said, ‘in the past, we had low wages but had no problems to raise 
three kids. Now you have your own jobs, why do we feel the money is short?’ 
These comrades greedily usurp public resources and prevent workers from 
getting any resources. Why is that? I can get [resources] too if you can get 
them! 
From his confession, we can discern that Beijing workers neither had an interest in 
critiquing the privatization of state enterprises and encroaching capitalism, nor did 
they hold idealistic views on Rousseuian democracy as Chinese intellectuals did. A  a 
result, , Beijing residents stood along with students in 1989 Tiananmen 
demonstrations, blocked major venues to stop military forces entering Beijing, and 
became involved in physical confrontations with troops (Zhao, 2001, p. 218). As 
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Giorgio Agamben (2000) keenly noticed, “the notions of democracy and freedom are 
too generic to constitute a real goal of struggle” (p. 89). When the Chinese state found 
out that it was facing a multitude, which is something that it could not and did not 
want to represent, it could only resort to violence (Agamben, 2000).  
In the post-1989 era, the state primarily employed two strategies to 
disintegrate the alliance between college students and Beijingers. First, the state 
generously offered Beijingers housing ownership through privatizing public property. 
Second, the state loosened the control of its hukou system and allowed more college 
students to gain formal hukou status in the city through meritocracy, allowing the state 
to deliberately create antagonism and competition between the natives and new 
arrivals. In the meantime, the loosing hukou system enabled a tremendous number of 
migrant workers from the rural areas to pursue an urban dream.  
REINVENTING BEIJINGER AND BEIJING CULTURE 
 During the cultural battle, intellectual Beijing natives played a significa t 
role in reinforcing their local identity. In the 1980s, Beijing natives enjoyed a gre t 
advantage of witnessing Western culture and economic advancement, which had 
cultivated a strong anarchist sentiment among Beijing natives. In the post-Tiananmen 
era, another well-know rocker, He Yong used his anger to project his nostalgia to the 
old Beijing lifestyle that was disappearing along with urban renovation and 
modernization in a song called zhonggulou (Bell and Drum Towers, which are the 
remains of the demolished inner city wall). In the end of He Yong’s music video, he 
jumped into an icy lake during a severe winter to protest his demolished hutong home. 
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He Yong’s nostalgia, therefore, is intermingled with his resistance against the tate 
sovereignty as well as social changes. This type of nostalgia was not only limited to 
Beijing rock and roll musicians, other Beijing intellectuals, including painters, 
sculptors, installation artists, documentary producers and curators, all demonstrated a 
strong nostalgia through a variety of aesthetical representation. Within Shibo Wang’s 
documentary of Chinese radical artists in the 1990s – Swing in Beijing, sculptor Zhan 
Wang laments “the huge changes in Beijing are like the snow covering your footsteps: 
you don’t know where you are coming from. I have lost the sense of belonging.” 
Nevertheless, the nostalgia of these intellectuals was rarely related to the bygone 
socialism but particularly tied to their cultural rooting of the local, since none of them 
would like to go back to the Mao’s age when individualistic and artistic expression 
was outlawed. They carefully teased out the cultural elements of the local from their 
socialist past and reassembled these elements to present their erasable nost lgia, a  if 
they only experienced the local culture without ever encountering the socialit past. 
Therefore, to the radical Beijing intellectuals, “the past does not just exist as aesthetic 
principles chosen for their suitability to ‘modern taste’: rather, “modern taste” is 
created with the very fragments of the past” (Dong, 2003, p. 16-17).  
In the meantime, their resistance to the socialist past cannot be severed from 
their cosmopolitan ambition, since the Beijing intellectuals who tried to retain and 
revive Beijing culture were no longer contented to position their identity in the 
domestic realm. The globalization occurring on both economic and cultural spheres 
forced and lured Beijing intellectuals to position their localized subjectivities in the 
141 
 
nexus of global culture and to accumulate transnational social capital. All the Beijing 
radical artists were eager to show Western audiences their ambivalence, rooted 
creativity along with cultural transcendence. As Visser (2004) narrates, Beijing artists 
are longing for “a new form of Chinese art – one which meets international stadards 
rather than merely promoting the nativist notion” (p. 286). Therefore, we witness a 
large number of Beijing performance artists travel to North America and Europe 
showcasing their high arts, which critique the on-going urban demolition in Beijing 
(Visser, 2004).  
Their obsession with the local culture and the ambition to achieve cultural 
transcendence inevitably eliminated the political progressiveness (Lee & Yang, 2007). 
In the field of rock music, the political retreat was even more evident. In a television 
documentary of Chinese rock music and the founding father of Chinese rock music 
Cui Jian, many young rockers frankly spoke about the historic limitation of radical 
rock music in the 1980s and early 1990s. One Beijing rocker said, 
We don’t really understand Nothing to My Name and people’s emotional echo 
to this song in the 1980s. It is hyperreal or even hypocritical to repeat Nothing 
to My Name. We have everything now. We do rock music because it is from 
the West and it is cool. I don’t feel we are fighting insects too. We are just 
rockers.  
Nevertheless, the fading political consciousness did not prevent the younger 
generation of Beijing rockers to express their urban nostalgia. In 1993, during an 
interview conducted after the Chinese Rock concert in Berlin, Wang Yong, one of Cui 
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Jian’s peer musicians, puts it this way:  
The goal of my music is to go global… Even though the Chinese rock music 
is born out of politics, it does not mean that being political is the only way to 
keep your rock music Chinese. My music is about rhythm, but is still under 
the umbrella of Chinese rock music. 
In 2004, Xia Yan, a Beijing native guitar player who is widely recognized as a 
Chinese shredder, composes a guitar song Beijing Hutong dedicating to his hutong 
memory. Bridging western guitar techniques with the rhythm of the Beijing opera, Xia 
Yan delivers his sentiment in a sensitive, almost romantic demeanor. The anger and 
despair embedded in He Yong’s Bell and Drum Towers have been completely replaced 
by purposefully demonstrated Western techniques and a deliberate integration of 
Chinese and Western music ingredients. The intention to embrace apolitical artistic 
expression is not only limited to young rockers, some earlier rockers either took a
commercial turn without any announcement or declared their move to the global 
market in the name of promoting local culture. This very act of aestheticization is in 
itself political (Zhao, 1997, p. 36). Initially, the aestheticization represents tha  they 
were eager to detach themselves from political radicalism and justify the liberal 
position they embraced. When they joined the global cultural assemblage, these 
Beijing native artists were reluctant to be burdened by historic and political residues. 
When they gave up their historic responsibility, they unavoidably lost their political 




YOU ARE NOT A BEIJINGER 
The intellectual boom in Beijing cannot be separated from its economic 
advantages, historical-political lineage, geographic proximity to the political center 
and accessibility to the Western culture. On the grass root level Beijing natives 
contend that vibrant and cultural expression is an essential feature of Beijing culture. 
“For city people without elite status, politics meant either accepting the logic of elite 
representation and protection” (Strand, 1993, p. 18-19) or to use the elitist logic to 
achieve their own gain. It further reaffirms that the cultural essentialism created and 
promoted by intellectuals and Orientalistic foreigners can only heighten people’s 
sensitivity to differences and facilitate identity politics. 
After the government privatized public housing and offered Beijingers 
housing ownership, Beijingers’ discontent towards the local municipal government 
vis-à-vis the Chinese government in the 1980s and early 1990s had been replaced by a 
special psychological sentiment of lack in the past, namely the materialistic scarcity 
and deteriorated housing condition in Mao’s era. No longer feeling disgruntled or 
disillusioned for being materially under-privileged, Beijing natives generally did not 
acknowledge their gain from the government’s policies. Unger and Chan (2007) 
describe the situation thus: “indeed, their collective view is that they are entitl d today 
to generous treatment” by the state “precisely because they had materially sacrificed 
and been deprived during the decades under Mao” (p.133). Even though Beijing 
natives were economically stratified, this type of self-entitlement could be discerned 
among both socially and economically privileged groups and the disadvantaged 
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groups, such as unemployed workers.   
As the group that has greatly benefited from the government housing policies, 
Beijing natives realized that it is difficult or even immoral to use their economic loss 
to justify their stay in the center of Beijing. Thus, they stopped claiming themselves as 
“economic losers” but instead a social group whose cultural distinction and 
uniqueness are stripped by the on-going urban change, and threatened by the in 
pouring of outsiders. For instance, “when crime and disorder began to increase in the 
1990s, Beijing residents blamed it on the outsiders; who were migrating to the city in 
search of prosperity” (Brownell, 2001, p.129). Although Beijing natives could not 
maintain their daily life without relying on rural migrants’ low cost labor, it did not 
prevent Beijing natives from blaming migrant workers from the rural areas as the 
cause of over-population and social disorder. Directly challenging new arrivers’ legal 
status in the city, Beijing natives emphasized their “legal status” and spoke for the 
hegemonic hukou system.  
Besides using their “legal” status to suppress migrant workers from the rural 
areas, Beijing natives tended to borrow cultural capital to empower themselv s in the 
ideological battles against new urbanites who gained formal hukou status through 
meritocracy. For instance, an identity of an Old Beijinger was invented to delineate 
the boundaries between the Beijing natives and new legal migrants – college 
graduates who obtained hukou through employment. 
As one college graduate who obtained Beijing hukou through employment 
argued in cyberspace: 
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Who has the authority to define Beijingers? What makes a person a Beijinger? 
I did my college education in Beijing, I have Beijing hukou, I work for a 
privileged and profitable state own enterprises, I own spacious housing in 
Beijing. Ridiculously, some Beijing natives claim that I’m still not a Beijinger.  
In response to this argument, one Beijing native satires:  
 I see your desperation to be a Beijinger. But all I can tell you is that it is 
impossible to transform a country pumpkin to a Beijinger, no matter how 
many flats you own in Beijing and how much you make. If you never live in a 
courtyard, you don’t like to drink douzhi (a local drink made of soy), you 
don’t appreciate Beijing opera and Beijing drum-songs… You will never 
become a Beijinger.  
From this argument, it is evident that the identification with native place is “not 
something that one is but something that one does” (Lipman, 1996, p. 99) and what 
spatial experience one has or has ever had. 
To secure their economic interests, Beijing natives are anxious to defend and 
delineate the borders which were transgressed and effaced by radical urbanization and 
domestic migration. When they are actively engaged in distinctions making and 
redrawing border, the local cultural essences they refer to are rather fr gmentary and 
inconsistent. For instance, when Beijing natives speak about Old Beijing, some of 
them refer to it as the “historically recent Republican Beijing” (Dong, 2003, p. 2)
promoting a vision of peaceful, vernacular and organic culture for working and lower 
classes. Nevertheless, they downplay the political history of republican Beiji g – 
146 
 
when warlords, the Nationalists, and the Communists, competed for political energies 
of city residents (Strand, 1993, p. 19).  
Other Beijing natives assign Old Beijing and Beijing culture to the Imperial 
Beijing. In documentaries Mysterious City of Ancient Alleyways (2004) and The Lost 
City (2006), the volatile nature of “Old Beijing” is vividly represented. The film 
makers included not only cricket fighting, pigeon-petting and Beijing opera to feature 
Beijing hutong culture, but also covered some members of Manchu imperial families 
without addressing their imperial power over the ancient inner city. Regardless the 
fact that pigeon-petting and cricket fighting were widely adopted customs acro s 
north China, Beijing opera was originally brought to Beijing by theatrical troupes 
from Anhui and Hubei provinces. Therefore, Beijing culture is not a monolithic form, 
but a coalescence of many local cultures.  
The flexibility of past displacement by Beijing natives is extraordinary in that 
they claim exclusive ownership of various cultural practices and their identif cation of 
different types of past elitism. In his remarks on genealogy, Foucault (1984) points out 
“a history that always encourages subjective recognitions and attributes a form of 
reconciliation to all the displacements of the past” (p. 86). As the cultural 
protecticionism of Beijingers is criticized in cyberspace, a Beijing native internet user 
argues that it demonstrates Beijing natives’ political consciousness and bravery by 
contrasting these identifiable features with the money driven new migrants, be state 
sponsored college graduates or state-condemned rural workers. He/she even attributes 
the bravery to the legacy of Manchu banner men who possessed aristocratic status, 
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warrior spirits and political activism. This re-articulation of Manchu culture negates 
the fact that, during the republican and Mao era, Manchus were seen as morally 
deficient for their economic dependence on the imperial state (Dong, 2003). The 
romanticized Manchu imperial culture definitely does not include the historical 
memories of violent feudal sovereignty and ruthless ethnical segregation between Han 
and Manchu populations. Therefore, this particular construction of identity is 
“characterized precisely by its suspension in time and by its effort to possess the 
object at the same time as it distances itself from it” (Dillon, 2000, p.223). “Whereas 
the invention of tradition entails the development of utterly new habits under the 
banner of timeworn custom, recycling involves the expedient patching up of 
genuinely old and all-too-used articles in an attempt to pass them off as authentically 
new” (Dong, 2003, p.16). More willing to seek their identity roots in more hoary 
epochs, Beijing natives rarely link their social and political superiority with the more 
contingent socialist state and the ukou system. It further reveals that their goal of 
culturalization and historicalization of their native identity is an original rupture 
produced by self-generation and “more directly linked to participants’ private 
interests” (Shi, 1997, p. 19). 
At the end of the documentary The Lost City, a young Beijing woman firmly 
asserts, “I want to protect Beijing spirit; I want to protect Beijingers; I want to keep 
Beijingers on their land!” Her articulation implies arbitary protectionism in an 
extremely tactical way –denying Beijingers’ economic dominance by retreating to a 
position of “subordination.” Since we are forced to give up our culture, we are not 
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oppressive to other people. In other words, Beijingers use their “subordination” to 
uphold the superiority of their local identity through transforming victimization into 
the very means of economic/cultural domination. The discourse of “salvage a dying 
culture” is used to forge a sense of injustice and “affirm a moral vision that things 
have been, should be, and could be different” (Lee & Yang, 2007, p. 7).  
In the meantime, Beijing natives’ animosity towards college graduates and 
migrant workers never extends to the third type of outsiders—foreign travele s. When 
the hutong tour became a “must see” tour for foreign visitors, Beijing natives joined 
efforts with local tourist agencies to provide local cuisine for foreigners. Some also 
provided a brief introduction of their living environment by combining fabricated 
native folklores with some historical facts. Many rickshaws – the most popular 
transportation device in the republic of Beijing – were prepared by tourist companies 
for foreign visitors to explore the maze-like ancient alleyways, although many 
rickshaws pullers were migrant workers who just arrived in the city. Some Beijing 
natives modernize their courtyard houses and turn them into profitable hostels. It 
offers foreign tourists a set of well-packed experiences, carrying both exticism and 
functionalism. Therefore, besides extracting political power from historical memories, 
Beijing natives also turn their historical legacy into museum pieces to facilitate 
commercialism (Wang, 1996, p. 116). Although Beijing natives’ “fascination with 
‘Old Beijing’ is in part a product of the commercialization of history, and it does n t 
interrupt the public’s rush to a more comfortable lifestyle away from the crowed 





By scrutinizing the geopolitical and cultural identity of Beijing natives, as 
continuously in the process of being created and given new meanings, we can 
understand social, economic, and cultural aspects of Chinese urban history from an 
entirely new perspective. Embedded in a global context and a historical trajecto y, the 
native place identity of Beijing is apparently linked to the contested terrain of class 
and habitus, urban culture, demographical mobility and the changing policies of 
sovereign state. The formation and transformation of native place identity cannot be 
simply understood as a singular entity but “in relation or contradistinction to other 
identities in particular local and historical contexts” (Honig, 1996, 145). It requires s 
to embrace the complexity of identity politics, including “creation, invocation, and 
manipulation of notions of cultural distinctiveness to establish self/other dichotomies 
among people in a shared political and economic system” (Honig, 1996, p. 146), 
particularly a system shaped by global capital power and sovereignty of the 
nation-state.  
  In the final chapter of Modernity at Large, Arjun Appadurai (1996b) defines 
“locality” as a contextual complex with phenomenological quality, “constituted by a 
series of links between the senses of social immediacy (p. 178). The emphasis on 
contextual nature of “locality” implies an embedded dialectic – “locality-producing 
activities are not only context-driven but are also context-generative” (Appardurai, 
1996b, p. 186). The dialectical complex between locality and context is evident in the 
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historical trajectory of urban Beijing and will keep shaping subjectivities of different 
social groups in the urban space.  
  In the meantime, Appadurai (1996a & 1996b) further explore the significance 
of locality in the context of the crisis of the nation-state. He argues that human 
mobility within the nation-state “challenges the orderliness of the nation-s ate” and 
“encourages the emergence of translocalities” (Appadurai, 1996a, p. 42). In the case 
of Beijing, although people from different localities in the Beijing urban space c n 
easily be located, we can barely discern a tendency to embrace translocalities and a 
tendency to challenge the state order. In socialist China, territorial integrity was 
crucial to state-sponsored ideas of sovereignty. Thus, hukou system was organized and 
executed to fulfill the state’s control of body through geopolitical tactics.  
  Rather than forming a new mass politics, the co-presence of rooted and 
floating populations in the city wages endless identity politics, producing discourses 
to reinforce their entitlement and exclude others. The endless politics of identities 
disguises the alliance between the capital and the state. Status, native place and 
division of labor all contribute to the invisible barriers among the masses and prevent 
the formation of a conscious and politically radical multitude (Hardt & Negri, 2004). 
The display of these divisions in public makes the power network between the capital 
and the state difficult to unravel and to challenge.  
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Chapter Five: From Turandot to Jasmine: the Historically Situated Political Aesthetics 
in National Representation 
Here is a beautiful jasmine flower, 
Here is a beautiful jasmine flower. 
Perfumed blossoms fill the branch,  
Fragrant and white for everyone's delight. 
 
Let me come and pick a blossom 
To give to someone, 
Jasmine flower, oh jasmine flower 
(-www.ingeb.org/songs/molihua.html) 
 
“Jasmine” is a Chinese folk song generally believed to be a ballad originatin  
in the southeast of China from the late period of the Ming Dynasty (1368-1644 AD) 
(Chang, 1999). In different territories, people perform it through a broad variety of 
dialects with minor mutations on its melody. In terms of lyrics and rhythm, “Jasmine” 
has different local editions, but its theme is relatively static as the lyrics shows that it 
is explicitly sexualized. Generating meanings on two levels, “Jasmine” ight 
ostensibly be a eulogy of the natural beauty and fragrance of flowers; or it could be a 
tacit glorification of femininity. Its capability of eliciting the intention of possession 
hints at a hidden order underlying universal sexual libido: the conquest of femininity.  
In the 2003 World Championship of Figure Skating at Washington DC, 
Chinese skaters Xue Shen and Hongbo Zhao presented their fabulous performance of 
–Turandot - amid a modified version of “Jasmine” and won the gold medal. As 
Harman, Garbato and Forberg (2008) put it: 
Their long programme was set to Vanessa-Mae’s Fantasy for Violin and 
Orchestra on themes from Giacomo Puccini’s opera Turandot, and it was 
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masterfully choreographed by Lea Ann Miller. The arena had a feeling of great 
anticipation as these reigning world champions took the ice. Perhaps never 
have any skaters seized a big moment as they did. The programme exuded 
phenomenal energy and emotion from the opening move. As they continued to 
execute each technical element to perfection, the energy and emotion from 
them and the audience continued to escalate. Despite incredibly difficult 
elements, every moment of the programme enhanced the grace, beauty and 
drama of Puccini’s great music (p. 95). 
In 2004, this highly gendered indigenous folksong was staged in the closing 
ceremonies of the 2004 Olympic Games and the Paralympic Games at Athens as a 
part of the invitation to the 2008 Olympic Games at Beijing. In the closing ceremony 
of the 2004 Olympic Games, a young girl from China performed a solo of “Jasmine”; 
and in the closing ceremony of the 2004 Paralympic Games, a group of 
instrumentalists with disabilities performed “Jasmine” with traditional Chinese 
musical instruments. The frequent use of this folksong in such widely-broadcasted 
cultural-political settings can be easily interpreted by outsiders as promotion of 
Chinese culture to the world marketplace. However, because of its highly gendered 
characteristics, one can hardly put it in a category of “high art” to signify supremacy 
of Chinese culture on the international stage. Instead, for China, a nation with a 
lengthy history and profound cultural legacy, this “Jasmine” fever, offering an inferior 
and stereotypical cultural representation, seems to reveal many underlying paradoxes: 
what meanings does it signify as a cultural symbol to its domestic and foreign 
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audiences? Who chooses “Jasmine” and for what purposes?  
 In sports domains, gendered discourse is always one of the topics that 
scholars are attentive to (Daddario, 1997; Duncan, 1990; Graydon, 1983; Hillard, 
1984; Kane, 1988). Many criticisms, targeting gendered artistic genres and texts, 
reveal how the public media uses different techniques to control female subjectivities 
(Daddario, 1997; Modleski, 1982). Beside commercialized television programs, the 
ceremonies attached to mega sports events, due to their popularity, have become the 
targets of cultural critiques. Particularly, the political influences of these c remonies 
are so imperative that participants and spectators use such words as “crying,” 
“patriotism,” and remembrance” to describe their subjectivities (MacAloon, 1981 & 
1984; Slowikowski, 1991). The nostalgia, discursively embedded in these ceremonies, 
may promote a hegemonic sense of solidarity and community (Slowikowski, 1991). 
For instance, in the study for the opening ceremonies of the Nagano 1998, Sydney 
2000, and Salt Lake City 2002 games, Hogan (2003) uses Stuart Hall’s (1992) term 
-“narrative of nation”- to interpret these ceremonies. On one hand, these ceremonial 
projects are used to promote and construct national identities; on the other, they 
reflect and facilitate the maintenance of current social hierarchies. Rather than 
comparing ceremonial presentations offered by different nation-states, this chapter 
specifically focuses on a piece of musical presentation of China in these sporting 




 In terms of artistic genres, music is traditionally perceived as the most 
rarefied, abstract, and specialized of all superstructural activities (Jameson, 1983a, 
p.vii-viii). Its political potential had been generally recognized until the Frankfurt 
School broadly promoted a critical analysis of music. Adorno (1976) argues, that 
“(m)usic is not ideology pure and simple; it is ideological only insofar as it is false
consciousness” (p. 63). Music makes people forget, makes them believe, silences 
them and ruins the sensibility of men (Attali, 1983). It possesses “the strongest 
affinities with that most abstract of all social realities” (Jameson, 1983a, p. vii). 
Rather than possess meanings in itself, it can only be conceptualized and materialized 
through the systems of power it serves (Attali, 1983). In addition, the discursive 
relationship between music and sport has been investigated by scholars in sports 
sociology and physical cultural studies (see Bateman & Bale, 2008). Therefore, a 
critical analysis of music has to involve a critical scrutiny of the system  of power and 
their genealogical changes, as an attempt “to decipher this superstructure for a sound 
form of knowledge” (Attali, 1983, p. 4).  
  Trying to decode “Jasmine” as a cultural and aesthetical symbol, this chapter 
attempts to contour the genealogical circulation and configuration of this folksong as 
an effort to articulate it as a shifting conjuncture where a group of powers with 
overarching discourses – not only nationalism but many others including colonialism, 
decolonial nativism, and global capitalism – contest their legitimacies. I argue that, 
for “Jasmine,” the “situation-specific function of its aesthetic” can only be 
comprehended “through sedimented layers of previous interpretations” (Jameson, 
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1981, p. 9). In past historical moments, its rhythm has been shaped by diverse powers 
in different contexts to become adapted in different musical genres. We can neither 
read it as a psychoanalytic shift on private and subjective levels nor as an embodiment 
of a historical romanticism. I try to radicalize its analysis with greater historical 
materiality, which provides the potential of political configurations. In other words, it 
represents an effort to scrutinize the versatility and ambiguity of aesthetic , both in the 
Western and Chinese contexts (Liu, 2000).  
TURANDOT: AN IMPERIAL IMAGINATION OF CHINESE NATIONALITY 
 As Nietzsche (1989) once remarked, “Hearing something new is 
embarrassing and difficult for the ear; foreign music we do not hear well” (p. 27). 
Staging something absolutely foreign to the rest of the world is risky in that it
involuntarily elicits the sense of Other. “Jasmine,” even though it is exotic to the 
majority of Westerners, is not absolutely heterogenic. As a matter of fact, it is not only 
far from new, but a result of Oriental and Western cultural exchange. To trace its 
proximity to Western audiences, we have to be attentive to the extended genealo y of 
the cultural exchange between the Orient and the West.  
With the longest and strongest continuous state tradition in documented 
history by far, the Chinese feudal regime never stopped promoting its independent 
sovereignty and an uncompromising pride for its enduring cultural and political 
hegemony (Zhang, X., 2001, p. 320). Based on historical records, the cultural and 
commercial exchanges between China and the rest of the world can be traced back for
thousands of years (Hobson, 2004). The well-known travel book written by Marco 
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Polo in late 13th century might be the earliest material upon which the Western world 
formed an incipient image of China. MacKenzie (1995) identifies Orientalism at the
pre-modern stage as an artistic genre resulting from cross-cultural amalgamation, 
emerging in different disciplines such as patterns, textiles, ceramics and so on. In this 
epoch, according to MacKenzie’s (1995) statement, Orientalist articulation was an 
endeavor to incorporate different cultural forms in more positive and constructive 
ways. For instance, in the field of drama, the famous Italian dramatist Carlo Gozzi 
(1720-1806) produced the famous Re Turandot in 1762 to materialize his exotic 
imagination about China. Based on an ancient fable, Gozzi developed a narrative 
about a Chinese princess who “remains a very human figure, who is an early 
spokesperson for women’s liberation” (DiGaetani, 2001, p. 57). Her resistance to 
marriage is a challenge to the universal male sexual hegemony and a showcase f the 
intellectual power of the female (Ashbrook & Powers, 1991). Gozzi’s drama achieved 
enormous and unprecedented success in his age.  
The balance of power between the Orient and the West, it should be noted, 
collapsed along with the outgrowth of modernity. Said (1979) argues, that starting 
from the late eighteenth century, the interchange between the Orient and the West was 
characterized by a dramatic change in which Orientalism had become an ideological 
institution symbolizing Western authority over the Orient. In short, Orientalism 
represented a strategic tool to generate panoptic control over the Orient in a variety of 
domains - political, scientific, military, religious, aesthetic and so forth (Said, 1979). 
Many artistic works produced in this specific period were no longer directly 
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borrowing genuine oriental characteristics transmitted to the West; instead Western 
artists creatively integrated Oriental artistic components in their works t  objectify the 
Orient structured by the modernization process (MacKenzie, 1995). To date, the 
success achieved by these Western artists continues to generate a prevailing influence, 
so much so that some of these works are still contesting our aesthetic epistemologies 
by disseminating the modern Western version of history in an apolitical approach.  
As one of the cultural byproducts of this historical time, a new version - also 
the most classical version - of Turandot came forth from Gozzi’s Re Turandot. 
Giacomo Puccini (1858-1924), one of the greatest Italian opera composers, produced 
the best and perhaps boldest variation of Gozzi’s play in 1924 (DiGaetani, 2001). 
According to Maehder (1994), it is a fully mature opera not only in terms of Puccini’s 
own output but also as the last descendant of the Italian operatic tradition of the 
nineteenth century, and it reflects in both its dramaturge and its music the ideas that 
were currently sweeping across Europe (p. 278). Ashbrook and Powers (1991) claim 
that, Turandot is the last masterpiece of the operative grand tradition to have proved 
itself over time and the last moment of the “Golden Century” of Italian opera. Moving 
from darkness, hatred, fear and death to light, love, trust and life, Puccini’s Turandot 
fully interprets the nature of modernity in a metaphorical way (DiGaetani, 2001). 
Through these binary pairs, Turandot continues to show the contingent nature of 
modernity in a specific historical period of expansion and colonization when the 
Fascist regime (1922-1943) dominated Italy (Liao, 1993; & Wilson, 2005). 
In Puccini’s Turandot, the Chinese princess, the pioneer of feminism in 
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Gozzi’s opera, was replaced by an icy Chinese princess (Ashbook & Powers, 1991; 
Fisher, 2002; Tommasini, 2004). She averts marriage by requiring her suitors to 
answer three riddles; those who fail are subject to decapitation. Her palace is 
decorated with the skulls of her would-be husbands (Platt, 1998, p. 2). The role of 
Turandot is to fully incarnate the wicked wisdom of Oriental culture as well as the 
incredible beauty which is always a dangerous seduction to righteous Western 
civilization. Liao (1993) states, in Gozzi, the Chinese crowd consists of slavewomen, 
eunuchs, soldiers, priests, and an executioner. But Puccini wanted a group of 
‘homeless’ Chinese people, who could be easily swayed and were clearly in need of 
both leadership and direction (Liao, 1993, p. 71-72). Their bloodthirsty nature, Liao 
(1993) argues, is fully demonstrated by their enjoyment of the decapitation spectacle. 
It also fully signifies the Chinese mass as an aimless mob waiting for guidance 
towards enlightenment. The Tartar Prince Calaf, in Puccini’s narrative, is portrayed as 
an agent, a savior and a leader who is capable of civilizing this anachronistic and 
inferior space. As a sun god he ends the unconsciousness, suffering and unhappiness 
of the Chinese people and brings love and life back to the old palace, to the Chinese 
people, and finally even to the princess (DiGaetani, 2001, p. 59). She finally becomes 
the passionate wife of Calaf, a decision which complies with the universal rule of 
cultural dependence of women on men (Ashbrook & Powers, 1991).  
  In order to “find a Chinese element to enrich the drama and relieve the 
artificiality of it” (Puccini, 1974, p. 272), Puccini incorporated several Chinese 
melodies derived from a music box into his opera (Ashbrook & Powers, 1991;
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Metzger, 2003; Weaver, 1994). As a partial work of his search for authenticity of 
Chineseness, “Jasmine” (Mo-li-hua) was chosen with several other ballads by him for 
their “heterophony and advanced polyrhythmic patterns” (MacKenzie, 1995, p. 164). 
In terms of musical presentation, Turandot is easily seen as an unconscious 
manifestation of racial arrogance in that the “authentic” Chinese melodies wer  
victimized by Puccini’s monster orchestra (Ashbrook & Powers, 1991, p. 10). The 
pentatonic “Jasmine” melody continues to be associated directly with Turandot, on or 
off-stage, throughout the opera as one of the most important rhythms (Ashbrook & 
Powers, 1991, p. 90).  
  As the final work of Puccini, Turandot achieved enormous success after the 
author’s death in 1924. Its beautiful lyric soprano, remarkable costumes, dreamy solos, 
marvelous ensemble work, and so forth enchanted a male romantic imagination about 
the Oriental world. From its initial staging in 1926 to present, artists have never 
wavered in their interpretation of this grand and legendary work (Berger, 2005). Since 
the 1960s, Turandot has been a staple of the repertory, even though it does not belong 
to the most frequently performed operas due to the prohibitive resources required to 
stage it (Berger, 2005, p. 268). The classic status of Turandot once again reaffirms the 
idea that it is the summit of Puccini’s achievement as a music-dramatist. Just as 
Maehder (1994) puts it, Puccini is the one who fuses the diverse European traditions 
in both dramaturge and music, and in so doing greatly influenced the contemporary 
music and opera (p. 278).  
Nevertheless, the success Puccini achieved in the artistic domain has also 
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attracted critiques from multiple perspectives. As Said (1979) notes, in reference to 
Orientalist projects, the success of Puccini can never be exempt from the influence of 
the historicity of his material world. In this opera, “women’s representatio s of the 
Orient are more clearly attributed to chronological periods and set into their historical 
contexts” (MacKenzie, 1995, p.13-14). In addition, this “alternative female discourse” 
(Melman, 1992) on the Orient is heavily fractured, signifying the fragmented 
subjectivities of Western women under the pressure of universal modern discourses. 
The demonstrated indifference to human life, a supposed characteristic of the Chinese 
mass in Turandot, was neither a realistic portrait of feudal China nor an accurate 
representation of the full-length trauma China encountered throughout its lengthy 
modernization. Influenced by this type of discourses, European audiences were 
convinced that, China is a kind of non-place, without any trace of history and context 
but full of ineffable mystery (Liao, 1993). Chinese music, to Puccini, is the ideal raw 
material for a modernist project of self-invention in the name of art (Liao, 1993, p. 
74).  
Quintessentially, aesthetics is a discourse of modernity, for it articultes the 
intrinsic contradictions of modernity through the most concrete and “sensuous” 
arrangement (Liu, 2000). As a result of self-invention, Turandot, the most exotic 
project for an imagined anachronistic world, represents the contradictions and 
ambivalence inherent in the modernity crisis of the West – the age of Fascism (Liao, 
1993). Only by elaborating a dramatic singularity of the “Other”, can the integrity of 
Western modernity be recognized and sustained (Liao, 1993). Therefore, “Jasmine,” 
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as one primary component of Turandot, is not an aesthetic adoption, but a 
re-appropriation of “originality” for discursive political purposes.  
JASMINE: THE EXPRESSION OF COLONIAL MELANCHOLIA 
   Let us say, in a Western context, that “Jasmine” represents the artistic
perfection of Orientalism; in the local context, it rather crystallizes the traumatic 
journey of China in seeking modernity. Classicism embedded in Turandot represents 
the tradition built upon European domination; and the melancholic romanticism of 
“Jasmine” expresses the resistant beliefs and practices of folk culture in th  colonial 
era (Gellner, 1992). The prevalence of “Jasmine” was incipiently associted with the 
decline of feudal Chinese society in the 19th century, and coincidentally or not, was 
connected with the tragic encounter of China with Western modernity.  
 A look into the history of modern China will make it clear that the Chinese 
route to the modern has never been a smooth one (Zhang, X., 2000, p. 430). Until the 
middle of the 19th century, Chinese feudal society was suddenly interrupted by the 
Western imperial power. China, the nation which used to claim itself as the “central 
Empire” possessing the “prototype of civilization” (Cranmer-Byng, 1962, p. 341) 
soon showed its inability to fend off Western intrusion. The failure of self-defense 
from the West turned the claim of “central Empire” into a ludicrous self-reflection.  
 Similar forced intrusion by the modern also happened to Japan, a country 
historically perceived by Chinese people as a derivative of the Chinese prototy e 
civilization. However, the Meiji Restoration in 1868 terminated the military 
superiority of the West over Japan and fulfilled its mandate for modernization, turnig 
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Japan into the most dangerous menace to China. Suffering oppression from military, 
diplomatic and economic perspectives from both the West and Japan, the Chinese 
feudal regime could hardly initiate any movement to realize national renaissa ce, but 
tried to imitate the Western track for modernity. For instance, the Chinese feudal
government did not even have a national anthem. Based on some folktales, a Chinese 
ambassador had to perform “Jasmine” as the national anthem in some international 
diplomatic events (Peng, 2005). The Chinese feudal regime initiated “colonial 
mimicry” (Bhabha, 1994b) by sending students to the West, with a hope of learning 
from the West. The first generation of Chinese students, therefore, can hardly 
disconnect themselves from pessimistic activism concerning their declining nation 
and culture. These students also used “Jasmine” as their national anthem in certain 
public settings to express their strong nostalgia vis-à-vis cultural dislocaton and 
irresolvable melancholy (Peng, 2005).  
 Symbolizing the vulnerability of jasmine flowers, “Jasmine” became the tie 
connecting the hopeless project of national renaissance and “a disillusioned soberness 
about the terror of fantasized reality” (Liao, C. 2000, p. 276). What is intriguing and 
historically revelatory about “Jasmine” is that it contains the tragic plot for the fall of 
an Empire called China. People became melancholic and nostalgic precisely because 
of their profound awareness of death and history; the fall created a condition of 
ontological nostalgia for the a golden bygone epoch (Fox, 1976, p. 120). Even though 
the age of the Chinese feudal regime can hardly been identified as a “golden epoch” 
by the Chinese mass, the fracture of national integrity, caused by external forces, has 
163 
 
cultivated a form of melancholia for the past rather than resolute disavowal (Khanna, 
2003). The usage of “Jasmine” could be interpreted as an aesthetic expression of 
“demetaphorization” (Khanna, 2003) - a symptom of melancholia and fear - through 
musical discourses.  
The enlightenment, which was a harbinger of Western modernity, accelerated 
the collapse of the Chinese feudal regime, but failed to guide China towards 
modernization. The failure of colonial mimicry seems to indicate the following 
notions: Western civilization cannot be adopted in China as a whole; and 
modernization cannot be achieved through simplistic mimicry of the West. The 
bankruptcy of the colonial mimicry project forced Chinese intellectuals to take a 
heroic journey of exploring another self-autonomous way to modernity (Tang, 2000). 
Their radical exploration started in 1919 with the first cry for science and democracy 
by Chinese intelligentsia, and was not anticipated to become the motif for the rest of 
the century.  
A radical intelligentsia is typically the result of a cultural crisis which may 
jeopardize the continuity and integrity of a national culture and dramatically 
transform the major structure of its society (Turner, 1994). Even though Chinese 
intellectuals indeed obsessively embrace the essentials of Western modernity – the 
rationality of industrial standards and social norms – a sense of cultural otherness 
facilitates them to perceive the process of modernization as a moment of alienation 
and nurtures a national consciousness which is more susceptible to the possibilities of 
eclecticism, synthesis, alternativity, pluralism, and negativity (Zhang, X., 2000). The 
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consciousness of the eclectic, synthetic and alternative forms of modernity, to a 
certain degree, might contribute to China’s move to communism- “unquestionably the 
most radical and brutal form of Chinese modernity” (Zhang, X., 2000, p. 432).  
REBIRTH OF TURANDOT AND JASMINE IN DIVERSE ARTISTIC GENRES 
   As Anne McClintock (1995 & 1997) asserts, all nationalisms are gendered. 
Following this statement, McClintock (1997) further notes, the temporal 
representation of nationalism is also gendered: 
Women are represented as the atavistic and authentic body of national tradition 
(inert, backward-looking, and natural), embodying nationalism’s conservative 
principle of continuity. Men, by contrast, represent the progressive agent of 
national modernity (forward-thrusting, potent, and historic), embodying 
nationalism’s progressive, or revolutionary, principle of discontinuity. (p. 92) 
According to this classification, the pre-revolutionary Chinese nationalism is certainly 
a feminine one. The nationalist project under the leadership of the Chinese 
Communist Party, antithetically, is a manic masculine movement facilitated by a 
“revolutionary mass culture” (Tang, 2000, p. 3).  
After the seizure of state power, the Chinese socialist nation-state promoted a 
folk culture campaign as a part of a larger multicultural project, which was soon 
replaced by a Marxist cultural hegemony. As a betrayal of the Marxist principle of 
economic primacy, the Chinese communist regime, under the leadership of Mao, 
privileged the culturalist tendency as an alternative to modernity (Liu, 2000). This 
culturalistic aesthetic was so hegemonic that all literary and artistic genres and forms 
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of expression had to be in accordance with the communist modern project. Pervasive 
cultural works produced in that period were all created by the “ideological state 
apparatus that operates to systematically interpolate the individual in an imaginary 
relationship” (Tang, 2000, p. 171) with communist Utopia. Without any entertaining 
and cathartic ingredient, literary and artistic works exclusively possess a crystallizing 
function of communist ideology by encapsulating a Utopian desire (Tang, 2000, p. 
195).  
In the public cultural sphere, a dichotomy of proletarian and bourgeois 
worldviews operated pervasively in that any narrative which failed to embrace class 
struggles lead by proletarians was condemned as bourgeois contaminated (Yang, 
1999). From a gender perspective, Mao radically proclaimed that “women can hold up 
half of the sky.” On one hand, it defiantly oppressed the central component of 
Confucian patriarchy; on the other, it successfully incorporated and absorbed women
into a state apparatus (Yang, 1999, p. 46). This communist state apparatus, buttressed 
with an overarching masculine nationalism, completely erased feminine discourses 
and images from the public sphere. Consequently, traditional and folk cultures were 
forced to hibernate; the rhythm of “Jasmine” was silenced. Based on Lenin’s 
contribution to Marxist theory, which grants socialist regimes the legitimacy to 
nationalism (Rai, 2002), a masculine image of China, closely tied to the communist 
nationalist project, was constructed by hegemonic culturalists.  
Following Mao’s era, the reforms set forth by Deng initiated a phenomenal 
economic development which shaped Chinese society as much within the spiritual 
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sphere as in the realities of daily life. Encountering global capitalism, the Chinese 
regime progressively steered adjustments on infrastructure to facilitate economic 
growth, but kept employing Marxist ideology as a theoretical justification for its 
authority. The controversy between superstructure and infrastructure, has unavoidably 
contributed to the emergence of a variety of problematic representations of the painful 
truth.  
The relationships between China and the logical imperatives of the 
marketplace are far from simplistic and one-sided; rather, the relationships are 
disordered, often paradoxical and unexpected, and of irreversible and juxtaposed 
complexity involving “a multidimensional mixture of production and effects of the 
global economy and capitalist market system, new technologies and media, expanded 
judicial and legal modes of governance, and emergent modes of power, sovereignty, 
and resistance” (Kellner, 2002, p.293). In this way, the relationships between China 
and global circuits of capital is a potent example of the ways in which nationalisms, 
internationalisms and transnationalisms interact in complex and frequently potent and 
emotive ways (e.g. Zhang, X., 1997; Zhang, L., 2001). Huntington (1996) argues, the 
modernization of China should not be confused with the unconditional adoption of 
western ideologies, cultures and institutions. Especially in the cultural domain, the 
global/local contestation cultivated a hybrid Chinese national representation expressed 
through “transnational reimagining of national cultures” (Silk & Andrews, 2001, p. 
186).  
To scrutinize the emerging Chinese national cultural image, the role of 
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Chinese intelligentsia has to be examined. Confronting the internal fracture beween 
capitalized daily reality and a communist theoretical superstructure, the Chin se 
intelligentsia, has once again, proven to be incompetent at resolving this conundrum 
(Zhang, X., 2001b). For them, this dilemma reveals them to be as schizophrenic as the 
state itself (Zhang, X., 2001a, p. 15). Meanwhile, a market economy, which brings 
transnational investment to Chinese media, has provided them opportunities to 
participate in various forms of cultural production (Yang, 1999). Influenced by the 
state and transnational capital, the Chinese intelligentsia has involuntarily undergone 
a process of specialization, academicization, and professionalization while losing their 
ability to speak for their own class, the people, and the entire nation (Liu, 2000). 
Hence, the secularization of Chinese intellectuals in distinct orientations diver ifies 
their practices, enriches and complicates the local meanings of cultural discourses in 
general and aesthetics in particular. In many cases, the culture they produce has 
become “a commodity not only in form but also in content” (Habermas, 1989, p. 166). 
Diversification of “Jasmine” in different artistic genres, as a result of cultural 
commercialization, exemplifies the schizophrenic nature of Chinese intelligentsia.  
In 1998, to celebrate the 140th anniversary of the birth of Giacomo Puccini, 
Turandot was staged in the Forbidden City at Beijing by Zhang Yimou, probably the 
most famous modern film director in China. For the first time, the imaginary chaacter 
of this ancient Oriental legend finally had been materialized in a place to where it 
belonged rather than a floating non-place. In terms of artistic expression, based on 
Zhang Yimou’s own words, he tried to inject Chinese emotional language and 
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sensibilities to reflect the power of Chinese (re)-imagination (Platt, 1998). The 
content of the opera has also been slightly modified, since no Chinese would accept 
the portrait of the Chinese mass as a blood-thirsty mob waiting for the decapitation of 
failed suitors. Thus, some sections, including music and chorus, were excised 
(Subercaseaux, 1998). The overall project cost $15 million, and generated a 
tremendous influence both in China and abroad. Foreign audiences were satisfied to 
see Turandot in ostensibly Chinese opulence through Zhang Yimou’s interpretation of 
the European fantasies (Metzger, 2003); to Chinese audiences, even through they are 
not the targeted population of the show, it imposed a violent and deviant image of the 
cruel princess as being Chinese (Platt, 1998). 
Metzger (2003) argues, that staging Turandot in the Forbidden City was a 
mega event during which the Chinese government and production team garnered a 
dream deal that employed thousands and raised millions (p. 215). Through the show, 
Beijing—an intercultural fantasy island—manipulated its old cultural stereotyp s for 
monetary purposes (Metzger, 2003, p. 216). It is typically true that driven by the 
global economic upheavals, cities adopt different tactics to constitute place-specific 
differences through a re-commodification of city images representing local history 
(Robins, 1991 & 1997; Rowe & Stevenson, 1994; Whitson & Macintosh, 1996; Silk 
& Andrews, 2001; Andrews & Cole, 2002; Silk, 2002). In this case, staging Turandot 
in the Forbidden City can be explained as a “hallmark event” through which Beijing 
redefines its position in relation to a consumption economy (Rowe & McGuirk, 1999, 
Silk, 2002). Later Zhang Yimou relocated Turandot from Beijing to France and Korea, 
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and earned considerable profits. 
Inspired by Zhang Yimou’s creativity, many other cultural products pertaining 
to Turandot emerged to cater to the aesthetical consumption of the mass. For instance, 
besides the Italian opera edition, it also appeared in other artistic genres including 
ballet and many Chinese local Operas—Sichuan opera and Yu opera. Tan Dun, a 
Chinese musician won an Oscar for his score for Cr uching Tiger and Hidden Dragon, 
cited “Jasmine” from Puccini's Turandot rather than the original melody for his 
symphony (Deschênes, 2004). In 2003, Xue Shen and Hongbo Zhao offered an 
athletic version of Turandot in a widely covered international competition, exposing 
Western audiences to a synthesis of modern sports and Western imaginary classics
materialized through two foreign bodies.  
   The substantial enthusiasm of staging Turandot demonstrated by the Chinese 
intelligentsia has provoked both critiques and challenges. In spite of having achieved 
widespread recognition for the economic miracle—not to mention its assertiveness in 
the international political sphere—China is still repeating its aesthetic id ologies 
according to the colonial power structure and selling its feminine past, as if the 
Chinese culture is only a feminine symbol without any vocal agency. Emphasizing 
this particular cultural phenomenon, Peng (2005) laments that Chinese can only seem 
to express their culture through the established symbolic norm that the West used to
fulfill its exotic imagination. Moreover, Peng (2005) further raises his quetions for 
Chinese intelligentsia at large: what is the authenticity of Chinese culture? How to 
explore the quintessence of Chinese culture? How to present it to the world as an 
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alternative to the Oriental/Occidental dichotomy?   
Turandot fever in China, on first impressions, is a result of cultural 
glocalization: “the tendency for the promotion of cultural identities of indigenous 
peoples to be co-ordinated in political movements at a global level” (Tomlinson, 1999, 
p. 69). Based on Tomlinson’s viewpoint, Turandot fever is the localization, 
vernacularization and hybridization of a Western high culture—namely Italian 
Opera—in another alien and inferior cultural context. In the meantime, the new 
shifting cultural landscape of China and the new cultural experience transform the 
aesthetic of Turandot by imposing new meanings on it. For instance, in the version of 
Sichuan opera, the central role was not even the icy Princess but the slave girl Liu,
who embodies all the traditional virtues supposedly carried by Chinese females. 
Through the re-centerring of the subject matter, “wile became guile, trickery became 
magic… and effeminacy was transformed into grace” (Appadurai, 1996b, p. 96). In 
another case, musician Tan Dun cites, reworks, and imitates other music in order to 
give his melodies a fresh context as an attempt to construct a disoriented musical 
mosaic (Deschênes, 2004).  In this sense, the Orientalistic romance of Turandot was 
re-activated by the Chinese intelligentsia through an exploration of the substitute 
codes and a creative renewal of the raw materials needed to accommodate an 
increasingly secularized world. To Chinese intelligentsia, renewing cultural raw 
materials might imply their dilemmatic position vis-à-vis indigenous and global 
cultures. Their dilemmatic position, in some respects, predetermines the hybridity of 
their cultural products - in this particular paper - the various versions of Turandot.  
171 
 
THE ALLEGORICAL NATIONALISM 
In 2004 Athens, when Beijing Mayor Qi Liu received the Olympic flag, few 
Chinese, sitting in front of their televisions, could have their emotions in check. 
Encountering the irresolvable uncertainties and turbulences (social stratification, 
emergence of gender subordination, dramatic urbanization, unemployment and fading 
of traditional moralities, and so forth.) brought by social reformation and 
globalization, the Chinese mass finally found something certain from the waving 
Olympic flag—a common destiny towards the near future. Particularly, this destiny 
seems optimistic in that it prefigures a stronger and more democratic China, a 
continually growing economy, and most important—better lives for individuals. To 
many Chinese, the Olympic torch in China not only acknowledges China’s 
contribution to the Olympic movement in past decades, but also signifies a vital fact: 
that China was gradually erasing its “otherness” which had resulted from its political 
isolation in history and was transforming its relations with the external world towards 
an optimistic direction. However, strong and discursive state structures only treat 
economic development as a means rather than an end (Castells, 1992; Yang, 1999). 
Many nationalist projects it adopted, including hosting the Olympics, are “the vital 
responses to infrastructural realities…as attempts to resolve more fundamental 
contradictions” (Jameson, 1985, p. 78), which may otherwise jeopardize the 
legitimacy of the Chinese nation-state.   
After Qi Liu’s appearance, a sweet little girl, in a white skirt, gave  moving 
solo performance of “Jasmine.” Weeks after the little Chinese girl’s solo in the closing 
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ceremony of 2004 Olympics, “Jasmine,” once again, was staged in the closing 
ceremony of the 2004 Paralympic Games at Athens by a group of Chinese 
instrumentalists with disabilities from the Chinese National Associatin for Artists 
with Disabilities. They used Chinese traditional musical instruments to present the 
most authentic version of “Jasmine” to the world. What is unexpected is that their 
performance, without astonishing artistic skillfulness, was met with great nationalist 
exaltation within China.  
This spontaneous and popular nationalism could never be exempted from the 
influence of the nation-state, and the state soon harnessed this outpouring of 
nationalism to its own service (Brownell, 2001, p. 215). Back from Athens, and 
basking in positive feedback from the public, these artists were instantly a source of 
interest to the domestic media. More fascinating, they were soon chosen by the 
Chinese government as social role models in a recent media campaign. For example, a 
TV program, targeting audiences nationwide, was created to introduce how the artists 
with disabilities suffered to fulfill their dreams. As well as being Chinese athletes with 
disabilities, these artists are “portrayed as winners, competitors, and patriots” (Stone, 
2001, p. 62); and how the dominant power trains their impaired bodies for its own 
interest is totally missed. Their achievement in artistic terms, along with the haul of 
191 gold medals by Chinese athletes with disabilities on the top spot of the final 
medal standings, demonstrates how China has become involved in the promotion of 
universal humanism and democracy. 
Nevertheless, in the two aforementioned scenarios, neither a result of 
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globalized cultural consumption nor an expression of colonial melancholy toward 
imperial power may explain the appearance of “Jasmine” in the global political 
settings. Compared with the semi-colonial age, the current post-revolutionary mage 
of China, with unprecedented economic and political strength, also differs radically 
from the kind of traumatic experience of feminine nationalism fored in China’s long, 
arduous quest for survival, change, and revolution in the age of colonialism and 
imperialism (Zhang, X., 2001b, p. 321). However, as a result of its modernization and 
marketization reformation, Chinese society is never free of tensions and 
contradictions (Liu, 2000). To sustain its economic development, the Chinese 
government has tried to ameliorate the tension and conflicts within the nation through 
ideological control and by invoking the spirit of nationalism (Liu, 2000). In order to 
avoid resistance from the mass, the popular discourse of nationalism has been 
fundamentally reconstituted so that it is no longer the coerced state rhetoric of 
patriotism but an inconspicuous disseminated overlap between the nation and the state 
(Zhang, X., 2001b). In the meantime, the presence of the Chinese nation-state is no 
longer ideological but discursive and metaphoric (Zhang, X., 1997). Through the 
pedagogy of national humiliation, the solidarity achieved is even more powerful than 
that through promotion of cultural supremacy. This new popular nationalism is often 
expressed and emotionally felt in a transnational context, such as the television 
coverage of Olympic ceremonies (Hogan, 2003; Silk & Andrews, 2001; Yang, 1999).  
Reconstituted national rhetoric, in an attempt to blur the boundaries between 
nation and state, has been frequently used by different nations in Olympic ceremonies. 
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For instance, in 1998 Nagano, the Japanese also used Puccini’s opera – Mad ma 
Butterfly – to assert its national pride in a non-threatening way (Hogan, 2003). 
Juxtaposing the Chinese presentation of its national character with its Japanese 
counterpart, the similarity among the two is that both present a passivity of national 
characters. Madama Butterfly’s major character is “suffering and sacrificing for her 
Western love (Hogan, 2003; Kondo, 1997); “Jasmine” demonstrates an extremely 
feminine, and therefore vulnerable, side of Chinese culture. Meanwhile, the difference 
between the two ceremonial presentations is also evident. The Japanese simply 
adopted a cultural symbol created by the West; the Chinese insisted on their 
“authentic” indigenous content.  
Strategically used as positivist essentialism (Spivak, 1985b), “Jasmine” 
seemingly approves a national character of maintaining its beauty after endl ss 
ordeals. Antithetical to that of the Western culture, the beauty is not overbearing and 
oppressive, but implicit and enduring. It does not celebrate its recent achievement of 
modernization but the “successful accommodations of the old institutions to modern 
technology” (Jameson, 1998, p. 62). Moreover, to the general Chinese audience, the 
configuration of “Jasmine” in various international ceremonial occasions, provoking a 
hoary imagination – a femininized “We” – is capable of making its audience 
conscious of a commonality, namely the humiliating past. The consciousness is 
political. As Spivak (1985b) puts it, under the leadership of nationalist elites, the 
boundaries between success and failure of the collective become blurred in that the 
most successful historical record can only be crosshatched by cognitive failur , by 
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which she means the colonial subordination in the past. Thus, the recent 
accommodations of the old institution, including economic achievement and political 
assertiveness, hosting the Olympics as well, can only be signified on a semiotic chain 
that symbolizes the painful journey to modernity. Particularly, to date, tales of China’s 
political repression and terror have more to do with the political, ideological, and 
commercial objectives of the Western media (and the national interests that lurk 
within) than with what is really happening in China today (Liu, 2000, p. 127). 
Compared to the pre-revolutionary period, the contemporary imagined “We” provides 
the possibility of forming solidarity rather than experiencing apolitical narcissistic 
pleasure for one’s own wounds of being alienated from modernity.  
Bhabha (1994a) notes, this type of national representation “is the mark of the 
ambivalence of the nation as a narrative strategy and an apparatus of power” (p. 292). 
It not only rests on a symbolic dimension but is performative as a political technology 
of guidance. The Chinese mass was enforced, unconsciously by “Jasmine” – “the 
volatile intersection between aesthetics and politics” (Gibbons, 2003, p. 5) – to 
identify with the hoary terror and pain as well as to appreciate their aesthetic 
experiences of the present, because the audience can easily connect their individual 
experience with the experiences of nation at large. The audience represents not only 
the historical object of a nationalist pedagogy given over to or constituted by a 
historical origin or event, but also the agent that may initiate bodily signification 
through participating in the reproduction of nationalist discourses (Bhabha, 1994b, p. 
297). That mental experience naturally contributes an undivided loyalty to, and a 
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collective sacrifice on the past of the Chinese for, the cause of the nation (Zhang, X., 
2001b, p. 321-322). The artistic repertoire can hopefully turn up new possibilities, or 
at least prevent the rigidification or reiteration of old conventions (Liao, C. 2000, p. 
276). As Attali (1985) puts it, “the sacrifices and music, the rites and the laws h ve a 
single aim; it is through them that the hearts of the people are united, and it is from
them that the method of good government arises.”  
In order to achieve this uniting effect and to create loyalty, the nationalist 
narrative has to create an insoluble Other discursively (Bhabha, 1994b). In this case, 
the Other, who cannot appreciate the indigenous aesthetics of “Jasmine,” rises 
naturally. Nairn (1977) and Buell (1994) for example, call nationalism, “the modern 
Janus” with two faces, one looking backwards and one forwards. Mastery of local 
culture – bodies of customs, religion, literary and artistic modes of production, and, of 
course, language – works as a border guard to differentiate the We from the Other, by 
downplaying anything beyond indigenous knowledge (Armstrong, 1982; Bhabha, 
1994b; Derrida, 1993; Trinh, 1989 & Yuval-Davis, 1997).  
To the Other – Western audience of the Olympic ceremonies, “Jasmine” is not 
a marker of their foreignness to Chinese culture. Instead, it could be deciphered as a 
wounded and inferior Chinese masculinity and national pride seeking to repair itself 
through a deployment of female symbols (Brownell, 1995). Furthermore, a 
voluntarily staged, exotic, vulnerable and feminine image might stand as a symbolic 
flirtation, in order to fulfill her lust. Thus, the invitation to the 2008 Beijing Olympic 
Games could be interpreted by a Western audience as China’s exposure of herself for 
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further capitalist penetration and its willful embrace of globalization. She enjoys the 
penetrating process, and meanwhile economically benefits from it. When the two 
types of Western subjectivities confront Chinese nationalism, a fierce friction can be 
easily anticipated. 
CODA 
In conclusion, I suggest that rather than being a fixed cultural symbol of 
tradition, “Jasmine” is a resource full of internal contradictions, which is used 
selectively by different agents in various social projects within specific power 
relations and political discourses in and out of certain collectivities (Yuval-Davis, 
1997, p. 43). It is a use of gendered language in order to serve distinct political 
purposes (Kaplan, 2004). It was adopted by Western intellectuals in a Fascist era, by 
Chinese nationalist elites during the semi-colonial period, by contemporary Chinese 
intelligentsia in a globalizing capitalist age, and by the current Chinese ation-state to 
invent a nationalist imagination in Olympic ceremonies. Throughout the process of 
constructing ideal citizens’ subjectivities, “Jasmine” was used to define the 
connection and solidarity within the boundaries of collectivities and contour the 
boundaries between different collectivities. It does not suggest a Surrealist assertion 
that, “Jasmine” is a set of floating signifiers without ever resting on any univocal 
signified. Particularly, its endurance notwithstanding changing historical and material 
contexts, is never simplistic cloning, but is sustained through symbolic resonance 
between those in power and collectivities they want to discipline (Yuval-Davis, 1997). 
Put more simply, Power enables its samsara in aesthetics.  
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On the other end, we not only need to tackle “the language of those who write 
it,” but also “the lives of those who live it” (Bhabha, 1994b, p. 1). “Jasmine” is alive 
in the symbolic sphere but more animate in reality. Within the imaginary space it 
constructed, people negotiated and are negotiating their identities through examining 
the self and objectifying the Other. It provides a sublime pleasure of fear and n 
aesthetic appropriation of “pain.” Taking the format of music, the discourses are so 
discursive that none of them can be identified as an ideological affirmation of cultural 
supremacy and historical priority; however, no one can deny its power to generate 
changes by presenting certain collectivities vis a vis the consciousness of 
“stereoscopic experiences” (Jameson, 1983b) through a wordless narrative. Just as 
Jameson (1983b) would have it:  
the proper political use of pleasure must always be allegorical … the 
thematizing of a particular “pleasure” as a political issue … must always 
involve a dual force, in which the local issue is meaningful and desirable in 
and of itself, but also at one and the same time taken as the figure for Utopia in 
general, and for the systematic revolutionary transformation of society as a 
whole. (p. 13) 
However, the figure for Utopia, especially that elicited by national allegori s, 
is never the one for the People. The “Utopia” is constructed by those in power 
through erasing various subjectivities and silencing voices of multiple social groups. 
In addition, the opacity of cross-cultural understandings can be easily manipulated by 
powerful agents as a means to reach certain ends. The political implications of 
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material allegories beg for our transnational critical reading of their maneuverability 
in their historical and contingent deployments, for the national project appears 
interminable (Alarcon, Kaplan & Moallem, 1999, p. 6). Only by tracing the desire, 
terror or pleasure beneath the aroma and beauty of “Jasmine” can we possibly remap 
the boundaries of different collectivities and renegotiate the power within and 
between them.  




Chapter Six: Let’s Transcend: An Agambenian Reading of the Paralympics 
EXPERIENCING THE TRANSCENDENCE 
The opening ceremony of the Beijing 2008 Paralympic Games welcomed 
80,000 audiences to the National Stadium to witness one of most inspiring scenes. To 
prevent staging a grand ceremony with few audiences, the organizational committee 
decided to make the ceremony truly for the people. Not only did most domestic 
audiences receive their tickets for free, but also every ticket holder was given a 
complimentary gift package for attending the opening ceremony. In addition, the 
Chinese government had promised that China would hold the Paralympic Games as 
serious as the Olympic Games. The opening ceremony of the Paralympic Games, 
therefore, was to be as spectacular as that for the Olympic Games.  
As it promised, the government staged a marvelous show. After nearly 
two-hours-long show staged by thousands of young dancers, Chinese media stars and 
a large number of performers with disabilities, the Paralympic torch finally arrived the 
stadium. When many were still guessing how the Olympic cauldron would be 
lightened, the last torch bearer, who is also a three-time Paralympian champion, Hou 
Bin slowly hoisted himself and his wheelchair up on a rope to reach the 
fifty-meter-high cauldron. When Hou was climbing up the rope, the whole audience 
was mesmerized, and music was silenced. Until Hou lightened the torch, the audience 
hailed with tears. As many said, if the opening ceremony of the Olympic Games was 
to showcase cultural specificity, the one for the Paralympic Games is definitely to 
celebrate cosmopolitanism. Regardless race, gender, class and cultural root, one can 
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hardly resist the extraordinary and emotional moment when people heartily celebrate 
Paralympic spirit. Regardless what type of bodies you possess – able or disabled – 
everyone felt the spiritual touch. At that moment, transcendence was crystallized, as if 
it would last forever.  
PARALYMPICS AS A TRANSCENDENTAL RIGHT 
 As a transnational institution established in 1989, the International 
Paralympic Committee (IPC) is often perceived as an evident manifestation of the 
globalization of humanitarianism. Even though its political, economic and cultural 
influence is not as prevailing as the International Olympic Committee (IOC), the IPC 
has successfully expanded its institutional infrastructure and promoted its mission– to 
enable Paralympic athletes to achieve sporting excellence and inspire and excite the 
world – across the globe. It is only recently that, its status as one of the most 
prominent the transnational organizations to empower people with disabilities and 
struggle for their social equalities in general and their human rights to play sports in 
particular has been gradually recognized by the public. For instance, in the firs  
International Paralympic Symposium on Disability Rights, the IPC demonstrated its 
passion to embrace human rights discourses and claim its role of advocating the 
human rights for both Paralympic athletes and citizens with disabilities at large 
(Farkas, 2004). Its inspiring mission along with the global coverage of the quadrennil 
Paralympic Games has passionately affected people with and without disabilitie  in 
different social settings.  
The growing prominence of transnational regimes, such as the IPC, has played 
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an important political role in reshaping subjective knowledge of human rights through 
deemphasizing citizenship rights legitimated by states and prioritizing postnati nal 
conceptions of human rights (Sassen, 2006, p. 287). It signifies the rise of human 
rights initiatives and a new form of global biopolitics (Grewal & Kaplan, 2001). The 
construction and circulation of universal human rights discourse for athletes with 
disabilities do not solely rely on transnational institutions such as the IPC, but could 
be enabled by the grass-roots organizations and national agencies with a variety of 
political agendas. In the Western context, activists, intellectuals and transnational 
agencies oftentimes use human rights approaches to secure dignity and well-being for 
marginalized social groups, including people with disabilities, and improve their 
disadvantaged status (Ellis, 2005; Kidd & Donnelly, 2000; Stainton, 2005; Stein, 2007; 
Yamin & Rosenthal, 2005).  
Compared to many other universal rights discourses, the rights discourse 
advocated by the IPC – everyone has the rights to play sports – seems culturally 
transcendental. Having 162 nations as its members, the radical expansion of the 
institutional structure of the IPC further approves the transcendental nature of its 
slogan. Nevertheless, through tracing the materialization of various human rights 
discourses in different cultural contexts, we discovered that universal human rights do 
not always empower marginalized social groups (Mullally, 2006; Narayan, 1997). For 
instance, Brittain’s (2006) study shows that, with the global spread of the Paralympic 
ideologies, many nation-states use the Paralympic Games as for political purposes. 
However, for some under-developed nations, they are facing a dilemma. On the one 
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hand, if they do not offer institutional supports to athletes with disabilities, and do not 
send athletes to participate in the Paralympic Games, they will be labeled as being 
reluctant to embrace humanitarianism. On the other hand, if they provide sufficient 
financial and institutional supports to athletes with disabilities, they are critiqued for 
exploiting athletes with disabilities for the political interests of nation-states.  
Needless to say, developed nations are themselves far from having achieved 
the humanitarian ideals promoted by the IPC. In the West, most people with 
disabilities are still largely marginalized. The opportunities to participate sports, 
particularly competitive sports, are still largely determined by the economic status of 
athletes. In addition, many activists in Western nations are campaigning for 
governmental supports on sports for the disabled. Therefore, we cannot simply take 
the expansion of the Paralympic regime as a manifestation of universal humanism. 
The claimed universal nature of its ideology deserves our critical investigation.  
In this chapter, I will adopt a different theoretical and ontological stance, 
proposed by Giorgio Agamben, to reveal the nature of the Paralympic Games as a 
sovereignty built upon oppression of the majority of people with disabilities, 
particularly how it disguises itself through human rights discourse and medical 
discourse. In addition, I tend to reveal the mechanism of the Paralympics through 
which it portrays itself as an access to transcendence for people with disability in 
particular, and inspire the rest of society.  
A BRIEF INTRODUCTION OF AGAMBENIAN THEORIES 
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  Giorgio Agamben has a discreet taste for dialectics (Negri, 2007). Because 
the world of academia is obsessed with the panopticon of biopower (Foucault, 1977), 
contextualization of power (Hall, 1978), global modernity (Appadurai, 1996b), 
assemblage (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987), Empire (Hardt & Negri, 2000) and global 
neoliberalism (Harvey, 2005), we have been so accustomed to the powers immersed 
in our life that we almost tend to understand the imminences of power as a part of our 
overall life. Agamben, however, insightfully reminds us to go back to Hegelian 
dialectics to rethink a question: what is the metaphysical foundation of dialectics - 
Being or beings? According to Negri (2007), “the point of this was to produce true, 
politically directed, and ethically characterized knowledge that would be directed 
toward a possible redemption of humanity” (p. 111).  
  Heidegger (1962) defines Being (Agamben uses the term “bare life”) as an 
entity with essential disclosedness - in Hegel’s term, pure nothingness, and beings as 
negativities that tend to but never outstrip Being (Agamben, 1991, p. 3). Contrary to 
Heidegger, whose ontological realism located the experiences of life, Agamben (1991) 
argues that bare life with pure nothingness should be restored as the foundation of 
dialectics. Agamben (1991) remarks, because the essence of Being is disclose ness 
and nothingness, it is unspeakable and unrepresentable. When the originality of Being 
encounters the negativities of beings, Being gives up its nature of nothingness and 
becomes “the experience of life” – the term Heidegger uses for the entity emerges 
after Being experiences beings. Different from the ineffable Being, the experience of 
life is expressible, and therefore, becomes the foundation of Western metaphysics – 
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various beings. As already mentioned, even though negativities of beings have 
permeated Being, it can never surpass Being, since metaphysics cannot be sustain d 
beyond the existence of Being. Rather than dissecting and scrutinizing the experi nce 
of life as a singular entity, Agamben is seeking nothingness, or the bare life, a state 
that has not been encroached upon and grasped by beings. In other words, he uses 
bare life as a departure to demonstrate the nihilistic and ungrounded nature of beings.    
  Starting from language, knowledge, grammar, artistic expression (such a  
prose composing and painting), history and aesthetics, Agamben destructs various 
beings (Agamben, 1991, 1993a, 1993b, 1995 & 1999). Through these works, he tries 
to demonstrate a paradigmatic methodology to construct a large group of phenomena 
as Foucault did with his “panopticism” (Raulff, 2004). For instance, in his destruction 
of arts and aesthetics, Agamben (1999) reveals to us that both arts and aesthetics, as 
beings, are achieved through the self-annulment of artists and critics. As Arnold (1962) 
notes, in all branches of metaphysics, including knowledge, theology, philology, 
history, art and science, tend to see the object they study as it really is, but they can 
never grasp the object. Nevertheless, what we often fail to realize is that the works of 
art and aesthetical critiques are themselves original ruptures between the objective 
materiality and subjectivity of sensitivity. Artists and critics experience the ruptures, 
but finally surrender to an integration through self-annulment. When the 
transcendence of arts and disinterested art critiques become expression, the 
ungraspable or illegible part of materiality and sensitivity is abandoned. When artists 
and critics are engulfed by the unconsciousness of the negation of themselves and the 
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abandonment, the signified transcendence of arts and disinterestedness of critiques
become their life. Thus, they sustain themselves through fatal self-negation, which is 
equivalent to “self-alienated spirit” (Hegel, 1977) and “death” (Heidegger, 1962). By 
doing so, Agamben uses his philological weapon to destruct the nothingness of arts 
and aesthetics. 
More recently, Agamben shifts his target from elusive Western philosophical 
metaphysics to more a sensible immanence – biopolitics as the being. By addressing 
the most contingent political events such as Guantánamo Bay, which operate under 
the sovereignty of the United States government, and refugees whose fate is mediated 
by national and international laws, his works – Homo Sacer and The State of 
Exception established his preeminence in the domains of political sciences and 
sociology. In general, redefining Foucauldian biopower and bioplitics, Agamben 
affords the two terms new meanings. In general, Agamben’s biopolitics is different 
from Foucauldian biopolitics on the following points: 1) the relationship between life 
and power; 2) the origin of the sovereignty of power; and 3) the topological 
relationship between exception and norm. 
In The History of Sexuality, Foucault (1990) notes:  
For a long time, one of the characteristic privileges of sovereign power was 
the right to decide life and death.…It was no longer considered that the power 
of the sovereign over his subjects could be exercised in an absolute and 
unconditional way….But if someone dared to rise up against him and 




Foucault further remarks that what enables the operation of power is no longer the 
state sovereignty but norms and knowledge. Foucauldian biopolitics ascribe the 
emergence of norms and the normalization of bodies and minds under the panoptic 
gaze. Assuming responsibility to life, the purpose of Foucauldian biopower, therefore, 
is to seize, to calculate, to invest and to optimize life in a positive way. Foucault (1990) 
keenly realizes that death is power’s limit, illegible secret and perpetual anxiety (p. 
138). Nevertheless, he does not offer further elaboration on the relationship between 
death and productive biopower. Even though Foucault indicates the discursive nature 
of power, some of his arguments imply that power is outside of life, and power’s 
function is self-evident. For instance, Foucault (1990) argues “it (power) is over life” 
(p. 138); “power gave itself the function of administering life” (p. 138). 
Rather than departing from life, Agamben starts his destruction from the 
illegible secret of power – death. On the one hand, Agamben brings Hannah Arendt’s 
(1958) critique of the modern for its prominent centering of normal biological life and 
the decadence of the political realm to critique the “positive” and “productive” nature 
of biopower as claimed by Foucault. To Arendt, political life, rather than biological 
life (or sufficient life), is the most critical element to live a “good” life. On the other 
hand, he borrows from Carl Schmitt (2005) to investigate the lacuna of death Foucault 
left. For Schmitt (2005), we can only grasp the nature of sovereignty through its 
exceptions, since the nature of sovereignty is the decision on the state of exception. In 
other words, power (or sovereignty) does not only aim to include life under the 
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protection of law (or rational knowledge) but also exclude life through identifying 
exception. Meanwhile, Schmitt (2005) advocates Foucault’s (1990) belief that 
sovereignty stands outside the law. In other words, the sovereignty uses its power to 
make laws and create exceptions.  
Agamben (1998) agrees with Foucault that “the modern Western state has 
integrated techniques of subjective individualization with procedures of objective 
totalization to an unprecedented degree” (p. 5). However, Agamben (1998) remarks 
that the inclusion and normalization of life are never something exclusively belonging 
to the age of modernity, and are not completely productive. Instead, since absolutely 
ancient age of the West, the production of a bioplitical body has become the original 
activity of sacred sovereign power (Agamben, 1998). By surrendering life to the rule 
of the sacred, man attains biological and political rights granted by the juridical order 
in the name of the sacred. Therefore, when power captures life under the political 
order, life is subject to political power and experiences exclusive inclusion. Here once 
again, Agamben (1998) brings back Arendt (1973) who claims that there is no 
absolute distinction but inner solidarity between totalitarianism and democracy. The 
trick of modern democracy is that it presents itself as a vindication and liberation of 
life, using freedom, naturalness and happiness to mark life’s subjection (Agamben, 
1998, p. 9-10), and hides its arbitrary exclusiveness over the life it includes.  
Apart from including life, the sovereignty also creates exception. The 
exception is achieved through exclusion. However, the relationship between exception 
and rule is not what Deleuze and Guattari (1987) describe, namely that “sovereignty 
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only rules over what it is capable of interiorizing” (p. 445). Instead, the rule, 
suspending itself, gives rise to the exception and at the same time, maintains a 
dialectical relationship with it (Agamben, 1998). On the one hand, laws claim 
exception as being unlawful, implying that it is “a free and juridically empty space” 
(Agamben, 1998, p. 36). It does not necessarily mean that, inside of this sphere, the 
force of laws disappears. Rather, “inside this spatial and temporal sphere, anything 
could happen as long as it was held to de facto necessary according to circumstances” 
(Schmitt, 1974, p. 67). This indeterminacy could be manifested as indifferent 
abandonment or killing without charge of homicide (Agamben, 1998).  
Even though Agamben owes theoretical debts to Schmitt and Foucault, he also 
points out the idea that power (law or sovereignty) as it stands outside of life deserves 
reconsideration. Agamben (1998 & 2005) claims that law stands both inside and 
outside of life. According to Derrida (1989), law cannot derive its validity from its 
own repetitive performativity (from inside), since “conservation in its turn refounds, 
so that it can conserve what it claims to found” (p. 997). Therefore, law can only be 
derived from life but at the same time objectifies life through violence. In order to 
prevent itself from suspension and to maintain its monopoly, law uses what it 
promises – “guarding lives” and “granting rights” – as an end to justify its violence 
and appeal to justice. In the meantime, it disguises its end as the subordination of 
citizens to law (Benjamin, 1996, p. 241). When we lose consciousness to the violence 
of law and are happy with the rights awarded by law, law becomes the norm of life. In 
other words, law becomes our life. For the Paralympic Games, when we celebrate the 
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rights for people with disabilities to play sports and to attend international competition, 
we may not be conscious about how the rights offered by the IPC have imposed 
certain norms to people with disabilities.  
Agamben (1998) agrees with Schmitt that there is a dialectic relationship 
between exception and law, but he dissents with Schmitt’s opinion that this dialectic is 
nothing but an arbitrary decision by the sovereignty. Agamben borrows from 
Benjamin who elaborates that the existence of exception does not demonstrate the 
sovereignty’s power to decide. Antithetically, the exception stands as a catastrophe of 
the sovereignty. Technically, the law encounters exception, when its juridical mahine 
can no longer function according to its norm. By announcing exception, law extends 
its violence beyond its own boundaries by legitimating violence with legal status in 
the name of maintaining its “natural” order. Agamben (1999) defines this relationship 
between the rule and the exception as “inclusive exclusion.” Claiming the exception 
of law to be purely transitory and temporary in nature (Rossiter, 1948), the 
sovereignty refuses to answer: “What becomes of the law after its messianic 
fulfillment” (Agemben, 2005, p. 63)? Furthermore, by establishing a willed state of 
exception or fictive crisis, the government shows its tendency to make the provisional 
abolition of the distinction among legislative, executive, and juridical power a lasting 
practice (Agamben, 2005, p. 7). Just as Benjamin (2003) laments, the state of 
exception becomes the rule. Therefore, “being-outside, and yet belonging: this is the 
topological structure of the state of exception” (Agamben, 2005, p. 35).  
According to the argument above, the sovereignty operates through a dialectic 
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between exclusive inclusion and inclusive exclusion. Equivalent to Foucauldian 
biopolitics, the former “optimizes” life to sustain its own operation and disguises its 
exploitative nature over bare life. The later allows the rule to emerge throug  
excluding “bare life” as exception and extend its power over the exception in the 
name of life. Agamben’s biopolitics, therefore, is the metaphysical dialect c that 
contributes to the blurred boundaries between life and politics.  
Taking the Paralympic Games as an example, the Paralympic Games parallels 
itself with the Olympic Games. Even though the Paralympic Games claims itself as 
the exclusive venue for people with disabilities to liberate themselves, it can only 
position itself on the secondary position to the Olympic Games. The Paralympic 
Games enjoys much little media coverage and attracts less public attention. For 
instance, both BBC and NBC covered the opening and closing ceremonies for the 
Beijing Olympic Games during their prime time, but neither of them covered the 
ceremonies for the Beijing Paralympic Games. As a result, the global celebration for 
people with disabilities and the exclusive venue through which people with 
disabilities could possibly liberate themselves became an event almost ign red by the 
mainstream. Except for the secondary status of the Paralympic Games, athltes with 
disabilities also have to face less social respect and supports. In the following sections, 
I will apply Agamben’s dialectic destruction, primarily from his works to reveal: 1) 
the transcendence of the Paralympic spirit is grounded on nothingness; 2) the majority 




THE MOST UNCANNY THING 
In the beginning of The Man Without Content, Agamben (1999) uses 
Nietzsche’s critique of Kant to explain the unlimited growth in the value of the arts 
and remarks that, “only because art has left the sphere of interest to become merely 
interesting do we welcome it so warmly” (p. 4). The transforming power of artis so 
strong that art “can lead to happiness as easily as to ruin” (Agamben, 1999, p. 4); 
therefore, there is nothing more urgent than a destruction of aesthetics by clarifying 
the purification of interests attached to the arts.  
If we agree with the notion that art can present us with happiness and ruin at 
the same time, we can probably draw a felicitous analogy between art and the 
Paralympics. The latter is supposed to move us from peerless desperation about the 
ruined body to ecstasy of transcendence beyond the corporeal materiality. This duality 
is not only experienced by spectators, but also by athletes with disabilities through 
bodily movement. From this perspective, the body of a disabled athlete is all gorical, 
since it is material but generates something beyond its materiality. On the o e hand, 
the athlete is the Being suffering within the objective confines of the corporeal; n the 
other hand, intending to present the Paralympic spirit, he is a being who demonstrates 
unlimited subjective potentialities. Performing with his body to the spectator, at hat 
very moment, he attains a unity of his Paralympic subjectivity and materiality of 
disabilities. However, in the meantime, his being is also experiencing an unachievable 
lacuna between the subjective and objective worlds. As Agamben (1999) narrates the 
schizophrenia of the artist: 
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The artist then experiences a radical tearing or split, by which the inert world 
of contents in their indifferent, prosaic objectivity goes to one side, and to the 
other the free subjectivity of the artistic principle, which soars above the 
contents as over an immense repository of materials that it can evoke or reject 
at will (p. 35).  
If the work of art shows the competence of artists to free their souls from secular 
contamination, the performance of athletes with disabilities represents the power they 
exert to erase the socio-cultural stigma notched on their bodies and to create 
transcendence beyond their flesh. Therefore, the athlete with a disability is also a 
living contradiction. 
In his work, Agamben (1999) also explains how the worldview of artists is 
imposed to others through the self-negation of artists. To form and modify the world, 
the artist’s body becomes his instrument to project his worldview (Agamben, 1999). 
To remove his personal interests from the expression of his works, he can only modify 
and inspire the world by negating his body as a nothing. The transcendence he wants 
to attain is a duel to the death, because when his spirit attains absolute freedom, he no 
longer needs material carrier. In the case of the disabled athlete, his body isa 
repository of all the causes and origins of the discrimination and restriction he 
encounters in the secular world. However, in the Paralympic arena, he can only negate 
all the material barriers brought by his body by showing his capacity to transcend. 
Rohrer (2005) puts it thus: “By acting as if we have no needs, we may perpetuate a 
‘super crip’ image – disabled people can do anything we want if we only try hard 
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enough” (p. 48).  
Generating influence to spectators in the Paralympic space, athletes with 
disabilities seem to achieve their freedom by performing in public sphere. According 
to Hannah Arendt, freedom is “action (that) requires a public space where it can be 
assimilated by an audience of peers who by turns may judge and be inspired” 
(Grumley, 1998, p. 57). Taking her opinion into consideration, the Paralympic Games 
seem to work as such an ideal public space in which freedom can be achieved through 
agonistic actions of competing for preeminence. By “agonistic” action, Arendt means 
that practices which are no longer bound to the biological life process and for the 
purposes of equality and “common good.” In such a public space, private interests 
should not be presented, since work intending to maintain the necessity of the 
biological process of life will never become the means to freedom (Arendt, 1958). 
This notion complies with the essence of the Paralympics for its transcendental 
inspiration and negation of secular interests. The performance of athletes with 
disabilities is not simply a demonstration of their excellence, according to Arendt, but 
a political act for universal freedom and justice. Thus, in such a scared public space, 
we should only have Heroes rather than people.  
Even though Arendt agrees that freedom is associated with a humanly 
constructed institutional artifice and morality (Grumley, 1998, p. 66), what she fails to 
recognize is that, “the notions of …freedom are too generic to constitute a real goal of 
struggle” (Agamben, 2000, p. 89). Due to the discriminatory treatment and hardship 
they encounter in daily life, many people with disabilities tend to dis-identify 
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themselves as people with disabilities (Huang & Brittain, 2006). Success in 
international disability sport can offer athletes an increased sense of pers nal 
empowerment, positive subjectivity and even tangible material benefits (Huang & 
Brittain, 2006). Thus, being a person with a disability is both a public and private 
matter. One’s heroic action in the public space cannot be dissected from a suppres ing 
privatized existence. Working to maintain individual biological life cannot be totally 
separated from acting in the interests of the Arendtian politics of freedom and justice.  
Summarily, being the creator of his absolute freedom and destroyer of his 
material content (body), the athlete “strives for the objectivization of his world” 
(Agamben, 1999, p. 38). However, no matter how hard he tries to achieve 
transcendence and negate his personal interests, his performance cannot come in o 
existence without material conditions. In the meantime, the increasingly innoce t 
experience of the sport spectator corresponds to the increasing danger inherent i  the 
athlete’s experience, because the transcendence – expected by spectators – might 
destroy the objective existence of the athlete. Therefore, when Paralympic 
transcendence is presented by an athlete with disabilities to the world, a dialectical 
negation of his body is ongoing. 
  According to the IPC, the transcendence of the Paralympic spirit embodied 
by athletes with disabilities is not only essential, but abstract and detached from any 
individual interests. When the spirit is presented, it is alien not only to the athlete 
himself for its body negation, but also to the spectator. As someone who does not 
possess the subjectivities of the athlete and who does not experience the athlete’s
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secular material hardship, the spectator more often insists his appreciation of the 
transcendence of the Paralympic spirit. In addition, he is convinced that his 
appreciation can free himself from his own objective alienation and help him to 
approach a state of unspeakable transcendence. It is similar to the ironical engraving 
Agamben (1999) offers in his critiques of aesthetics - a boorish man who barely 
understands what art is, but assuredly believes that art is something extremely 
valuable and can realize his self-transformation. Thus, the Paralympic spectator is 
also experiencing the most radical split, for what his principle is what is most alien to 
him (Agamben, 1999, p. 24). In addition, the spectator’s experiences tell him that the 
principle of daily life is suppression, and thus, he consciously hopes to pursue the 
transcendence which is absent in his life. To understand the performance of athletes 
with disabilities, the spectator has to fully consent to the transcendental spirit – the 
principle, which has been fully deprived of material content of the athlete as well as of 
the spectator. In this regard, any spectator, regardless of his cultural and historical 
context, will admire its essence which takes “him from the live tissues of society to 
the hyperborean no-man’s-land” (Agamben, 1999, p. 16) of spirit. What the spectator 
does not realize is that, the athlete is doing what the spectator is doing but in a more 
clumsy way (Rohrer, 2005), and the athlete is still suffering social alienation r ther 
than enjoying the transcendence his bodily performance indicates.  
  Not only do they experience negation, but spectators also experience 
difficulty in delineating the boundary of the “real” Paralympic. In Critique of 
Judgment, Kant (1951) defines the four characteristics of aesthetic judgment. The 
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criteria indicate that art should be totally disinterested; it tends to pursue universal 
satisfaction; it possesses purposiveness without a purpose; and, its universal 
satisfaction cannot be conceptualized. According to Kantian aesthetics, it seems we 
can only define art through a negative way in that we can only identify what non-art is 
and separate it from art (Agamben, 1999). Positing Kantian norms within the 
framework of the Paralympics, it also makes perfect sense. By assuring the 
universality of the Paralympic spirit, we can only recognize what is NOT Paralympic 
rather than identify what it is. First of all, the Paralympic spirit, essentially, cannot be 
conceptualized, because it is not derived from something of daily materiality. Its 
universality has freed it from national or cultural boundaries; therefore, it loses its 
geographical and cultural reference. In addition, athletes should not carry any 
personal interests. Any practice contaminated by personal benefits and 
self-satisfaction will be identified as non-Paralympic. Furthermore, athletes with 
disabilities have to obey the various rational rules and regulations constituted by the 
IPC. Under these laws and regulations, the spectator and the IPC can sensitively 
practice their judgment on “what is not the real Paralympic spirit.” Any transgression 
of rules and disobedience of regulations may be labeled as non-Paralympic.  
Even though the spectator will never undergo the body/spirit split experienced 
by athletes, it does not prevent the spectator from judging what real Paralympic 
transcendence is through a series of negations. Here, another unbridgeable lacuna 
emerges. It seems that the transcendental and pure spirit of the Paralympics can only 
be identified through engagement of a rational calculation of laws and regulations. 
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That is to say, a pure transcendence of the material world can ironically only be 
enabled by moral and ethical laws of materiality. These man-made standards and rules 
purify man’s approach to an elevated stage beyond man. In other words, we work as 
the reference for ourselves. 
Under the sacred Paralympic flame, athletes with disabilities give up their 
intimate unity with their material and believe that they can attain a state of 
transcendence; spectators deem that they are witness to a divine power that can bring 
them to transcendence. Cheering and tearing, both parties sense that they are an 
uncanny enigma and put their mind in tune with the divine world (Agamben, 1999, p. 
34). Within this agonistic public space – the Paralympics – transcendence becomes 
the perpetual rule, and the material life is abandoned as an exception. In this 
semi-autonomous sphere (for existential intervention of moral and ethical laws), 
athletes and spectators, voluntarily or compulsorily, consciously or unconsciously, 
suppress their material content, making the Paralympics their most uncanny 
experience – one approaching a spiritual transcendence of nothing. 
THE STATE OF EXCEPTION 
In The Human Condition, Hannah Arendt (1958) explains:  
According to Greek thought, the human capacity for political organization is 
not only different from but stands in direct opposition to that natural 
association whose center is the home (oikia) and the family (p. 24).  
Outside the public sphere of political actions (the polis), people live a life in which 
persuading speech cannot make sense. Forcing people by violence and through orders 
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is the only way to deal with people characteristic of life outside the polis. Therefore, 
freedom, to Arendt, can only be achieved in a public sphere. 
  In The Origins of Totalitarianism, Arendt (1973) further clarifies that having 
the right to act in the public sphere depends on one’s capability to have rights. 
However, claiming one’s own rights may be alienating to others, since “we became 
aware of the existence of a right to have rights…and a right to belong to some kind of 
organized community, only when millions of people emerged who had lost and could 
not regain these rights” (p. 295-296) in the sphere beyond the polis. When some 
groups present themselves in the public sphere for their rights, others might be 
positioned in the oikia and subjected to violence. 
  If we perceive the arena of the ancient Olympic Games as a polis, the right to 
have rights, obviously, only belongs to male citizens rather than male slaves and 
women. Non-citizens who entered into the divine space of the Olympics would be 
subjected to the death penalty. If we examine Aristotle’s notion of “good life,” ev n
males with disabilities may not possess the right to have rights, at least full rights:  
Or as the eye, the hand, the foot, and each of the parts of the body seem to 
have their work, must we then suppose that alongside all of these man 
similarly has a certain work? And what then might this be? The simple fact of 
living seems to be common even to plants, but we are seeking something that 
is proper to man (quoted from Agamben, 2007, p. 3).  
To Aristotle, without proper functions for each body part, one can hardly be defined as 
man, because man should be “born with regard to life, but existing essentially with 
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regard to the good life” (Agamben, 1998, p. 7). Particularly, the right to have rights, 
for able-bodied male citizens, in such an ancient democratic context, was awarded by 
the divine sovereignty. 
  In Political Theology, Carl Schmitt (2005) makes a creative statement that 
the sovereignty of the modern state is the secularized and neutralized theological 
sovereignty. The divine power of the ancient age has been transformed to power 
embedded in state jurisprudence (Schmitt, 2005). In the meantime, the citizens 
identified by the divine power are replaced by people who are born and remain free 
and equal in rights. Women, people of colour and slaves join this broad category of 
people who share “common consciousness.” Schmitt (2005) deems this 
transformation as a progression of human rationality since the voice of the people
substitutes the voice of the God.  
If we take the Olympics as an instance, the inclusion of women, people of 
color and people from a lower class indicates a “myth of the creative power of the 
democratically equal populace” (Strong, 2005, p. xxviii). The emergence of the 
Paralympic movement, therefore, could be perceived as distributing the right to have 
the rights of participating sports to people with disabilities. The right discour e 
apparently plays a significant role in including people with disabilities in general and 
athletes with disabilities in particular into the polis. The seamless distribution of 
liberal domestic democracy enables its universal extension. (Agamben, 1998). It 
seems that the space of the oikia, where violence rules, has disappeared.  
As Agemben (2000) remarks, “where there is a People, there shall be naked 
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life (p. 35).” First of all, Agamben (1996) notices a fact that the citizen status – he 
right to have rights – is no longer closely associated with divinity. Almost all 
European nation-states grant equal human rights to their citizens and consider thi  
natural granting as the foundation of state sovereignty. The structure of the 
nation-state is traditionally defined by three elements – territory, order and birth. The 
state mechanism is used to operate upon regulating individuals who violate this triad. 
The role of the state is to eliminate life that increasingly cannot be inscribed into the 
order overarched by the triad (Agamben, 2000, p. 43). However, after World War I, 
most European states started to reserve the right to denaturalize and denationalize 
their citizens (Agamben, 1996). From this sense, the proposition - “all ones born 
equal”- is replaced by the idea that “citizens have to show themselves deserving of 
citizenship” (Agamben, 1996). Meanwhile, the politics of making decisions by the 
state sovereignty has been reconfigured to a politics of making choice for citizens – 
choosing to become a deserving citizen or not.  
  This political reconfiguration can also be adopted to understand the 
biopolitics of the Paralympic Games. The right to play in the agonistic space of the 
Paralympic games is portrayed as a right for people with disabilities to choose a 
physically active lifestyle. From an Agambenian perspective, this right is never 
naturally granted. Athletes, thus, have to approve that they deserve the right to 
compete in the Paralympic Games through their bodies. For most athletes with 
disabilities, winning is assumed as the only end by promoting physical excellence. 
Under such a rule, natural body movement has been transformed to gesture. As 
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Agamben (2000) puts it, “the gesture…opens the sphere of ethos as the more proper 
sphere of that which is human (p. 57).” The gesture itself becomes the destiny of 
various bodies. Only through complying with certain gestures regulated by ethos can 
success be realized, and the transcendence that is promised by the Paralympics be 
expressed through the body. When the ideal gesture is realized, every human being 
has lost his or her sense of naturalness in that “contingency and necessity become
indiscernible” (Agamben, 2000, p. 53). Therefore, the gesture becomes the rule 
whereas the natural body is transformed to the state of exception. 
  Nevertheless, under such a rule, most people with disabilities cannot inscribe 
their bodies into the order under which Aristotle’s “good life” for human could be 
achieved. Their right to act in the agonistic space of the Paralympic Games is revoked 
for the sake of the rights and freedom of athletes with disabilities to embrace an active 
lifestyle. Their lawless bodily movements disclose the secret of the body fetishism of 
the Paralympics. In other words, their presence characterizes the state of em rgency 
of the bodily ethos as embraced by the Paralympics. The universal right discourse 
loses its voice in the exception, because their body presents a “catastrophe of the 
sphere of gestures” (Agamben, 2000, p. 51).  
  What of people who can neither start nor complete the simplest form of 
gestures? How about people who do not even understand the norms of “good life” that 
support and sustain the gesture? In order to resolve this paradox, some have suggested 
that we need to replace the universal human rights discourse with medical discourse 
for people with disabilities. Unlike the power of state sovereignty, which comes as if 
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from the outside and marks the space to eliminate, the biomedical power seems more 
moderate and productive in that it sets its goal as saving life. Under medical 
discourses, “biomedicine as a body of expertise might assist peoples to achieve 
greater heights of personal enrichment through personal and individual freedom 
(Bishop & Jotterand, 2006, p. 207). Anyone who is against it is against “the just 
distribution of the fruits of technology (Bishop & Jotterand, 2006, p. 209).  
Even though the emphasis on biopower, to people with disabilities, is on 
“finding a cure” (Rohrer, 2005), it cannot disguise its limit that it cannot save all the 
life. Therefore, biopower assigns itself another divine responsibility, to identify the 
“life unworthy of being lived” and to guarantee other situations as a whole in its 
totality (Agamben, 1998). Agamben (1998) acknowledges, “the sovereign is entering 
into an ever more intimate symbiosis not only with the jurist but also with the doctor, 
the scientist, the expert and the priest” (p. 122). The distribution of medical discourses 
is no longer coercively conducted by the nation-state, but worked through by 
promoting certain ethical standards. It is no longer a question of seeking to identify 
and violently eliminate or constrain those defective individuals, or to promote the 
reproduction of those whose biological characteristics are most desirable, in th  name 
of the overall fitness of the population, nation or race (Rose, 2001, p. 6-7). Instead, 
being “abnormal” or having a lower quality of life indicates only one possibility in a 
field of choice. As Nikolas Rose (2001) remarks:  
 Agamben and Bauman are undoubtedly correct in suggesting that, over the 
course of the 20th century, there was no such clear distinction between 
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preventive medicine and eugenics, between the pursuit of heath and the 
elimination of unfitness, between consent and compulsion (p. 3).  
The one that makes the decision is no longer the divine or the state sovereignty. Every 
citizen has the right to make the wise choice and benefits from his or her decision. In 
the meantime, the biopower also awards abnormal individuals the right of death. The 
threshold between violence and right, law and nature, becomes a zone of indistinction 
(Agamben, 1998). The operation of medical discourses of biopower is similar to that 
of the state sovereignty. To the sovereign, human rights only function under normal 
circumstances. When it deals with exception, any violence can be applied in order to 
“restore” human rights, including unconditional violation of human rights by revoking 
the basic right to have rights. Just as Rohrer (2005) declares:  
The worse the economic and social conditions of people with disabilities are, 
the more people will “choose” to die; the more people who “choose” to die, 
the more refusal to provide services and access will seem to be justified by the 
“inevitable” unbearability of life with disability. Eventually, assisted suicide 
will be the social expected “solution” to severe disability (p. 58). 
  In addition, presenting certain life as a risk to the common well-being of men, 
the biopower creates a “fictitious state of exception”, “fancied emergency” or even 
“willed state of exception” to justify the necessity of exclusion (Agamben, 2005). In 
responding to this fictitious and catastrophic exception, the biomedical power 
safeguards its norms and its applicability to the normal situation (Agamben, 2005, p. 
31). In other words, the biopower excludes life in the name of the common well-being 
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of life.  
  Agamben (2005) notes that “in order to apply a norm it is ultimately 
necessary to suspend its application, to produce an exception” (p. 40). The emergence 
of the Paralympic movement indicates a norm of compulsory able-bodiedness 
(McRuer, 2002) to people with disabilities at large. Even though it portrays itself as a 
vehicle of humanitarianism, its propaganda of inclusion through participation in 
competitive sports is antithetical to social acceptance for disabled bodies. Just as
Agamben (1998) remarks, a humanitarianism that separates biopolitics cannot fail to 
reproduce the isolation at the basis of sovereignty (p. 134). In addition, elimination of 
the state of exception, such as “mercy killing” or “death by grace,” was offered to 
people and fetuses with disabilities in the name of humanitarian consideration 
(Agamben, 1998, p. 140). In the case of the Paralympic Games, compulsory 
able-bodiedness embodied by athletes with disabilities becomes the rule; the majority 
of people with disabilities who fail to inscribe their bodies into this order become the 
state of exception.  
CODA 
  Agambenian biopower, different from Foucauldian inclusive biopolitics, is 
actually a dialectic between exception and norm. Under the biopolitics of the 
Paralympics, humanitarianism becomes the new sovereign order of violence (Edkins, 
2000). The Paralympic sovereign is not simply a dialectic between the majority nd 
the minority, exception and normality. Instead, it is a dynamic dialectic between 
inclusive exclusion and exclusive inclusion.  
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In order to attain full civil rights and benefits, the able-bodied individuals and 
the athlete with disabilities must remake themselves as legal subjects who are 
consistent with the requirement of normativity (Shildrick, 2005a). From this 
perspective, every human being is a potential exception in that political and civil 
rights are only given to us according to biopolitical strategic deliberation (Ek, 2006). 
Under the Paralympic sovereign, athletes with disabilities not only need to comply 
with certain gestures that represent the ethos of human beings, but also need to 
alienate their secular materiality in order to present transcendence. Even for spectators 
with able bodies, who identify with the transcendence demonstrated by the athletes 
with disabilities, the alienation of their material life becomes the only factor 
sustaining their life. The transcendent sublime can only be realized through violence 
and a quasi-sacrificial or totalizing logic (LaCapra, 2007, p. 129). Both parties are 
immersed in the “eternal joy of becoming- that joy which also encompasses joy in 
destruction” (Nietzsche, 1968, p. 110).  
To the majority of disabled people who are excluded from the Paralympic 
Games, particularly those who have severe disabilities, their social status i further 
jeopardized. When they confront sublime human rights discourse, they are excluded 
for the sake of the freedom of athletes with disabilities. When they encounter innocent 
medical discourses, they are immoral beings who can only enjoy the right to choose 
death over life. As a catastrophe of norms, they are the exception to norms but subject 
to violence beyond norms. Only by eliminating the catastrophe from existence or 
abandoning it to the space of invisibility, can the norm fulfil its self-legislation as the 
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totality of life.  
In the end of The State of Exception, Agamben (2005) notes, the sovereignty, 
by constituting a fictive emergency, tends to transform itself into a killing machine. 
The only possibility to halt the machine is to articulate the link between violence and 
law as well as between life and norm. Thus, to fulfil a destruction of the Paralympic 
sovereignty, the links between humanitarianism and the right to death, between rights 
and lack of all rights, and between integration and exclusion should be delineated.  
  Nevertheless, it does not necessarily mean that the Paralympic Games cannot 
absolutely exist as a way to “good life.” Thus, Agamben (2005) borrows from 
Benjamin to redefine “good life” as life that “cannot be appropriated or made 
juridical” (p. 64). In contrast to Aristotle’s definition of “good life” which has been 
designated for human beings, Agamben (2000) asserts:  
The “happy life” on which political philosophy should be founded thus cannot 
be either the naked life that sovereignty posits as a presupposition so as to turn 
it into its own subject or the impenetrable extraneity of science and of modern 
biopolitics that everybody today tries in vain to sacralize. This “happy life” 
should be, rather, an absolutely profane “sufficient life” that has reached the 
perfection of its own power and of its own communicability – a life over 
which sovereignty and right no longer have any hold (p. 114-115).  
It is also a call to deactivate the sovereignty of the Paralympics. As Agamben (2005) 
pictures that “one day humanity will play with law just as children play with disused 
objects, not in order to restore them to their canonical use but to free them from it for 
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good” (p. 64). Therefore, we should re-construct the Paralympic Games neither as 
sacrifice to divine power nor as demonstration of human rights or spectacle promised 
by medical discourse, but as a sphere for play devoid of value and play of the 
Agambenian “good life.” 
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Chapter Seven: I am an athlete; I am not disabled! : Identification with 
Peoples with Disabilities 
In a recent television show hosted by the Phoenix Television, former Chinese 
gymnast Lan Sang proudly asserted, “I never consider myself as disabled.” Ev r a
hopeful Olympian, Sang represented China to participate in the 1998 Goodwill Games 
in Uniondale, New York. In a warm-up vault, she accidentally dislocated her C6 and 
C7 vertebrae and severely cracked her spinal cord. After a year of unsucces f l 
rehabilitation in the United States, she returned to China for further treatment. Despite 
of her disability, Sang never stops trying to live an independent life. Moreover, Sang 
actively involved in various public activities to help people with disabilities in China. 
For instance, Sang played an active role to promote building cities accessible to all. In 
2002, she was admitted by Beijing University to study media and communication. She 
often appeared in TV shows as a commentator for disability sports and gymnastic 
events. She also trained for the 2008 Beijing Paralympic Games. In 2007, she 
received her bachelor degree and joined Star TV, a leading media agency in Asia. I  
2008, Sang launched a charity fund after her name for injured athletes. Demonstrating 
extraordinary passion and courage to the public, Sang won herself a nickname 
–“angel on wheelchair.”  
In contrast to many disabled people who are unwilling to talk about their 
experiences in public settings, Sang is very outspoken about her injury, her frustration, 
and the painful role changing from a promising elite gymnast to a person with severe 
disability. In the show, she told the host that it is natural for disabled people to be 
210 
 
reluctant to engage with the social world, because they are afraid that people from the 
outside may see them differently. The host asked Sang, “Do you feel you are differ nt 
after the injury?” Firmly and spontaneously, Sang responded to the host: 
 No, I never think I am different. Indeed, I never consider myself as disabled! 
 I always tell myself, if other people get my injury, can they achieve whatI 
 achieved? Others may think you are different (as a disabled), but you can’t 
 just treat yourself differently.  
 I am injured, but I can’t just stop wearing nice makeup and showing my 
 beautiful side to people. I have to sit on wheelchair, but I can’t just stop 
 buying nice skirts and dresses. Yes, I am sitting on the wheelchair, and you 
 can’t see my figure and my lines. But I still want to be beautiful as much as 
 before! Once I was in a party with my former teammates, they thought 
 someone did the makeup for me. They were wrong; I spent two hours and did 
 the whole makeup by myself.  
From Sang’s articulation, it seems that her conception of disability is not so much an 
imposed social construction but a subjective constitution. Sang resisted the social 
labeling of “people with disabilities” by affirmatively defending her full commitment 
to gender. Using gender – a social constituted concept, Sang justified herself as 
normal and attack another social construction – disability. It makes me to ponder how 
do other athletes with disabilities perceive themselves, and why.   
READING DISABILITIES THROUGH AN INTERSECTIONAL LENSE 
  Based upon the notion that the major systems of oppression are interlocking 
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– an idea raised by feminist theorists (Combahee River Collective, 1983; Crenshaw, 
1991; Collins, 1990; Yuval-Davis, 2006), intersectional analysis has been adopted by 
scholars to explain the discursive and complex construction of differences of race, 
gender, class and sexuality (Crenshaw, 1991; Collins, 1990). Garland-Thomson (2002) 
furthered that the varieties of disability should be added into intersectional studies in 
an attempt to further our understanding of contradictory and situational identities and 
to facilitate social integration of subalterns. In addition, Garland-Thomson (2002) 
encourages us to integrate disability as a category of analysis through which we can 
deepen, expand or even challenge feminist theories.   
Primarily informed by (Black and Third World feminist) standpoint theory, 
some scholars further suggest that integration of people with disabilities into ociety 
can only be achieved by understanding their political and epistemological stance
(Mahowald, 2005). Only if we interpret a multiplicity of interlocking identities 
through the stance of the people with disabilities, can we better understand how 
disability as a social category is constructed or imposed through various avenues of 
exclusion and inclusion. Furthermore, we can understand their subjective 
understanding of their bodies and probably initiate individual or collective political 
intervention.  
  Influenced by Foucault and Derrida, queer theorists, including Judith Butler, 
Eve Sedgwick, Gloria Anzaldua and Donna Haraway, suggest that taking the political 
standpoint of certain marginalized social groups not only runs the risk of victimizing 
and disempowering these social groups but also reinforcing the various categories of 
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identities. Noting the impossibility of gender politics vis-à-vis subversive gender 
category, Butler (1993) remarks, “if…gender is part of what decides the subject, how 
might one formulate a project that preserves gender practices as sites of critical 
agency?” (p. x). Queer theorists suggest that we adopt flexible and transcendental 
subjectivities to overcome the boundaries formed by various identities politics. Rather 
than reifying and naturalizing constituted identities, we should emphasize the 
performative aspect of the body and upset various binaries by queering our 
subjectivities and performativity. When it was first invented, queering (or queerness) 
was designated as a political strategy only for gays and lesbians agait the 
heterosexual regime. Along with its expansion and radicalization by queer theorists, 
queerness has been broadly embraced as a means of disordering other identity regimes,
including gender, race, class and even disability, and to showcase the agency of 
subaltern groups.  
Taking athletes with disabilities as an example, it seems that their atl tic 
performativity could be interpreted through both queer and standpoint theories. Their 
active engagement of athleticism can be seen as either an affirmative sttement of 
their political standpoint as people with disabilities or a queer agency blurring the 
boundary between ableness and disabledness. As Shildrick (2005a) suggests, 
“Disability is a highly complex and intrinsically ambiguous designation, that cannot 
be addressed adequately by positivist and binary based models of analyses alone” (p. 
768). Crenshaw (1991), Collins (1990) and Eng (2001) argue that, isolating one 
identity from the others as if they were distinct categories of analysis can only serve 
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the political, economic and cultural hegemony of a dominant social order. In this 
chapter, I want to tackle this question: Are the boundaries between disabled and able 
bodies secured or contested through symbolic performativity of their athletic bodies? 
To do so, I examine how athletes with disabilities negotiate various forces that tend to 
construct a multiplicity of identities within the parameters of class, gender, sexuality 
and able bodiedness. In addition, I want to reveal that their identification with “athlete 
with disabilities” is neither a historically universal concept nor a politica ly 
progressive one, but one that takes shape within the social and political conjuncture.   
A CHINESE SINGULARITY? 
To study sports for the disabled in China, the influence of the Paralympic 
Games cannot be ignored. As one of the most influential non-governmental institution 
that facilitates social integration of people with disabilities through sports, the 
International Paralympic Committee (IPC) promotes a cosmopolitan ideal that 
everyone has the right to play sports. The IPC already has 162 nations as its members 
since its establishment and has significantly changed the social image of people with 
disabilities. Nevertheless, through tracing the materialization of various cosmopolitan 
ideologies in different cultural contexts, we discovered that cosmopolitanism do not 
always empower marginalized social groups (Beck, 2002; Pheah, 2006; Mullally, 
2006; Narayan, 1997). For instance, Brittain’s (2006) study shows that the success of 
disabled athletes in the Paralympic Games is not comparable with the economic 
condition of nations. Instead, the reality is that athletes from under-developed nations 
have better achievement in the Paralympic Games. Therefore, we have to be critical to 
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the idea that certain nation-states use the Paralympic Games to leverage their political 
capital (Brittain, 2006).  
However, for some under-developed nations, a dilemma that they are facing 
has not attracted the attention it deserves. On the one hand, if the under-developed 
nations do not offer institutional support to athletes with disabilities and do not send 
athletes to participate in the Paralympic Games, they will be labeled as being reluctant 
to embrace the spirit of Paralympic humanitarianism. On the other hand, if they 
provide sufficient financial and institutional support to athletes with disabilities, hey 
might be critiqued for exploiting athletes with disabilities for the politica interests of 
nation-states. In the case of China, the significant achievements of Chinese athletes 
with disabilities in the late 1990s and in the new millennium are suspect from a 
Western viewpoint. In Stone’s (2001) work on sports for the disabled in China, she 
points out: first, sports for the disabled in China are the exclusive preserve of a limited
number of elite athletes in segregated events. Stone (2001) further shows that, the 
success of Chinese athletes in international competitions jeopardizes the social status 
of ordinary Chinese disabled people by asking “how far might the apparent ‘failure’ 
by the majority of ordinary Chinese disabled people to get out of poverty and make it 
in the mainstream (p. 62)?” Stone (2001) also recognizes that the high-level support 
from the Chinese government enables sports for people with disabilities to disguise its 
state dictatorship. On the one hand, ordinary Chinese disabled people have very 
limited access to international disability sport; on the other hand, disabled athletes ar  
forced to train harder to achieve medals in international competitions (Stone, 2001). 
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Even though Stone (2001) admits that the Chinese government had no economic 
capacity to provide sufficient welfare benefits and social support to millions of 
disabled people, she still conveys an underlying message that the marginalization of 
the majority of people with disabilities and the achievement of Chinese elite ath etes 
is indeed a human rights issue in China. 
Meanwhile, Brittain’s (2006) work also draws our attention to developed 
nations to see how much they have done for people with disabilities. The British 
government did not provide sufficient funding to its Paralympic sports until London 
started to bid for the 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games. The United State 
manipulated injured soldiers from Afghanistan and Iraq wars to promote nationalism 
(Batts & Andrews, 2008). Needless to say, developed nations are themselves far from 
having achieved the humanitarian ideals promoted by the IPC. Across national 
boundaries, most people with disabilities are still severely marginalized. Th  
opportunities to participate in sports, particularly competitive sports on an 
international level, are still largely limited by the class background of people with 
disabilities. Some training programs still largely rely on charity funding to maintain 
their daily operations. In addition, many activists are struggling for more
governmental supports for the disabled sports, due to the low chance of getting 
commercial endorsement and philanthropic endorsement. Nevertheless, it does not 
prevent the West from directing its gaze and release frequent rhetorical invocation 
against China. In many parts of her work, Stone (2001) accentuates the post-Mao 
body culture for people with disabilities as “only restricted to the few, the strong, the 
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winners” (p. 63), as if the Paralympic movement in the Western world has 
successfully integrated the majority of people with disabilities. Stone’s i t ntion of 
simplifying all issues regarding China to “human rights issues” or even as cultural 
issues, to Narayan (1997), is indeed a colonialist schizophrenic analysis through 
taking an enlightening position. The accentuation of the human rights situation in 
other national contexts not only constitutes cultural Others, but also reinforces “the 
moral and cultural superiority of ‘Western civilization’ and its ‘civilizing mission’ 
(Narayan, 1997, p. 57).” In the meantime, her missionary stance contributes to her 
blindness to various inequalities formed in the western context in particular and global 
context at large.  
Rey Chow (2002) further theorizes the gaze projected by the West to China as 
a multi-layered politics of mimeticism. As Chow (2002) remarks: 
The first level of mimeticism has to do with the imperative, created by 
Western imperialism and colonialism of the past few hundred years, of the 
white man as the original…the original, so to speak, exists as the sole, primary 
standard by which the copy is judged… the colonized subject must 
nonetheless try, in envy, to become that from which she has been excluded in a 
priori manner…She is damned if she tries; she is damned if she doesn’t (p. 
104).  
Regardless of whether the colonized subjects try or not, “for those who distrust it, 
mimesis is suspect because it results in an objectified image, yet the image is, 
ultimately, not the problem; the act of imitating, of copying, is” (Chow, 2002, p. 101). 
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Using the gaze, the colonized subject is confined to where it should stay (Chow, 2002). 
Meanwhile, the West is exempt from any gaze and examination since “there is only 
one destiny. And that is white,” (Fanon, 1991, p. 10), and makes the colonized a 
permanent inferior copy (Fanon, 1967; Bhabha, 1994b; Chow, 2002).  
In this Chapter, I do not want to deny the fact that the Chinese nation-state 
tactically employs the Paralympic Games to justify its sovereignty, demonstrate its 
role as a good citizen in global politics, highlight its “peaceful rise” and desire to 
embrace human rights and democracy (Mittelman, 2006). The achievement of 
Chinese athletes with disabilities is deployed as an indicator of the embraceent of 
human rights by the Chinese state sovereignty. Nevertheless, I also want to emphasize 
that the institutionalization of the Paralympics in China and the tremendous succes  of 
Chinese athletes with disabilities have to be understood as a compromise by the 
Chinese sovereignty for a sense of legitimacy and security, and ultimately, a s nse of 
empowerment in the global power dynamic. Due to the fact that global politics is 
always taking place inside national boundaries, the phenomenon of global dynamics is 
often mistakenly perceived as being locally constructed. Through participating in the 
global Paralympic movement, athletes with disabilities contest and subordinate to the 
changing power dynamics on both national and global levels. Therefore, rather than 
being a work that reinforces the notion of singular Chineseness, the analysis I pursue 
here tends to serve as a modest, albeit critical model for the continued cross-cultural 





Of the two teams for which I conducted my research, the class status and 
family backgrounds of athletes varies dramatically, from an abandoned orphan to a 
medical doctor and a former professional soccer athlete who was accidentally 
disabled. Some of them have stable financial assistance from their families; some rely 
on governmental welfare subsidies for the disabled; some athletes who were injured 
during their work receive compensation for the disabled from their former employers 
or local governments on a regular basis; and several athletes still maintain stable 
employment in public institutions.  
Due to the difference of class background, the athletes I interviewed 
demonstrate different levels of motivation to participate in competitive athletic 
training. For instance, one female athlete, who was abandoned since she was born 
because of her disability, thinks that participating in athletic training is a way to 
escape the suppressing and disempowering confines of an orphanage institution, to 
obtain a higher financial subsidiary for athletes with disabilities alloc ted by the 
government, and probably as a way to access other opportunities which cannot be 
provided by the orphanage. As she said,  
In the orphanage, what they are supposed to do is to feed you, dress you up 
and make sure that you are not sick. Don’t expect them to do anything else 
beyond that, since they are not responsible for you. You are not supposed to do 
anything other than stay full and healthy. 
Due to her class constraints, she is more dedicated to training, and demonstrates a 
very strong will to win in the National Championship. Without a satisfactory 
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performance in the national games, she cannot justify her stay with the team and will
possibly be sent back to the orphanage.  
Another female player who is from a lower class family in a rural area 
mentioned to me that participating in competitive athletic training is a default option 
rather than a choice made based on her preference. She wants to do independent study 
at home, apply to colleges for the disabled, and eventually have a stable career 
commensurate with her education. But her family cannot provide enough financial 
support for her education. Staying at home, she can only run a small variety store in a 
very confined environment to supplement her family financially. During the interview, 
she complained that she cannot afford the expensive tuition to fulfill her dream of 
attending college. I told her that there might be some colleges that offer education for 
people with disabilities at lower rates. She mentioned that two players on her teams 
have access to computer and internet at home. Internet access provides them a 
privileged position to locate various services and opportunities available for people 
with disabilities. She further reveals that she has not had an opportunity to use a 
computer yet. Thus, she does not even know what material to study in order to be 
enrolled in special colleges for the disabled. Because the preferential policy in China 
encourages retired athletes to obtain higher education, she is hoping that her athletic 
performance may make her eligible for higher education with a tuition waiver and 
lower academic standards. In addition, she saved the monthly training subsidiary 
allocated by the government for her new wheelchair and was content with the 
financial independence she achieved.  
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For male athletes, most of them receive sufficient financial support from their 
families or their employers; however, their disabled bodies become an obstacle for 
them as they climb the social ladder. A disabled professional soccer athlete nd a 
young surgical doctor lament that they have had to give up their ambition and 
compromise with the cruel social reality. The young surgical doctor who works in a 
prestigious hospital told me his role is more like a role model for all the disabled 
patients rather than a real doctor. The former soccer athlete rather conceives that 
playing wheelchair sports is a secondary choice to continue his career as an athlete. 
Still having a sporting body, he acknowledges that the honorary value of being a 
professional soccer player is no longer preserved. They both told me that they no 
longer feel comfortable socializing with their (former) friends and colleagu s. In 
addition, they no longer feel secure in their social class and are forced to make long 
term plans for the rest of their life. Two other male athletes who have less severe
disabilities still maintain their employment within public sectors. Nevertheless, they 
clearly realized that the possibility for them to be promoted in their workplace is 
rather slim. Even though they are protected by law and do not need to be concerned 
about unemployment, an atmosphere of alienation and ignorance at the workplace is 
still evident in that some social activities, such as group mountain climbing and 
camping, become luxurious and embarrassing to participate. One of the male athletes 
recalled that he won a title in the previous nation championship. The success once 
again brought him back to the center of attention in his workplace for a short period 
and gave him an opportunity to showcase his ableness.   
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The result suggests that lower social class further exacerbates the negative 
influence brought about by disability. Athletes from a lower class are morpr ne to 
use their bodies as a means to escape a deteriorated social status – more often than to 
escape their social confines. For athletes from a higher social class, even though they 
are less socially confined, having disabilities has significantly changed their lifestyles 
and career path. Failing to be incorporated into the labor system not only jeopardizes 
their access to economic capital, but also harms their social capital and prevents them 
from attaining cultural capital. Disabilities have jeopardized their legitimacy to stay in 
their social class. Therefore, they are more prone to use sports to restore their sta us.  
Nevertheless, success in the sporting arena might give them a better chance to 
access social and economic capital but cannot fully integrate them in the global 
economy of labor. Irrespective of either the nation-state or the Paralympic institution, 
athletes with disabilities are trained to succeed in the sporting arena rather than in the 
labor market. During the interviews, many athletes told me that they consider 
participating in athletic training to be their only way out of this predicament but they 
are unsure how big the possibility is for their efforts to pay off. In other words, the e 
athletes with disabilities are conscious of the fact that they are needed for their athletic 
performance rather than their labor power. Even in Western nations, successfl 
athletes with disabilities are primarily cheered for their performance. Their economic 
condition and employment are rarely addressed by the public media.  
SEXUALITY 
As mentioned before, one female athlete uses internet access to make friends.
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Even though access to a computer and internet provides her the opportunity to 
socialize with the external world, she is still hesitant to go out and meet her (romantic) 
friends. In the cyber community, she portrays herself as an athlete who fully dedicates 
her time to intensive training and competition. Whenever some friends invite her to 
dates, she will use different excuses, such as conflicts with training and competition 
schedules, to decline invitations. Particularly in China, most professional athletes ar  
under the strict discipline of a semi-military system. The public is always curious 
about the life of professional athletes. Therefore, none of her cyber-friends ever call 
her role in question. She mentioned to me, making friends on-line gives her a 
ratification of being wanted by others, even though it is barely possible to maintain 
this friendship if she reveals the fact that she is an athlete with a disability.  
The young surgical doctor with the spinal cord injury above T 10 level has an 
able-bodied girlfriend. Nevertheless, neither his family nor he is optimistic about this 
relationship because of his inability to perform sexual activity. To both the athlete and 
his father, failure to perform sexuality is an insurmountable obstacle to a sustainable 
marriage. The athlete is deeply immersed in the guilt of not being able to fulfill his 
sexuality and to satisfy his girl-friend. On the one hand, he wants to maintain this 
relationship; on the other hand, he is consciously aware of his selfishness and the 
instability of their potential marriage. His father is more concerned that this marriage 
may make his son more vulnerable, if one day his wife decides to divorce him. In 
addition, his father believes that it is pointless to even start such a marriage without 
sex. When I implicitly suggest maybe it could be an alternative choice for his son to 
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seek a romantic relationship within the disabed community, his father disputed my 
idea and deemed that it will be burdensome not only to the athlete himself but also to 
the family.  
Not only do the close family members of athletes hold the idea that having a 
disability (severe disability in particular) shuts the door for them to have a sexual 
relationship or marriage with able-bodied people, but most athletes with disabilities 
perceive themselves as not being sexually attractive and dismiss the idea of marriage. 
From the field research, I found out as above that their sexualized understanding of 
disabled bodies is definitely a double-standard in that it only applies to other disable 
people rather than themselves. For instance, during an informal group interview, 
female athletes jokingly told me that they have reached an agreement – they all will 
try to marry guys with “high-quality” (guys with able bodies) rather than 
“second-class products” (disabled guys) in the training center. Among all the female 
players I interviewed, only one athlete has developed a romantic relationship with an 
able bodied person following her injury and successfully turned this relationship into 
marriage. This female athlete becomes the role model for the whole team. She told me, 
the reason that her husband wants to marry her is not only because she has a minor 
disability, but also for her strong motivation to be independent. Moreover, her 
husband perceives her as an athlete, which is totally different from other dependent 
and demanding disabled individuals. Another female athlete, during the time of my 
field research, had a serious relationship with a male athlete in the same training 
center. Notwithstanding, she still perceives her boyfriend as an individual even with 
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his disability, but he is highly convenient, mobile and flexible. She also emphasizes 
the fact that her boyfriend can easily pass for an able-bodied person.  
The strong intention of disabled athletes to associate with able-bodied 
individuals through marriage, to some extent, reflects the deficient social resourc  
available for them from the society. Therefore, they can only go back to the most 
basic social institution – family – for assistance. In addition, they expect to somehow 
erase the stigma of being a disabled individual through a marriage with an 
able-bodied individual. Marriage with another person with disabilities undoubtedly 
reinforces the stigma. Thus, athletes with disabilities perceive marriage with another 
disabled as an option they “cannot not have.” In the meantime, marrying another 
disabled individual, to them, only exacerbates the inconvenience they encounter in 
their daily life.  
Nevertheless, the majority of athletes who have severe disabilities, both male 
and female, show that they are consciously aware that it is impossible (or less likely) 
for them to have a marriage with an able-bodied person. The same situation also 
applies in a Western context. As Asch and Fine (1997) note, “the public assumption is 
that this woman is a burden and her husband is either saintly or a loser himself” (p. 
245). Similarly, are able-bodied woman married to a disabled man will be eulogized 
as an embodiment of “traditional virtues” of Chinese women. Compared to other 
compliments, a moral acclamation is more suffocating to able-bodied people in that it 
prevents any moral deviance, particularly sexual deviance against family values.  
Even though many athletes with disabilities conceive marriage with 
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able-bodied individuals as an “ideal” marriage, they are also consciously discerned 
that marriage with an able-bodied person may not bring them happiness and the sense 
of home that the normal heterosexual family promises, because they believe that such 
a marriage could be unequal and oppressive from the beginning. Even though their 
wives and husbands could be supportive and considerate, it would not help them to 
escape from the feeling of guilt. For example, the only female athlete in th  team who 
married an able-bodied man, during our conversation, keep emphasizing that her 
husband is “a VERY good person,” and they have a very happy family life. It seems 
that his kindness to her and the success of their family are something completely 
incomprehensible, and all the happiness she speaks of can only be attributed to his 
essential personality. Therefore, their successful marriage, transcending the 
able/disable binary and outside the norm, is only an unspeakable exception.  
McRuer (2006) remarks that little notice has been taken of the connection 
between heterosexuality and able-bodied identity. Able-bodiedness, even more than 
heterosexuality, still largely is perceived as a nonidentity, but the natural order of 
things (McRuer, 2006, p. 1). As Shildrick (2005b) argues, we witness the significance 
of the psycho-social aversion not only to disabled bodies in general, but to the 
interface of sexuality and disability more specifically. By breaking the dyad between 
able-bodiedness and heterosexuality, the sexuality of people with disabilities is also 
severely challenged. So strongly is “proper” sexuality associated wi h one particular 
set of standards –able-bodiedness – that those outside the standards have been 
naturally castrated by the public or family members (Shildrick, 2005b).  
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Foucault always affirms that the power generates endless refusals, which are 
usually embodied as counter-discourses. Nevertheless, we should also pay attention to 
the “continual and circular process of internalization and externalization” (Eng, 2001, 
p. 20-21) under the refusing power. It is manifested as internalized feelings of 
self-contempt and self-rejection as well as externalized negation of their identity as 
“people with disabilities” and degradation of other disabled people in general.  In the 
case of athletes with disabilities, refusals to acknowledge themselves as disabled are 
conducted through participating in athletic training and embracing the identity of 
athletes. Through their physical performativities, athletes tend to “repudiate the literal 
meaning of the word disabled” (Garland-Thomson, 2002, p. 22). However, their way 
of repudiating “disabled” is dilemmatic and self-contradictory, because the r fusal to 
claim disability identity is often adopted by athletes to justify their pursuit of marriage 
with able-bodied people while denying the possibility of marriage with other disabled. 
In other words, “their words … serve to disassociate them from the identity group of 
the disabled” (Garland-Thomson, 2002, p. 22). Nevertheless, it is evident that being 
athletic is not enough to rescue athletes with disabilities from the bankruptcy of the 
dyadic project on heterosexuality-able-bodiedness. The discourse of able-bodiedness 
is so strong and discursive that athletes have fully internalized it. The internalization 
of the presupposition of able-bodiedness positions athletes in an ambivalence between 
full embracement of heterosexual marriage with able-bodied people and 




Maintaining or performing sexually seems luxurious to most severely disabled 
athletes; however, they still invest in the project of gender performance in a rlatively 
generous way. Because of the intensive training schedule, inconvenient access to th  
surrounding areas, and the disturbing stares outside of the training center, athletes 
(except for the ones on employment) choose to spend most of their time in the center. 
Male athletes in general believe that participating in athletic tra ning makes them look 
and feel like a man or at least makes them feel more masculine. Particularly, they 
hope to develop their muscles through physical activities. Therefore, compared to 
female athletes, male athletes are more enthusiastic about participating n strength 
training and care about having the proper diet for muscle growth. One male athlete 
proudly mentioned to me that people on the street once asked him whether he was a 
soldier or a policeman before his injury. He also told me that he thinks these male 
non-athletes with disabilities do not look normal for their weak and shrinking bodies: 
“they don’t even look like humans, not even close to looking like a man.”  
The sense of supremacy for being an athlete is not limited to male athletes. 
The social isolation does not prevent female athletes from pursuing fashion, such as
clothing, makeup and jewelrys. Every month, they choose to go out together for 
shopping (or just window shopping) in the downtown area. One player comments that 
the accessibility in the downtown areas has been greatly improved but is still not 
convenient enough for people with disabilities. For example, more and more public 
restrooms have toilets designated for wheelchair users, but many departmentl stores 
are not equipped with fitting rooms large enough for them. She further attributes her 
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unfashionable look to inaccessibility. On a daily basis, after training, they comment 
on the current fashion in TV shows and soap operas and plan what to buy during the 
next shopping excursion.  
Many other female athletes tend to avoid wearing plain uniforms, opting 
instead for colorful and feminine sporting wear. Three female athletes dye their hair 
and sport fashionable hairstyles. Only one relatively older female athlete died not 
show any enthusiasm for fashion and she was critiqued or kindly blamed for “not 
taking care of herself.” On the team, two female basketball players wear makeup 
during their training every day. They even showed me that their makeup is 
sweat-proof. When I ask them why they do that every day, they both affirm that they 
have been used to wearing makeup even prior to having disabilities. They do not see 
having disabilities and being athletes as contradictory to their gender role.  
Even though female athletes are disabled and confined in a small space with 
few opportunities to showcase their femininity to males, they believe it is not a good 
excuse to give up their gender project. As one female player insists, she applies 
makeup not to attract attention from males, but to make herself self-confident. They 
further emphasize that if they stop using makeup just because they have disabilitie , 
people may think having disabilities makes them no longer qualified for being female. 
However, the elder female athlete in the team demeans the act of applying makeup 
during the training. As she cynically puts it, “applying makup every day won’t make 
you less disabled.”  This phenomenon prevails not only in China, but also in other 
social contexts. As Garland-Thomson (2002) notes, the excessive confirmation of 
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normal femininity, in certain cases, is necessary to counter the social negatio  of 
disabled women’s sexuality. As disabled activist and writer Eli Clare reminds us, even 
though sexual objectification disciplines performativity of femininity, its ab ence is 
also detrimental to female subjectivities (quoted by Rohrer, 2005). Disability brngs 
desexualization of females, while at the same time, triggering excessive gend r 
projects to compensate for the potential loss of sexuality. I suggest, for gender 
performance, female athletes who wear makeup are critiqued by their peers for the 
unacceptably transgressive performativity of femininity and their embodied anomaly 
(Shildrick, 2005a). West and Zimmerman (2002) argue, “women can be seen as 
unfeminine but [this] does not make them ‘unfemale.’ (pp. 11)” In this case, the power 
of the able/disable binary is evident in that athletes with disability can display their 
ableness in sports, but it does not make them closer to the ideal gender role.  
 Most athletes with disabilities attempt to incorporate ideal gender images 
through intensive investment in gendering projects, and insist that the gendered self is 
their authentic self. However, “these images remain stubbornly exterior to them” (Eng, 
2001, p. 111). From Lacan’s essay “The Mirror Stage,” we know that the willed 
identification has to be validated by the social collective to maintain the self-sameness. 
The gender project, initiated by female athletes, was even negated by their peers for 
its impossibility to transcend the chasm created by disabilities. For the elder f male 
athlete, rather than contributing to self-care, the gender project further reveals their 
impotence to reverse the coercive inscription made by stereotypical images of 
disabled bodies.  
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I AM AN ATHLETE, NOT A PERSON WITH DISABILITIES 
Through a critical investigation of the production and reinscription of class, 
sexual and gender identifications, we can see that the construction of the identity of 
“athletes with disabilities” is not fully an embodiment of pure political agency but a 
conflicted and ambivalent process. Athletes demonstrate their agency to liberate 
themselves from social oppression, but their self-emancipation is always contradictory 
and politically constrained. Sometimes, it involves self-negation and self-rejection; in 
other cases, they adopt practices of exclusion and estrangement against other people 
with disabilities to showcase their identity as athletes.  
During my field research as above, athletes with disabilities often emphasize 
to me that they are athletes rather than people with disabilities. For instance, one 
athlete puts,  
When we win medals, they hang the Chinese flag and play the Chinese anthem. 
We glorify the nation as much as they (athletes with able bodies) do. However, 
they get all the honors, benefits and attention, whereas we get nothing! 
This punitive ordering between able-bodied and disabled athletes, at a first glance, is a 
hegemonic construction by the nation-state for exploiting the athletic ability of the 
disabled for political interests. A careful examination of the relationship between the 
Olympic Games and the Paralympic Games reveals that the two are never a pair of 
political equivalents. Therefore, the self-willed embracement of the Paralympic 




  Even though it is preconditioned that the Paralympic movement cannot help 
people with disabilities to achieve “genuine” equality with able-bodied people, it 
leaves athletes with disabilities “forever in combat with his (her) own image” (Fanon, 
1967, p. 194). Gravitating toward idealized images of athletes, athletes with 
disabilities make their life an endless production of “stories of overcoming.” For 
example, the first day of my field research, the coach reminded me to not help thes  
athletes; otherwise, I might hurt their self-esteem. Athletes with disabilities, in some 
cases, behave in an extreme “independent” way to demonstrate their ableness. During 
my field research, one Chinese female athlete from Beijing told me:  
Last time we had a tournament in Wuhan (a city in central China), I stopped 
eating and drinking the day before we got on the train. I don’t want to bother 
others to take me to the bathroom. You know, it is very crowded on the train. 
So, I didn’t pee in 12 hours on the train. I am proud of what I did. I hate to 
burden others, especially when someone is eager to offer help.  
This case was very typical during my field research. Not only are some athletes with 
disabilities reluctant to accept any social assistance from volunteers, th y also 
discourage their family members from showing their affection. For example, some 
athletes live on the second floor in an apartment building without an elevator. They 
insisted on climbing the stairs by themselves in front of me and their family members.  
Similar to Fanon and Bhabha’s theorizings of the discursive construction of 
racial subject, the behavior of athletes with disabilities illustrates the coercive power 
that produces these culturally idealized images of able-bodiedness and elicits their 
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psychic faith and bodily mimicry. Trying to overcome the boundaries between 
disabled and able bodies, athletes with disabilities comply with compulsory 
able-bodiedness. However, their mimicry of the able-bodiedness can hardly gain any 
social validation from class, sexuality and gender perspectives. The structured 
able-bodiedness works in tandem with class, sexuality and gender to foreclose 
disabled athletes’ access to the mainstream normativity, including higher social class, 
heterosexual marriage and ideal femininity and masculinity. These social invalidations 
keep eliciting a consciousness of their disabled bodies and force them to admit their 
disableness in spite of their “self-willed” identification with athletes.   
Rather than achieving a coherent sameness with able bodies, athletes with 
disabilities present a “hapless doubling” (Bhabha, 1994b). The self-consciousness of 
their bodies and the idealized image of able bodies not only encourage them to 
dis-identify with their own bodies, but also lead to their fragile and incoherent 
subjectivities. On the one hand, they constantly speak about their ableness but cannot 
liberate themselves from self-negation. Their guilt to their able-bodied partners and 
their pride in being able to pass for able-bodied people reveals nothing but an 
unbridgeable lacuna between their desired image and the mirror image of themselves. 
On the other hand, they demonstrate an over-determined hysteria to people who tend 
to offer help. Living in a hegemonic space structured for people with able bodies, 
athletes with disabilities, no matter whether they are willing or not, have to ask f r 
help or encounter good-intention. Even though the Paralympic Games promote an 
ideology of independence and transcendence of social and corporeal barriers, a fact 
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that cannot be denied is that the Paralympic Games are largely enabled by able- odied 
people, playing roles like coach, organizer, volunteer and so on. During my field 
research as above, I was told by coaches and volunteers who work closely with 
athletes with disabilities that they are very sensitive and prone to over-react. As one 
volunteer says, 
You just don’t know what to do and what not to do. Sometimes, you try your 
best to be considerate to them. They often got mad at you, since you are 
making them feel useless. So, I only do what they tell me to do. Then they 
think I don’t have initiative. Or even more, I am blamed for putting them in 
hardship on purpose. 
As Eng (2001) remarks, “ the hysterical condition … indicates the failure of the social
order to produce successfully those it seeks to name and to regulate successfully tho e 
it seeks to deny” (p. 176).  At the same time, this hysterical condition also highlig ts 
the ambivalent role played by athletes with disabilities, that is, shifting from hero to 
victim. As the hysteric symptom, Eng (2001) encourages us to explore a question 
regarding whether hysteria contests or conserves the dominant order of things. In the 
case for athletes with disabilities, it urges us to rethink the sensitive reaction by 
disabled athletes as an over-determined symptom by the social hierarchy of bodies or 
an embodied agency.  
CONCLUSION 
  Obviously, having a disability (or disabilities) generates a significant impact 
on the life of individuals. From the chapter, I found that the presence of disabilities 
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distorts the intersectional construction of social life across various parameters, such as 
class, gender and sexuality. Compared with other binaries that are used to map and 
construct physical differences, the lacuna between able and disable bodies is more
difficult to bridge in that the alternative of able-bodiedness is absolutely abnormal and 
deviant. We can argue that the modernist ideal privileges separation and autonomous 
being, and all bodies strive and fail to attain normative stability (Shildrick, 2005a). 
However, there are limits beyond which the body in deficit takes up the position of an 
unreclaimable difference (Shildrick, 2005b, p. 331).  
In addition, what we can see is that people with disabilities are severely 
disempowered in that their structured able-bodiedness threatens their psychic and 
bodily existence. Different from the findings of Huang and Brittain’s (2006), the 
result of this chapter showed that athletes with disabiliteis refuse to define themselves 
as disabled people. In an attempt to incorporate the images of able-bodied individuals, 
they embrace the identity of athletes to differentiate themselves from peple with 
disability in general.  However, their attempt still cannot emancipate them from the 
stigma of bodily deviance.  
I also found that the theorizing of racial subjectivity by Fanon, Bhabha and 
Eng can be applied to the refusal to identify themselves as people with disabilities. 
Nevertheless, the solidarity emerged within minority racial groups can be hardly
located within the community of athletes with disabilities. Garland-Thomson (2002) 
suggests that the refusal to claim disability as an identity is due to the lack of  
non-oppressive language for this social group as for many racial groups. Nevertheless, 
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from my ethnographic study, I can barely find any initiative from disabled athletes to 
take standpoint politics by investing in emancipatory or resistant language and 
practice against their marginalized social position. Instead, they are subject to the 
intersectionality of power and recur to various other power dimensions to better 
themselves by repeating or even reaffirming the values of the able-bodied syst m. 
Therefore, we can see the tension of applying standpoint theory to understand the 
practices of athletes with disabilities.  
  Taking queer theory as a framework, I found out that the subjectivities of 
athletes are not as transcendental and fluid as queer theorists suggested. Instead, I
want to argue that the “queerness” demonstrated by athletes with disabilities is an 
embodiment of the compulsory able-bodiedness (McRuer, 2002 & 2006), or a slavish 
mimicry of the able-bodied people. Using quotation marks here, I want to reveal that 
their queerness definitely has no connection to progressive or radical political projects. 
Even though I am not trying to take the position of blaming the victims, it is equally 
important to not conflate the conflicted identifications with the desired identities. In 
other words, we should not confuse subjection with progressive transgression. In the 
conclusion chapter of the “Bodies that Matter,” Butler reminds us to critically queer 
as an approach to achieve the possible within the impossible. Even though Butler 
reminds us that the “success” we can achieve is always conditional, it still impl es that 
queering in a critical way can still afford us certain mobility within the rigid structure 
of power. Using my ethnographic study of disabled athletes in this chapter, I want to 
raise critical consciousness on various limitations of being queer between certai
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binaries, in this case between able and the disable.  
  In addition, using the colonial and post-colonial theorizations of race in the 
analysis of the formation of the subjectivities for disabled athletes, I want to disclose 
that the identity of athletes with disabilities is neither singular nor natural, but a 
complex social construction through intermingled class, gendering and sexualizing 
strategies. Without exploring class, sexuality and gender conjuctures of athletes with 
disabilities, we cannot investigate the discursive formation of the identity as athletes. 
Just like Fuss (1993) points out,  
 Fanon asks us to remember the violence of identification, the material 
practices of exclusion, alienation, appropriation, and domination that 
transform other subjects into subjected others. Identification is not only how 
we accede to power, it is also how we learn submission (p. 14).  
Therefore, we have to understand the self-identification with athletes and 
disidentification with people with disabilities as a hybridized subjectivity that ends to 
resist but finally compromises with the dominant norm. In the meantime, the hybrid 
result of athletes’ subjectivities forces us to reconsider the political agency of the 
Paralympic Games. Rather than blurring the boundaries between able and disabled 
bodies and alleviating the marginalization of people with disabilities, the Paralympic 
Games reproduces the hierarchy of bodies and promotes the able-bodiedness under a 
disguise of cosmopolitan ideal. Even though the Paralympic Games provides limitd
number of disabled people an opportunity to gain media attention and better social life, 
the hypervisibility of athletes with disabilities facilitates us to expand our critique of 
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its mechanism that renders the majority of disabled people invisible and reinforces the 
social structure exclusively for the able-bodied. Thus, the Paralympic Games 
exemplifies how “both mainstream and minority, remain invested in the normative 
identifications, stereotypes, and fantasies that maintain the dominant social order” 
(Eng, 2001, p. 4). It also urges us to propose political alternatives that can truly 
liberate the disabled “Others” and challenge prejudiced able-bodiedness.  
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Chapter Eight: Janus-faced Cosmopolitanisms in/out Cyberspace: Boycott and 
Anti-Boycott of the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games 
On March 24 2008, the Olympic torch lighting ceremony was held in Greece, 
officially launching the XXIX Olympic Games that will be held in Beijing i  August 
2008. It not only announced the global torch relay, but also ignited a global protest 
against the Beijing Games. Following the path taken by torch relay, pro-boycott 
protestors converged in major cities in England, France, and the United States, and 
drew widespread media attention. Rather than an immediate and autonomous social 
movement, this global protest had been discussed, proposed and planned in 
cyberspace since China won the bidding for the 2008 Olympic Games.  
According to Western media, following a peaceful demonstration in Tibet on 
March 14, the Chinese government cracked down on the demonstration with military 
force7. In response to the unrest in Tibet on March 14, the boycott of the Beijing 
Games went beyond cyberspace, transforming a symbolic demonstration in 
cyberspace to a global social movement. The torch relay for the Beijing Games 
suddenly became one of the global media’s major headlines.  
Following the turmoil in Tibet, the premier of China, Wen Jiabao, in a speech 
                                                       
7 After March 14th 2008, Western media primarily reported that the Chinese regime violently cracked down peaceful 
demonstration in Tibet. Regarding what happened in Tibet, the Chinese media reported it as a riot orchestrated by the 
Dalai Lama and the Tibetan Government in Exile. Most overseas Chinese tended to believe the Chinese media for two 
reasons: first, the Tibetan Government in exile tries to use the Olympic Games to maximize media attention; second, 
Taiwan was in the final stage of  its 2008 presidential campaign. The Democratic Progress Party (the DPP, the 
pro-independence party) has ruled Taiwan from 2000 to 2008. During its ruling, the DPP tended to achieve the 
economic independence of  Taiwan by restraining Taiwan’s investment in mainland China as a means to prepare for 
Taiwan’s independence in 2008. Nevertheless, the Kuomintang (the KMT) – the opposition party in Taiwan –had 
significantly led the polls because of  its pro-China and neoliberal economic policies. Following the unrest in Tibet 
(eight days before Taiwan’s final election), the KMT candidate Ma Ying-jeon was harshly criticized for his pro-China 
agenda and labeled as “selling Taiwan” by the DPP. Eventually, Ma Ying-Jeon only won 58% of  the votes. Overseas 
Chinese generally believe that Taiwan’s election was influenced by the turmoil in Tibet. Particularly, the unrest 
happened only in eastern Tibet, where the Dalai Lama has strong religious influence. To most overseas Chinese, the 
riot in Tibet was an organized conspiracy, attempting to jeopardize the Beijing Games and to swing Taiwan’s election. 
The later is more disastrous because it may push the Chinese regime to use military force against Taiwan.  
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urged against politicizing the 2008 Olympic Games. Shortly thereafter, China’s 
President Hu Jintao asserted that the Tibet issue was an internal affair of Ch na. 
Nevertheless, the widespread international attention on the upheaval in Tibet has 
made the politicization of the Beijing Olympic Games inevitable. In Western 
countries, many media celebrities and politicians have made public statements 
suggesting a boycott of the Beijing Olympic Games. Meanwhile, many well-known 
athletes proclaimed that they would skip the opening ceremonies. Black & Bezanson 
(2004) ever predicted that, much like the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games, the Beijing 
Olympic Games may facilitate an improvement of human rights conditions and 
political liberation in China. Nonetheless, all the protests have demonstrated that, 
rather than resulting in social change in China, the Beijing Games might become 
another major controversy in Olympic history for triggering a movement of 
cosmopolitan dimensions. 
OLYMPIC MOVEMENT IN HISTORY: SPORTS BEYOND POLITICS? 
  The official policy of the International Olympic Committee (IOC) is to keep 
politics out of sports. However, throughout much of the history of the Olympics, 
various entities have adopted sporting events as a venue to express political opin ons. 
Rather than representing an apolitical celebration of universal humanitari  v lues 
through athletic competition, the Olympic Games have staged political and symbolic 
struggles “that have been manufactured in particular kinds of historical and social 
circumstances” (Cashmore, 2000, p. vii; also see Schaffer & Smith, 2000; Bass, 2002; 
Kruger, 2004). For instance, the Olympic Games during the Cold War became the tool 
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of two superpowers, the US and the Soviet Union, to showcase their might and 
promote their ideologies (Shaikin, 1988; Wagg & Andrews, 2007). The confrontation 
between the US and the Soviet Union led to the boycotts of 1980 Moscow and 1984 
Los Angeles Olympic Games. Although China was not the most prominent player of 
Olympic politics during the Cold War, it had never stop claiming “Sports and politics 
don’t mix” on the one hand, but the Olympic Games as a political battlefield on the 
other hand8(see Brownell, 2004 & 2007).  
  Since 1984, the Olympic Games have become commercialized media 
spectacles, allowing the global market to declare the final stage of human history 
(Jameson, 1998b; Andrews, 2006). Even though neoliberalism introduced the 
post-Cold War Olympic movement into its golden age by eliminating various political 
alternatives (Andrews, 2006), the recent global protest against the Games sees to 
bring us back from “the end of history” (Fukuyama, 1989) to a Cold War politics.  
 Nevertheless, the campaign to boycott the Beijing Games is unique in that it 
is the first time that a boycott of the Olympic Games has gone beyond the political 
conflicts between nation-states and manifests itself as a global complex involving 
many entities. Particularly, the involvement of individuals, which was enabled by 
Internet technology, makes many to believe that the Olympic political moveent is no 
longer driven by state institutions and political elites, but has become a bottom-up 
transnational movement. To a certain extent, cyberspace enables protesters to 
                                                       
8 Competing to be the legitimate representative of  China with Republic of  China (ROC, Taiwan) in the IOC, the 
People’s Republic of  China (PRC) only attended for the 1954 Helsinki Olympic Games. From 1952 to 1975, the ROC 
replaced the PRC as the representative of  China in the IOC. Until 1984, the PRC rejoined the Olympic Games in Los 
Angeles, pushing the ROC to attend the Games as a territory of  China (Brownell, 2004). 
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transcend geographical boundaries and become truly cosmopolitan in reach and 
impact.  
The interpretation of cyberspace as the new public place for progressive social 
movements is overarched by Habermas’ theory of an inclusive “public sphere.” What 
is often deemphasized is that these spaces are almost always influenced or 
deliberately constructed by agents in power with concrete institutional infr structures 
or discursive cultural roots. Moreover, because of its dependence on the affordability 
of technological infrastructure and services, access to this “public sphere” is unequal 
(Haywood, 1995). Thus, the expressive self in cyberspace is not a free agent but 
historically conditioned, class based, politically restricted individual.  
 The cyberspace of networks not only provides a platform for individuals’ 
expression, but also enables the emergence of cosmopolitan politics with new 
characteristics – an end of geography and temporal compression (Virilio, 2000). The 
disappearance of distance and compressed temporality allows a universal voyeurism 
as well as a transnational panoptic vision (Virilio, 2000). Circulating a tremendous 
volume of texts and images across the world, cyberspace does not offer equal care or 
attention to each its passenger it carries (Virilio, 2000). The staged “virtual reality” is 
not a random navigation through the networks of cyberspace, but a selective 
“amplification of the optical density of the appearances of the real world” (Virilio, 
2000, p. 14). Therefore, to critically study cosmopolitan politics in cyberspace, we 
need to consider these new features of cyberspace.  
The emergence of cyberspace pushes the boundaries of the traditional 
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methodology in that it no longer requires geographical proximity for a researcher to 
establish interactive relationships with targeted groups. Particularly, it a lows the 
researcher to easily establish interaction with invisible subalterns or even to construct 
productive dialogues with antagonistic groups (Gergen & Gergen, 2003; Wilson, 
2007). The researcher can stay in a corner of the world but witness the whole process
of a grand social movement. However, the tremendous amount of information also 
greatly challenges the traditional approaches of data collection locations, 
arrangements, content analysis, etc. (Hine, 2000). Therefore, the research r must 
maximize his/her exposure of fragmentary information in cyberspace and to take into 
account different political stances (Hine, 2000).  
For this chapter I have been tracing the emergence of a cyber social movement 
– boycotting the Beijing Olympic Games – since 2006. Witnessing the burgeoning 
amount of cyberspace information about the boycott, I had anticipated that a large
counter force – namely, Chinese nationalism – would emerge before the Games. 
However, I did not anticipate that Internet technology would enable the Chinese 
diasporic communities to develop cosmopolitan counter force to wrestle with the 
worldwide boycott, producing a struggle between two breeds of cosmopolitanisms. 
Cyberspace for overseas Chinese allowed me to witness a worldwide movement with 
ethnic characteristics. In this chapter, I suggest that the cosmopolitan politics, both 
boycott and anti-boycott of the Beijing Olympic Games, is a representation of a 
global/local power conjuncture rather than a manifestation of cosmopolitan 
humanitarianism. The narrative of cyberspace as an autonomous and transparent 
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public space disguise the powers that enable this politics, and naturalize the political 
and economic inequalities embedded in the cosmopolitan rhetoric. Through 
contextualizing the historically and politically conditioned agency of different parties 
who participated in the global social movements and overarched by cosmopolitanisms 
in cyberspace and social reality, I hope to raise critical consciousness about the 
political complexity of cosmopolitan politics – in this case, a contest between 
pro-boycott and anti-boycott of the Beijing Games – for the sake of future political 
intervention.  
THEORIZING CONTEMPORARY COSMOPOLITANISM 
To explore the dynamics of the cosmopolitan politics generated in and beyond 
public cyberspace regarding the boycott of the Beijing Games, I borrow a theore ical 
framework from Ulrich Beck, Paul Rabinow, Pheng Cheah, and Bruce Robbins on 
cosmopolitanism to study the boycott. In his theorizing of globalization, Ulrich Beck 
(2000) indicates that we are experiencing a “transition from a nation-state world order 
to a cosmopolitan world order” (p. 83). Unlike many theorists who define the 
contemporary moment as postmodern, Beck (2000) asserts that we are still in a 
continuum of modernity that he names as the second stage of modernity. In the first
stage of modernity, international law tends to maintain the order of sovereign states;
in the second stage, in a cosmopolitan society, the international law of human rights 
“goes over [the] heads of nations and states and addresses individuals directly” (Beck, 
2000, p. 84). This cosmopolitan order of human rights is dialectically manifested 
through two components – Western military humanitarianism and civic cosmopolitan 
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humanitarianism. For military humanitarianism, some Western nations, under the 
leadership of the United States, have initiated military actions n Kosovo, Afghanistan, 
and Iraq through circumventing the United Nations (UN) Charter and directly 
violating human rights in the name of defending human rights. Beck (2000) reminds 
us that this type of “human rights precedes international law” is a manifesttion of a 
power conjuncture as well as a system of cosmopolitan morality (p. 85). For civic 
cosmopolitan humanitarianism, we see the emergence of the cosmopolitan “good 
intentions” of world citizens, often described/reported in by Western mass edia and 
supported by an institutionalized neoliberal individualism (Beck & Beck-Gernsheim, 
2002). It is often manipulated by Western sovereign powers to disguise and naturalize 
the political and economic interests embedded in their militant projects. By giving 
Western individuals subjective rights and justifying individuals’ choice as the 
legitimate choice of the nation-states, “the cosmopolitan project both entails the 
national project and extends it” (Beck, 2000, p. 92).  
From an economic perspective, it is unlikely for the cosmopolitan solidarity 
manifested in Western developed nations to end global economic inequality (Cheah, 
2006a). Actually, the Western cosmopolitan vision is enabled by the economic 
inequality it tends to erase, because cosmopolitanism is “an ideological reflection of 
global capitalism” (Cheah & Robbins, 1998, p. 8). Therefore, “the transnational 
activities we are witnessing today are not new cosmopolitanisms but are instead 
aporetic cases of nationalism as given culture in a cosmopolitical force field” (Cheah, 
1997, p. 160).  
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The “civil-military-humanitarian” (Beck, 2000) and 
civil-capitalist-humanitarian (Cheah & Robbin, 1998; Cheah, 2006a& 2006b) 
complexes are constructed through flexible political tactics and achieved through 
discursive transformation of the public’s subjective awareness. However, “there is no 
cosmopolitanism without localism” (Beck, 2002). The activities of “progressiv ” 
social movements have to connect to the nation-state and capitalist interests, either 
through a direct or discursive manner (Cheah, 2006a). As a response to Paul 
Rabinow’s (1996) call for critical cosmopolitanism, I will contextualize th  global 
boycott against the Beijing Olympics and its counter force by articulating its political 
and historical conditions. Particularly, I explore how cyber-technology enabls the 
expression of two versions of cosmopolitanisms and disguises their embedded 
political forces. 
MAKING THE “CHINA THREAT” IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA 
  Rather than an issue emerging after the Cold War, identifying China as the
enemy of cosmopolitan politics cannot be understood without tracing the ideological 
rivalry between communist and capitalist superpowers in the second half of the 20th 
century. Since the Sino-Soviet split in 1959, China has not stopped balancing its 
position between the two superpowers through playing triangular politics with the 
United States and the Soviet Union (Waltz, 1979). Although China established a 
diplomatic relationship with the United States through “Ping-Pang diplomacy” in the 
1970s, the Tiananmen turmoil in 1989 and the collapse of the Soviet Union soon 
resulted in China replacing the Soviet Union and surviving the Cold War fantasies 
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(Silk, Bracey & Falcous, 2007). In the sphere of competitive sports, following the 
Tiananmen incident, the presence of Team China at international sporting arenas has 
always been associated with the country’s totalitarian regime and a tracking record of 
human rights violations in Western media.  
   Nevertheless, China’s pariah political status did not prevent it from ascending 
to a new economic hegemony during the 1990s. In 1992, Deng Xiaoping 
demonstrated to the West that China could and will maintain its social stability, 
dedicate to economic development, and welcome investment from worldwide. 
Through a series of economic incentive policies, China’s foreign direct investments 
dramatically increased by 150% from 1992 to 1993, and maintained that momentum 
through the 1990s (Ash & Kueh, 1996). The state-granted social stability also attracts 
foreign technology from the developed nations. Once a triangulation of capital, 
technology and China’s low-cost labor is formed, it generates a powerful economic 
momentum, allowing China to resume the economical miracle of East Asia after the 
1997 Southeast Asian financial crisis and the events of September 11 (Arrighi, 2007). 
Nevertheless, the double-digit figure of economic growth of China in the 1990s could 
not have been achieved without the US embrace of the Project for a New American 
Century (Arrighi, 2007). To undermine the socialist regime of the Soviet Union, the 
Reagan-Bush government adopted neoliberalism to strengthen US economic power. It 
minimized the size of its government by pulling away the power of the state over 
economy and giving economic autonomy to transnational corporations (Giddens 1998; 
Giddens 1999; Harvey, 2001; Arrighi, 2007). In the meantime, by promoting the 
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maximization of profits, neoliberalism led to the creation of new economic regions, 
which sometimes extended beyond its original state borders. To a certain extent, the 
Reagan-Bush neoliberal policy greatly enabled China’s economic growth.  
  Meanwhile, a booming domestic economy, rapid urbanization, expanding 
export processing and domestic consumption have increased China’s demand for 
energy and other critical natural resources (Zweig & Bi, 2005). Rather than adopting 
hegemonic military strategy, China meets its energy demand primarily through 
bilateral trade and diplomatic relations. China’s crude oil imports are from Russia, 
Canada, Australia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Oman, Angola, Sudan, Congo, Brazil, etc. 
(Zweig & Bi, 2005). Among major oil importers to China, African nations establish 
partnerships with China for both economic and geopolitical interests – not only 
because China is willing to build infrastructure in African nations, but also becaus  
many African nations are politically marginalized or even suppressed by the West 
(Zweig & Bi, 2005).  
Even though Western scholars and political observers have long identified 
China as a potential threat to the United States (Kristof, 1993; Huntington, 1996; 
Krauthammer, 1995; Bernstein & Munro, 1997), it was not until very recently that the 
notion of the “China threat” was re-affirmed by Washington and redistributed to the
American public through the media. In 2005, the China National Offshore Oil 
Company (CNOOC) announced its intention to buy the US oil company Unocal. The 
news elicited a panic in the US Congress, blocking the CNOOC from making the bid 
(Arrighi, 2007). In 2008, China along with the Sovereign Wealth Funds of other Asian 
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and the Middle East nations further salvages investment banking behemoths from the 
sub-prime loan crisis. All these phenomena led Washington to adopt a new strategy to 
deal with the growing “China threat,” which was fed with its own neoliberal policies. 
However, China’s economic, political and military influences force Washington to 
maintain diplomatic relations with China, but to use a variety of tactics to contain 
China’s development and undermine its political influence.  
THE TIBET ISSUE 
One of the most frequently used strategies is to attack China’s human rights 
record; and one of most frequently addressed human rights issues is the Tibet issue. 
Rather than condemning the Chinese regime forthrightly, the method of pressing 
China is usually done more discursively and strategically. For instance, in th  meeting 
with the Dalai Lama, in October 2007, George W. Bush praised the Dalai Lama as a 
“universal symbol of peace and tolerance, a shepherd of the faithful and a keeper of 
the flame for his people” (Retrieved from: http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/21320198/). 
Rather than addressing the embedded power complex directly, Washington 
purposefully erased its political goal and paraphrased a political issue on a moral 
dimension. According to most Western media, the Dalai Lama is a peaceful spiritual 
leader of the Tibetan people against the oppression of the Chinese regime. A 
Hollywood movie Seven Years in Tibet, directed by Jean-Jacques Annaud and staring 
Brad Pitt, became the most tangible source for the Western audience to learn about 
Tibet. As a result, many Western Internet users joined the cyber campaign for 
boycotting the Beijing Games in the name of a “free Tibet.” 
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The US media tends to de-emphasize certain facts: Tibet is recognized as 
Chinese territory not only by the UN, but also by the majority of UN member stat s 
that have official diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China. Recently, 
de-classified documents from the US State Department have revealed that the Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA) provided financial support and military assistance to the 
Dalai Lama from the 1950s until the early 1970s (Kramer, 2006). In addition, The US 
regime and Western media strategically depoliticized the Dalai Lama and the Tibet 
Government in exile by promoting a fictive public memory of Tibet. Through a 
politics of selective cosmopolitan remembrance, Western media romanticized Tibet 
and Tibetan Buddhism prior to the 1959 exile; the undeniable reality is that the 
pre-1959 Tibet and the Tibet in Exile have never been a Shangri-La without tension 
and violence (Lopez, 1998). Instead, this idealized Tibet, invoked by the Dalai Lama 
and further invented by the Western media, erases the historical and current violent 
conflicts between different sects of Tibetan Buddhism9. When “Tibet and the Tibetan 
people are portrayed as innocent sacrificial offerings immolated in the horror of the 
Chinese invasion and occupation” (Lopez, 1998, p. 203), what is denied is Tibet as 
having a materialist history and a contested political reality. When Tibetan culture and 
the Dalai Lama are universalized and depicted as the cosmopolitan embodiment of 
peace, spirituality, freedom, and passion, the political activism of “free Tibet” 
becomes a mirage. Not only are these generic and universal concepts socially 
                                                       
9 In Prisoners of  Shangri-La: Tibetan Buddhism and the West, Donald S. Lopez, Jr. (1998) provides a critical account of  
Tibetan Buddhism. Rather than a religious singularity, Tibetan Buddhism is a juxtaposition of  various sects of  
Buddhism. Lopez Jr. quotes a Tibetan saying to narrate the situation – each valley a different language, each lama a 
different dharma system. Since its exile, the Tibetan Government in exile never stopped fighting against other sects of  
Tibetan Buddhism for being the singular representative of  Tibet.  
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constructed, but also it is by no means possible that these concepts can be politically 
materialized (Agamben, 2000; Brown, 1995).  
In the meantime, through telling the one-sided and fragmentary history of 
Tibet, the media shows to its audience that China is a singular and inscrutable 
problem. Rather than study Tibet’s history and its current realities, rumors, such as 
“the Chinese regime murdered millions of Tibetans” and “the Chinese conducts 
cultural genocide on Tibetans,” are circulating in cyberspace. Because of the absence 
of institutional restrictions on cyberspace, such rumors have fully overridden the 
reality that Tibetans are one of the ethnical minority groups exempt from China’s 
“One Child Policy,” the growth of Tibetan population is much greater than the 
national average (Yan, 2000). And, Tibetans can practice their religion freely, if they 
do not engage in separatism.  
By emphasizing the violation of human rights occurring in China, Western 
media’s role in the underpinnings of this cosmopolitan morality suggests that China is 
the only spectacle deserving of everybody’s political attention and righteous action. 
However, even the most economically developed nations cannot guarantee their 
citizens, particularly for the minority groups, the full human rights they promote. 
Western media also distracts the public attention of Western society away from the 
exclusion and debasement of their ethnic minorities and facilitates public 
unconsciousness regarding the struggles for independence else where For instance, 
Western media frequently gives priority coverage to China’s issues and highlig ts the 
boycott and protests of the Beijing Games during the Olympic torch relay. Phrased by 
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Butler (2004) as a cheerleader for the Bush administration, the American media barely 
mention the protests around the world against the independence of Kosovo and 
against George W. Bush inviting Georgia and Ukraine to join NATO. When unrest in 
Tibet met another global media spectacle – the torch relay for the Beijing Games – an 
“information bomb” with maximized optical density (Virilio, 2000) was ignited, 
sending kinetic energy through cyberspace.  
THE DARFUR ISSUE 
The second strategy used by the West to contain China is to publicize “Darfur 
Genocide.” According to Beck’s (2000 & 2002) theorizing on the transition from an 
inter-state world order to a cosmopolitan world order, China has to be constructed as 
the Other at an international level because of its growing economic might and 
political assertiveness. The depiction of China as a violator of universal human rights 
pushes the international macro diplomatic struggle between the West and China to an 
individualist humanitarian struggle, because the imaginary China violates the 
moral-value system of every individual in the West. When the masses in the West 
form a perpetually endangered subjectivity under the discourse created by the Western 
nation-states and media, everybody is justified to criticize China in the name of 
defending sacred rights. And, the “genocide” in Darfur becomes the second most 
legitimate reason to boycott the Beijing Games and protest during the torch relay.  
Besides securing their fictively endangered subjectivities in “risk society” 
(Beck, 1992), in many cases, the Western masses often use China and universal 
human rights discourses to secure their moral superiority. Numerous Internet users 
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suggest boycotting the Beijing Games because of PetroChina’s economic investment 
in Darfur, Sudan. Showing the world a relationship between the two-billion-dollar 
investment by PetroChina and the religious and ethnical conflicts in Darfur, most 
Western Internet users do not know about the investment made by the American 
construction corporations in Iraq10. Mentioning China’s interests in Sudan’s crude oil, 
Western Internet users are definitely unable to picture how American politicians are 
using the Darfur issue for their self-interest. For instance, during the 2008 US 
presidential campaign, to showcase her keen diplomatic consciousness, Hillary 
Clinton proudly acknowledged herself as the first senator to recognize what happened 
in Darfur as “genocide” and to draw attention to China. On the one hand, the West 
wants China to keep playing the role of “world factory” to keep its inflation rate low 
as it did for the past two decades; on the other hand, China’s seeking of energy 
overseas is constantly labelled as unethical. Especially, what has not been told to the 
American public is that “China’s fear about a backlash and the potential damage to its 
strategic and economic relationships with the United States and Europe have 
prompted Beijing to put great effort into demonstrating that it is a responsible power” 
in the Darfur issue (Kleine-Ahlbrandt & Small, 2008, p.46). Regarding stopping the 
ethnical and religious conflicts in Sudan, China has played an unprecedented active 
role by forcing the Sudanese government to agree not to abuse military forces. 
Although the US deputy secretary of state, John Negroponte comments that China has 
“played a pivotal role in brokering the agreement” (Kleine-Ahlbrandt & Small, 2008, 
                                                       
10 The United States Agency for International Development offers construction contracts to five major American 
companies, including Bechtel Group, Inc., Fluor Corporation, Halliburton Company, Louis Berger Group Inc., and 
Parsons Corporation.  
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p. 47), it could not stop the US media and American politicians from using the Darfur 
issue to stir up anti-China sentiment among the American masses. It makes American 
Internet users take their moral superiority for granted and play the role of 
cosmopolitan fighters for justice.  
By taking the social inequality in the Western context as natural, these Int rnet 
users in the West are indeed defending their hegemonic regimes. With an O er 
deliberately chosen by the Western nation-states and constructed by the media, people 
in the West can be distracted from the (racial, gender and class) oppression and 
exclusion occurring within their own social context but which keeps generating what 
Charles Dickens (1998) called “telescopic philanthropic” attention to another 
continent that they have only fragmentary knowledge. Simultaneously, characterizing 
China as a singular spectacle and the source of a moral crisis (Chow, 1991), American 
politicians and the media unite “Right and Left in such a manner as to facilitate the 
ongoing myth of a single, undivided American culture” (Chow, 1998b, p. 99).  
Although the boycott of the Beijing Games began soon after Beijing won the 
bid in 2001, it was highly restricted in cyberspace. In January 2008, the largest 
Internet search engine, Google.com, provided 63,500 matches for “boycott Beijing 
Olympics.” All the entries can be generally divided into three categories: f om 
Western media and governments; from various political organizations, such as 
pro-Tibet independence organizations; and from individuals in their personal blogs. In 
addition, boycotting the Beijing Games is one of the popular topics in various on-line 
forums and chat rooms. In youtube.com, the largest video sharing website in the 
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world, numerous video clips relevant to “boycotting Beijing,” “free Tibet,” and “save 
Darfur” can be easily located. In many cyber discussions, Western Inteet users 
identify the pathology of the Chinese masses by saying “most Chinese peoplehave 
little willingness to demonstrate against their government in order to pressure it to 
change.” Portrayed as being indifferent to their human rights condition, Chinese 
people are excluded from the discussion of their own rights and often labeled as 
“commies” and “frantic Chinese nationalists.” The labeling further reveals the fact 
that cosmopolitanism, at least in this case, is rather a representation of sovereignty, 
which maintains its integrity through constant inclusion and exclusion (Agamben, 
1998). A dialectical dynamic between “de-nationalization and re-nationalization” 
(Beck, 2000, p. 98) is going on through which a “harmonious” cosmopolitan society 
and its enemy – China – come into being.  
After the unrest in Lhasa and eastern Tibet on March 14 2008, the boycott was 
no longer confined in cyberspace but widely manifested as large protests in cities tha  
hosted the Olympic torch relay. Not only Tibetans in exile, but also Western masses 
who are enthusiastic to “free Tibet” and “save Darfur” participated in the protests. 
During a boycott of the Beijing Games during the torch relay, individuals from
different countries, including the US, England, France, and many other nations, for 
cosmopolitan solidarities. Joining this grand movement from different parts of the 
world through the Internet, the political activism that protesters demonstrated 




PROTECTING THE OLYMPIC TORCH FOR CHINA 
 When the torch relay moved across Western nations and encountered “free 
Tibet” and “save Darfur” protestors, the Western media was given another opportunity 
to make a media spectacle and demonize China. When the Olympic torch-lightening 
ceremony was interrupted by activists who were waving Five Ring handcuff flags 
behind Beijing mayor Qi Liu, a fierce discussion regarding the Beijing Games and the 
torch relay was ignited in Chinese disaporic cybercommunities. The factions w thin 
these communities were evident in that some condemned the West and the Dalai 
Lama’s conspiracy, and others ridiculed the Chinese regime for caring only about 
economic development but not improving China’s human rights conditions and 
polishing the global image of China.  
When the Olympic torch arrived at London on April 6, it had to be protected 
by a large number of policemen. Even though some Chinese students and ethnic 
Chinese people in London had organized a celebration of the Beijing Games, they 
were greatly outnumbered by pro-boycott protestors and barely covered by any
mainstream Western media. During the torch relay in London, physical confrontation 
occurred between the pro-China/pro-Olympic and pro-boycott demonstrators. Ang y 
Chinese students and ethnic Chinese in London soon started a cyber campaign, calling 
for protecting the Olympic torch as it traveled on the next legs of its relay journey, 
particularly in Paris and San Francisco. Chinese students and local ethnic Chinese in 
France soon responded to the call and organized a pro-China/Pro-Olympic Games 
demonstration. At the same time, the first large demonstration called for “condemning 
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Western media’s distortion of China” and “celebrating the Olympic Games,” was 
organized in Toronto, Ontario by Chinese students and local ethnic Chinese living in 
Canada through the Internet on April 6th 2008 (technically the second day after the 
torch relay in London).  
  At this time, the Chinese community in the US was still holding a fierce 
cyber debate. The fraction of the Chinese community in the US has historic roots. The 
majority of student protestors in 1989 Tiananmen Square immigrated to the US as 
graduate students or refugees, and kept challenging the Chinese regime. Compared to 
Chinese students in the United Kingdom, Canada, and France who pay their tuition to 
get education in the West, most Chinese students in the US enjoy their universities’ 
financial support, and are often engaged in cutting-edge research in engineeri and 
the sciences. Since most of them obtained or will obtain employment in research 
institutes, universities and transnational corporations, they intend to justify their 
upper-middle class status through meritocracy and consider themselves as superior to 
Chinese students in other Western nations. On the one hand, they eager to align their 
stance with ethnic Chinese, who use flexible citizenship to negotiate with various 
states and to maximize their economic gain (Ong, 1998); on the other hand, they are 
willing to approve themselves as the social elites of China by embracing a role of 
pushing China’s political and economic reformation. Just as Dirlik (2004) puts it, 
“diasporic elites in turn have proven to be quite adept at manipulating diasporas as 
well as nation-states in the pursuit of status and power in global class formations” (p. 
495). As a matter of fact, the establisher of the biggest Internet forum for Chinese in 
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the US – Unknown Space (www.mitbbs.com)– was a former student protestor in 
Tiananmen. He and a group of Chinese students at Beijing University and the Chinese 
Academy of Science established the first Chinese Internet forum to facilitate 
democratization in China. Because of Internet censorship in China, the establisher 
brought the server to the US when he was a Ph.D. student at the Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology.  
Nevertheless, Chinese students who came to the US in the late 1990s and the 
early 2000s witnessed China’s economic miracle and its gradual political changes, s 
well as the disintegration of the Soviet Union. They no longer celebrate the 
anti-government ideology held by their earlier generation. The collapse of th  Soviet 
Union and 1997 East Asia financial crisis made them realized that “the 
denationalization of the state merely serves the predatory rights of global capit l” 
(Cheah, 2006b, p. 492), and jeopardizes economic development in China. Not only do 
they hold a disapproving attitude about China for embracing the shock therapy to 
achieve democracy, they also challenge the universal validity of the Westrn 
democracy, and are conscious about the conflicted interests between China and the 
West. Therefore, a battle between “traitors of China” and “frantic natio lists” is long 
lasting in Unknown Space.  
  In the end of March 2008, French president Nicolas Sarkozy gave a speech 
urging the Chinese government to hold dialogue with the Dalai Lama. Sarkozy hinted 
that he might refuse to attend the opening ceremony of the Beijing Games if th  
Chinese government failed to initiate such a dialogue. In April 7, when Paris’ 
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Olympic torch relay was severely disrupted by the pro-boycott protestors, the Chinese 
organizers of the relay extinguished the torch twice in order to maintain the security. 
Tibetan flags and five ring handcuff flags hung outside of the city hall of Paris. Many 
French facilitators of the torch relay wore “free Tibet” T-shirts. One French torch 
bearer even carried a Tibetan badger. Pro-boycott protestors chanted “Shame on 
China” “Stop Killing” to the torch bearers and pro-China/pro-Olympic Games 
demonstrators. When Western media was still obsessed with the continuum of “free
Tibet” protest against the Beijing Games, Chinese people in Paris, since they had been 
told by their peers in London to do so, sent pictures and video clips of the torch 
disruption in Paris to diasporic Chinese communities across the world on the same 
day of the relay.  
  One of the video clips and many pictures address an attractive Chinese 
female Paralympian (Jin Jing) wrestling with pro-boycott protestors to protect the 
Olympic torch. When the pictures and video clips started to circulate on the Chinese 
cybercommunities in the US, they soon attracted a huge number of overseas Chinese
who usually are not attentive to political issues and the Beijing Games. As one 
Internet user spoke of the sudden politicization of his/her subjectivity in cyberspace: 
 I was far from being a fan of the Chinese government. I didn’t support the 
Olympic Games, which I think is a big party held by the Chinese government 
for foreigners rather than for the Chinese people. But if the West wants to use 
Tibet issue to resume their imperialism and undermine China, I feel I have the 
responsible to do something. We are no longer the “sick man of East Asia!” 
259 
 
The rhetoric of “sick man of east Asia” reflects not only the fragile physiques of 
Chinese people in the past sporting competitions but also the incompetence of 
Chinese regimes in late imperial and the republic eras (Brownell, 2008). When the 
endeavor of China to embrace cosmopolitanism is prohibited by the West, a collective 
involuntary memory of China’s semi-colonial past – a nation-centered historiography 
– immediately emerged to justify political actions that conflate their cosmopolitan 
interests with that of the current Chinese nation-state.  
On April 8th, 2008, in Unknown Space, topics such as “When the whole world 
betrays China, what should we do?” “Should we allow what happened in Paris in San 
Francisco again?” soon override the voices of pro-Tibet independence and 
anti-government groups. Autonomously, overseas Chinese in San Francisco used 
Unknown Space to organize a demonstration to welcome and protect the Olympic 
torch, and celebrate the Beijing Games. When they found out from the Internet that 
the pro-boycott activists had rented two aircraft to carry banners, some senior users of 
Unknown Space immediately launched a Paypal (e-commerce business allowing 
payments and money transfers to be made through the Internet) donation, in order to 
pay for airplanes to carry pro-Olympics/pro-China banners. Within a couple of hours, 
more than 20,000 US dollars were raised, and the organizers soon made an 
announcement to hold the donation account. After paying two aircraft for banners 
carrying and buying Chinese national flags, on-line discussants reached another 
agreement to vote for a number of pro-China/pro-Olympics Internet users who do not 
live in San Francisco and to use the rest of the donation for a half of their airfare to 
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travel to that city. Based on their seniority in U known Space and the record of their 
previous articulation, more than twenty users of Unknown Space were awarded this 
prize. From places as far as Atlanta, Washington D. C. and Toronto, many other users 
of Unknown Space claimed that they would travel to San Francisco and finance their 
own trips.  
The campaign was not geographically limited to San Francisco. Chinese 
students and ethnic Chinese used the Internet listserv sponsored by Chinese Students 
and Scholars Associations at various universities and clubs to organize their travels to 
San Francisco overnight from places as far away as Los Angeles and Seattle to protect 
the Olympic torch. Chinese Students and Scholars Associations in University of 
Southern California, California Institute of Technology, University of California at 
Berkeley, Los Angeles, Irvine, Davis, and others all sent Chinese students to San 
Francisco by bus. Many Chinese not affiliated to these educational institutions 
organized carpools on the local discussion boards in Unknown Space.  
On the same day, another major activity in U known Space was to choose “a 
theme” for the demonstration. Even though most forum users were sparked by biased 
Western media reports on China, an agreement was soon reached that the goal of this 
demonstration is to celebrate the Beijing Games and attract attention from the media. 
Therefore, besides carrying the Chinese national flags, they also decided to bring 
American flags as well as the banners of the Olympic Games to avoid confrontation 
with local Americans. Interestingly, many forum users who claim themselve  as 
Tiananmen protestors in 1989 reminded Chinese protestors to be rational and to 
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engage struggles strategically. Therefore, many of them made posters on China’s 
enthusiasm to the Olympic Games and printed color pictures of the recent attack on 
the Chinese Paralympian torch bearer in Paris by pro-boycott protestors. 
When a large number of pro-China/pro-Olympic protestors showed up at the 
AT&T Park in downtown San Francisco on April 9th 2008, not only pro-boycott 
protestors but also reporters for Western media were shocked. Numerous Chinese 
demonstrators waved flags and banners with the logos such as “Beijing Olympic 
Games,” “One World; One Dream; One China,” “No politics in Olympics,” 
“Welcome to Beijing,” etc. As a Chinese Internet user from San Francisco later put it: 
“it was the largest Chinese party I ever attended since I came to the US, bigger than 
any Spring Festival parties held by the local Chinese communities! The Olympic 
Games bring us together!” Another Internet user commented on the power of 
Unknown Space: “I drove from Los Angeles to see the torch. I don’t know anybody in 
San Francisco. But when someone asked me whether I was on Unknown Space, I 
suddenly felt that I was with my siblings. Unknown Space rocks!”  
The designated route of the torch relay had been changed by the City Council 
to maintain security; and no physical confrontation occurred between the pro-boycott 
and pro-Olympic/pro-China protestors. The presence of pro-Olympic/pro-China 
protestors in San Francisco was deliberately downplayed by most Western media. One 
of the CNN’s reporters even pointed to a group of pro-Olympic/pro-China protestors 
who were holding Chinese national flags as protesting against the Beijing Games. It 
further reveals the discursive power of censorship exerted by the American media. 
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Rather than helping the American people to understand complex interdependency of 
the global political community, the media becomes an extension of the state 
sovereignty. 
  Due to the media sanitization, before the torch lighting ceremony, few 
Chinese in mainland China realized that pro-boycott groups had demonstrated in front 
of most Chinese embassies in Western nations and the UN headquarters in New York. 
Since late March, many overseas Chinese in the US and Europe had started to post 
pictures in the most popular cyber forum in mainland China– Ti nya Club. During the 
torch relay in San Francisco, several Chinese at Tianya Club were conducting live 
reports on the torch relay to Internet users in mainland China. From Tianya Club, the 
information was further distributed to Chinese diasporic communities across the 
world. After the San Francisco relay, many of the pro-China/pro-Olympic protestors 
published and circulated their experiences on the Internet. Furthermore, they called 
for a campaign of “global torch protection” to diasporic Chinese communities in cities
that would host the torch relays. In Buenos Aires, Bangkok, Kuala Lumpur, Canberra, 
Nagano, and Seoul, Chinese students and ethnic Chinese were soon mobilized 
through local chat rooms and Internet discussion boards, to protect the torch from 
being interrupted by the pro-boycott protestors. As a result, pro-China/pro-Olympic 
protestors have largely swamped the pro-boycott protestors at the torch relay legs that 
followed.  
After April 9, the emphasis of Chinese students and ethnic Chinese in North 
America has shifted from torch protection to large scale demonstration against 
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Western media distortion and the celebration of the Beijing Games. Large gatherings 
have been organized in Seattle, Los Angeles, Chicago, Atlanta, Houston, Ottawa, 
Vancouver, Boston, Salt Lake City, New York City and elsewhere. On the campuses 
of many American universities, including University of Michigan, University of 
Southern California, Duke University, University of Texas at Austin, Harvard 
University, Yale University, University of Pennsylvania, Massachusetts Ins itute of 
Technology, State University of New Jersey, University of Illinois, John Hopkins 
University and many others, Chinese students organized activities to celebrate the 
Beijing Games or hosted workshops on the history of Tibet. These campaign 
organizers use Internet listserv or mailing lists to share their experinc s of organizing 
workshops and educational materials, including pictures, posters, academic books and 
PowerPoint presentations. Chinese students and local ethnic Chinese communities 
also used local Internet forums to organize assemblies in London, Paris, Berlin, 
Manchester, Frankfort, Sydney and Auckland to condemn Western media for 
demonizing China as well as to celebrate the Beijing Games. When Chinese students 
and ethnic Chinese started to realize that the Western mainstream media barly gave 
any coverage to their protests, they adopted tactics from the pro-boycott campaign, 
using the Internet to make themselves visible. Responding to a call for “waging a 
perpetual guerrilla war in youtube.com,” many uploaded self-made video clips to 
youtube.com to express their anger towards the bias of Western media against China. 
Made by a Chinese Canadian, a video clip - “Tibet WAS, IS, and ALWAYS WILL BE 
a part of China” – was uploaded to youtube.com in late March. By the beginning of 
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May, this video clip has received more than 210, 000 comments, placing it the third 
place as the all time “most discussed” video.  
  When the Chinese disaporic communities use the Internet to organize various 
pro-Olympic/pro-China campaigns, Internet users in mainland China have realized 
that the rosy image of “One world; One dream” painted by Chinese mainstream media 
was fabricated. Even though hosting the Olympic Games has attracted domestic 
criticism on issues such as compulsory relocation, restriction of driving private cars to 
reduce pollution, corruption and high investment in sporting facilities, the enthusiasm 
of Chinese youth to the Beijing Olympic Games has been phenomenal. For instance, 
across the nation, more than 960,000 citizens participated in nationwide competition, 
fighting for 11,534 seats of the Olympic torch bearers (Retrieved from: 
www.i-olympic.com/Torchbearer_selection_process_basically_complete-c_28-pc_2-p
.html). The Beijing Organizing Committee for the Olympic Games (BOGOG) 
announced that it needs 150, 000 volunteers for the Games. During the first day of 
public volunteer recruitment, the BOGOG received more than 150, 000 on-line 
applications from Beijing citizens. Overall, more than 150, 000 college students in 
Beijing applied to be volunteers for the Olympic or Paralympic Games. To most 
Chinese youth, hosting the Olympic Games to Beijing is not only invitation for China 
to join in the global cultural mainstream, but also to provide them an approach to 
possess cosmopolitan subjectivity.  
When overseas Chinese sent pictures and video clips regarding how 
pro-boycott protestors interrupted the Olympic torch relay in London, Paris and San 
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Francisco, a cyber-nationalism was soon stirred in mainland China. Stories, pictures 
and video clips of how overseas Chinese protected the Olympic torch and fought 
against media distortion were widely circulated in various domestic websites, online 
discussion groups, and on-line chat rooms. Tianya Club and Sohu Network (one of the 
most popular commercial websites in China), soon started a cyber campaign, callng 
Chinese people to donate Chinese national flags, Beijing Olympic flags and other 
pro-Olympic banners for pro-China/pro-Olympics protestors overseas. Because a 
pro-boycott protestor physically attacked Paralympican torch bearer Jin Jing during 
the Paris relay, and the Paris city Council awarded the title of honorary citizen to the 
Dalai Lama, Chinese Internet users called for a nationwide boycott of French products, 
particularly targeting the French retail giant – Carrefour. A rumor that Carrefour 
Corporation sponsored pro-boycott protestors further heated this Carrefour boycott. 
Millions of Chinese Internet users changed their MSN and QQ (a Chinese equivalence 
of MSN messenger) names to “support the Olympic Games; boycott Carrefour” and 
sent cell phone text messages to each other. During April 2008, in several cities in 
China, including Wuhan, Hefei, Changsha, Qingdao and Zhuzhou, thousands of 
protestors gathered in the front of Carrefour supermarkets to boycott the company and 
celebrate the Beijing Games. Some young protestors even held a portrait of M o
Zedong and hoped to send a message to the current Chinese regime that they want a 
more politically assertive government like the one that existed under Mao. By the end 
of April 2008, “Carrefour” has been censored by the Chinese government from all 
Chinese Internet search engines to bring the nationalistic mania under control.  
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A PROGRESSIVE ETHNICAL COSMOPOLITANISM? 
  This set of events provides an occasion for an exploration of the new politics 
of Olympic movement and the formation and articulation of cosmopolitanism with 
Chineseness in cyberspace. Even though it is not the first time the diasporic 
community used cyberspace to extend their political agenda and organize assembly 
(see Ong, 2003; Landzelius, 2006), it is definitely the first time that a large Chinese 
diasporic Internet-based movement is directly triggered by an Olympic sporting event. 
Through the Internet, the migrant Chinese communities generated an unprecedented 
influence on the domestic politics of mainland China. The geographical displacement 
of diasporic communities, which was often associated with political inability, can no 
longer restrict diasporic Chinese communities from embracing political activism on 
both national and global dimensions. Through circulating information in cyberspace, 
their political engagement transcends the boundaries delineated by the nation-states; 
their political actions enabled by Internet technology also “engendered a yearning for 
a new kind of global ethnic identification” (Ong, 2003, p. 88). One Chinese protestor 
in US remarks in Unknown Space: “we wanted to host the Olympic Games for the 
world. If they don’t want us to host a successful event for the world, let’s unite 
together and make the Games a party for Chinese in the world!” This type of assertion 
clearly reveals a desire of overseas Chinese to embrace cosmopolitanism through the 
Beijing Games (Brownell, 2008) and a determinant “domestication of 
cosmopolitanism by way of renegotiating China’s place in the world” (Rofel, 2007, 
p.111). Although cosmopolitanism is often presented as an entirely new conjuncture 
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or a universality without any local cultural attachment, the recently manifested 
cosmopolitanism with Chineseness works as a spatial mediator between China and the 
West as well as a temporal arbiter between China’s semi-colonial past and its
capitalist present. It also reveals the multiplicity of cosmopolitanisms.  
  Like the cosmopolitan politics calling for boycott of Beijing Games, the 
widely manifested cosmopolitanism with Chineseness is far from being politically 
progressive. Regarding the “global torch protection,” many overseas Chinese 
commented:  
Although Western media tries to brainwash us, what can’t be changed is that 
we are always proud of being Chinese, and we are always critical to the West. 
The West tries to use the Olympic torch to torch China, but ends up unite 
Chinese people across the world. Thirty years of Open Door policies, Western 
media only makes Chinese people more Chinese than ever before!  
From these comments, we can clearly discern that the cosmopolitan Chineseness i  
highly volatile, and the globally manifested ethnic identity through the recent cyber
movement should not make us to assume oversea Chinese a unified and progressive 
diasporaic community (Ong, 2003). Playing the role of “righteous” third party 
between the East and the West, oversea Chinese portrayed their culturally rooted 
cosmopolitanism as a political ideal and normalize new forms of inequality embedded 
in this cosmopolitanism with Chineseness. Overseas Chinese claim that the 
nationalistic fever they demonstrated is completely autonomous and cosmopolitan, 
since it is not orchestrated by the totalitarian Chinese regime. But the nationalis  fever 
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they ignited in China has surely been employed by the Chinese regime to justify its 
legitimacy and fend off criticism. Moreover, their cosmopolitanism with Chineseness 
cannot be achieved without their geopolitical dislocation from China. Nevertheless, 
“spatial freedom and movements we associate with diasporas and market-driven 
mobilities are no guarantees of the spread of human rights” (Ong, 2006b, p. 242). 
Exempted from the power of the Chinese nation-state that forces the Chinese masses 
to give up their political life and invest in caring their biological life, overseas 
Chinese tend to ignore a fact that the economic development in China coexists with 
severe social inequities. When they used the Internet to denote cosmopolitanism with 
Chineseness on both local and global level, the 0.8 billion mainland Chinese who do 
not have access to the Internet were silenced. As a Chinese Internet user in the US 
lamented, “When we overseas Chinese confront Western media’s distortion of China, 
we simply dismiss injustice and inequalities in China.”  
In addition, the cosmopolitanism with Chineseness that overseas Chinese 
express in cyberspace is overarched by a particular version of historical memory of 
China – namely the semi-colonial past of China. The collective memory of China’s 
humiliating past is embraced and reworked to constitute “a specific moral 
interpretation of the past” (Unger & Chan, 2007, p. 133). Their memories of “having 
been materially deprived contributes to their moral discourse of having earned 
favored treatment in the present day” (Unger & Chan, 2007, p. 133). The type of 
moral economy is fully embodied through a poem “My friends, what do you want 
from us?” which has gained tremendous popularity in Chinese cyber communities 
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since the Olympic torch relay started.  
When we were called sick man of Asia, we were called the Yellow Peril.
When we are billed to be the next superpower, we are called the China Threat.  
When we were closed our doors, you smuggled opium to open markets. 
When we embrace free trade, you blame us for taking away your jobs.  
When we were falling apart, you marched in your troops and wanted your 
“fair share”… 
And piece by piece we put our nation together again, 
all of a sudden, “Free Tibet” you screamed, “it was an invasion!”… 
When we tried Communism, you hated us for being communists 
When we embrace Capitalism, you hate us for being capitalists…  
When we buy oil, you called that exploitation and genocide. 
When you fight for oil, you called that liberation…  
When we were silent, you said you want us to have free speech. 
When we were silent no more, you say we were brainwashed-xenophobics… 
Enough is enough, enough hypocrisy for this one world.  
We want One World, One Dream, and peace on Earth. 
This big blue Earth is big enough for all of us. 
 
Later, a video clip was composed based on this poem and widely circulated in and out 
of China. Not only has it justified any conduct of the current Chinese regime in the 
name of maintaining China’s territorial integrity, it also uses the Western capitalistic 
imperialism to legitimatize China’s active participation in global capitalist 
exploitation (Wang, 2003). Juxtaposing China with the West, particularly on how to 
acquire crude oil, the author deliberately portrays a passive, innocent and victimized 
China, plea for its “One World, One Dream” Olympic ideal. Through playing 
“discrepant cosmopolitanism” (Clifford, 1992), overseas Chinese tend to disguise 
China’s “success at climbing the competitive hierarchy of international division of 
labor and maintaining its position there” (Cheah, 2006b, p. 495). Therefore, rather 
than deconstructing the Chinese nation-state, overseas Chinese serve to extend th  
power of the nation-state and contribute to “the ethnicization and racialization of 
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politics globally” (Dirlik, 2004, p. 500).  
CODA 
  Briefly contextualizing the boycott of the Beijing Games and tracing the 
whole trajectory of the anti-boycott of the Games from virtual to social reality, I 
suggest that both versions of cosmopolitanisms represent a global/local power 
conjuncture rather than a manifestation of transcendental humanitarian ideals. On the 
one hand, the worldwide boycott is not an interest-free cosmopolitan social movement 
(Beck, 2000 & 2002; Cheah, 1997& 2006). On the other hand, the anti-boycott 
manifests a desire of Chinese disaporic communities to project their cosmopolitanism 
with Chineseness (Rofel, 2007). “Cosmopolitanism is constituted differently, and thus 
through exclusions that return to haunt its politics” (Rofel, 2007, p. 113). Therefore, 
we should promote a critical cosmopolitanism – “an ethos of macro-independencies 
with an acute consciousness … of the inescapabilities and particularities of places, 
characters, historical trajectories and fate” (Rabinow, 1996, p. 56) – and examine how 
the cosmopolitan rhetoric is justified and sustained with concealed political and 
economic interests in and out of cyberspace.  
As a place where multiple cosmopolitanisms are staged and contested, 
cyberspace should be taken by sport sociologists and physical cultural scholars as a 
significant location for academic studies and political engagement (Wilson, 2006 & 
2007). We have witnessed how the Internet technology creates media miracles, but 
sends other information into exile. Even though some rumors or distorted information 
keep circulating in cyberspace, we can barely put them under constraint. Another 
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phenomenon I noticed in this cyber cosmopolitan politics is that the more emotionally 
appealing and generic the cyber articulations are; the more attention or resp ns s they 
received. For instance, the suggestion of establishing constructive dialogues betw en 
the East and the West, no matter by the Chinese or the Western Internet uses, wer  
often dismissed. Logical arguments and rational political engagement are of en 
discouraged in cyberspace for the limited attention that Internet users can give. For 
example on youtube.com, the discussions of video clips relevant to the boycott almost 
become an ideological battle between “commies” and “imperialists.” Thus, t e play of 
identities in cyberspace also distorts the political transparency, interrupts the political 
rationality, diminishes political investment (Benhabib, 1995; Dean, 2001), and 
reduces global political complexity to a dichotomous Black-or-White fallacy. These 
characteristics of cyber politics make cyberspace far from the ideal public sphere 
proposed by Habermas.  
The flaws of these cosmopolitan projects in this chapter raise a question 
regarding how to build cross-cultural communication in the virtual age for the 
common good, particularly through global sporting events. Therefore, we should be 
conscious of the historical trajectory of cosmopolitanism and how universalistic 
rhetoric has shaped our subjective consciousness and preconditioned the way we enter 
interpersonal politics in cyberspace.  
  The boycott of the Beijing Olympic Games has elicited similar cyber 
activism for boycotting the Vancouver and London Games for different political 
motives. It further urges us to develop cross-cultural languages and free our 
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personalized politics from the rigid structure of cosmopolitan rhetoric in both virtual 
and secular realities through global sporting events.  
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Chapter Nine: Afterword: Making China Cosmopolitan? 
  After the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games, many friends of mine in China 
updated their MSN Spaces. Some of them closely involved in preparation for the 
Games; others worked for various media agents. One of them works for the CCTV 
Olympic Channel (the sport channel), covering all gymnastics related sporting news. 
She documented her feelings during the Beijing Games in details.  
  Before the Games, she wrote:  
I went to the media center today. I think all the senior gymnastics reporters 
have to agree, this is the best we ever have. Best layout, best equipment, and 
best volunteers. The gym is beautiful. Such a beautiful gym should be used to 
witness triumph. I can’t wait any more… They (foreign reporters) will be 
shocked, and they will remember it.  
  During the Games, she wrote:  
I have worked with gymnastics for eight years. Today, I experienced the most 
exciting and emotional moment in my career. The first time, in China’s 
history, we won the Olympic (women’s) team gold! When they (Chinese 
female gymnasts) were on apparatuses, my hands were shaking, and my tears 
were pouring… From my angle, they are so tiny that I’m almost afraid that 
their supple bodies can’t bear the pressure. But, they delivered!  
When Cheng Fei (a world-class gymnast from China) concluded her floor 
exercise, the audience was exploding! In a gym that can accommodate 
thousands of audience, I couldn’t find any vacant seat. Red flags were 
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waving in front of my eyes… I want to say “thank you” to everyone, the 
gymnasts and the audience. Thank you for doing this for China… Thank you 
for doing this for me.  
After the Games, she wrote:  
After the closing ceremony, I left the Bird’s Nest. Watching the fireworks, I 
couldn’t help myself from screaming. Yes, I behaved like a kid, screaming 
with tons of people surrounding me. I still can’t believe the Games is over. I 
was so much occupied by it, as if my life is all about the Games. Walking 
towards the Metro, I asked my friends whether they feel nostalgic. “Surely 
do!” they told me.  
In the past weeks, I sensed another side of me – emotional and hysterical. I 
sometimes doubted the mineral water I drank was actually energy drink. The 
self was no longer the small self I was familiar with. It has been enlarged by 
millions of times. Like a hot balloon. The feeling was fantastic but certainly 
had some side-effects. Now, I feel extremely exhausted… 
Her self-narrative was very representative, not only for Chinese people who 
experienced the Games in Beijing but also for many who watched the Games via TV 
and internet. During the Games, a new record was made in the Unknown Space. Four 
months after the record set by San Francisco board on April 9th 2008, when overseas 
Chinese organized Pro-China/Pro-Olympic demonstrations, the Olympic Games 
became the most popular board, and set a new record with 3867 users visiting the 
board at the same time. Inside and outside of China, the Beijing Games truly become 
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a thread waving in people’s life and bonding them together.  
For me, the feeling attached to the Games is much heavier and more 
complicated than nostalgia. By tracing the Beijing Games, I kept having new 
understandings of the city, the nation, the peoples and myself. It often confuses me 
whether I was discovering a new side of me or the subjective self I was familiar with 
has been changed during the process of exploration.  
Widely known, the Beijing Olympic Games were used by the Chinese state to 
justify its authority and reinforce its prominent position in the global world. However, 
the Games is not just a means for the state to reach its ends. In my dissertation, I h ve 
shown that the Beijing Olympic Games has become a venue through which Chinese 
people develop cosmopolitan consciousness, project their desires and fulfill 
self-interests. In the meantime, the Beijing Games also became a site where new 
East-West dichotomy is constructed in a global context. The Beijing Games that the 
state, the peoples and the West have tied together from intellectual debates, public 
protests, identity struggles, and musical expression manifests itself as a global 
conjuncture.  
The discourse of protecting the Old Beijing promoted architectural 
Chineseness, while the subjectivities of the advocates were indeed heavily mediated 
by the West. Those foreign visitors who have recognized the value of the Old Beijing 
debated and negotiated how to protect the city for the interests of tourists and the 
residents. They actually contributed to the dramatic change occurring in the city. New 
comers of the city learned how to possess ownership of the city through housing 
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consumption. As a counter-force, old Beijingers adopted strategies to make urb n 
subjectivity exclusively for them by constructing a certain version of history. F lk 
song Jasmine was constantly chosen by the state to embody Chineseness on global 
stage to imply a twisted nationalistic sentiment. Athletes with disabilties alleged their 
identification with athletes rather than people with disabilities. Oversea Chinese 
protected the Olympic torch for China and insisted to host an Olympic Games only 
for Chinese in the world. Each of these allegorical images, with disparate quality, 
demonstrates the tension between the West, the Chinese state, and the peoples. By 
participating in the power conjuncture of the Beijing Olympic Games, they were 
brought together and became a cultural entity.  
Forming a cultural entity called the Beijing Games does not prevent them from 
facing ambivalence. For Chinese people, the Beijing Games brought them a 
compelling and ambivalent challenge: what it means to be Chinese in this global 
world, and where they should position China in this global system? Globalization is 
an ongoing process of fraught cultural encounters that are inherently unstable. Only 
by tracing the historical contingency and mapping the on-going dynamics of these 
encounters can we possibly interpret the paradoxes presented by these allegorical 
images. Throughout the process of interpreting these allegorical images, I not only 
engaged critiques of neoliberalism and nationalism, but also scrutinized various 
identity projects shaped by the on-going globalization. In the pre-Olympic Games 
times, what are the meanings and practices of being a cosmopolitan Chinese in this 
global world? It was the question I try to explore by having dialogues with others, and 
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the question I constantly asked myself. It seems the Beijing Games has offered an 
answer.  
…… 
By the end of year 2008, many of my Chinese friends added a blog entry 
called “My 2008.” Similar writings, reviewing the eventful 2008 and looking forward 
to 2009, prevailed on the internet. Regardless lengths, genres and contents, most 
writings addressed following events: Tibet riot in March, the Olympic torch relay in 
April, Sichuan earthquake in May, the military conflicts between Russia and Georgia, 
the Beijing Game in August, poisonous infant formula in September, and financial 
crisis in October. Taking a deeper look, it is not a writing about one’s personal 
experience but one’s subjective interpretation or recording of the turbulent contexts. 
As the peoples, they sometimes are no longer just being a counter-force or resistanc  
against the state or the West as subalterns. For instance, the Chinese state used th
Beijing Olympic Games to reinforce its state sovereignty; its people, however, use the 
Games to acquire global subjectivities. Sometimes, the people form alliance with the 
state or the West; other times, they are involved in the power negotiations and give up 
their self-interest involuntarily.  
In their blogs, they wrote about themselves as if they totally ignored the 
tension between the state, the West and themselves. They are writing as if they are 
China; they are writing as if they are the world. Although they are limited by their 
context and confined by various power-constructed identities, they still can form 
cosmopolitan imagination. This type of transcendence could be a sign of hope for a 
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cosmopolitan community to come into being.  
Does this type of emerging cosmopolitan subjectivity indicate a political 
possibility anticipated by Sassen (1995) that the People/peoples eventually adopt 
global economic and political citizenship built upon transnational political institutions 
and economic agencies? I would say, probably not. Does it anticipate that peoples can 
finally escape various traps and confines of identity politics by going beyond various 
constructed differences and embracing cosmopolitanism? It is possible that this 
question will be resolved in practice before it is resolved in theory. Will the 
cosmopolitan subjectivities lead China toward its proper place in a globalized world 
(Rofel, 2007)? Maybe.  
I want to borrow a verse from Gu Cheng to conclude my dissertation: Dark 
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